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At the outbreak of the Civil War the Federal military
arrested certain people whose loyalty was suspect.

One

victim, John Merryman, attempted to free himself by
petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus.

However, President

Lincoln authorized the military to suspend the writ in such
cases.

The matter came before Chief Justice Taney who

disputed the president's authority to suspend the writ and
ruled in Merryman's favor.

This thesis recounts the

history of the habeas corpus process in Anglo-American law and
its inclusion in the Constitution, Merryman's role in the
first hostilities, his arrest, and the attempt to free him.
Also discussed are associated topics and events, the
positions of the president and the chief justice in their
conflict over the matter, and the implications of this
constitutional crisis.
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INTRODUCTION
Next to denying life itself, denying personal physical
freedom is the most severe sanction that one man can impose
on another.

When instigated secretly, without public

knowledge, incarceration is even worse.

Alone, at the mercy

of a superior and hostile force, the captive has no recourse
and no future but despair.
Man's lamentable history of inhumanity to man abounds
with episodes of people seized and sequestered at the whim
of those possessed of greater power.

Fortunately man's

proclivity to be inhumane toward his fellows in this manner
is exceeded by his innate determination to avoid such
suffering himself.

Consequently, when free men of reason

gather together to form reasonable governments, concern for
the inviolability of the physical person is always a high
priority. 1 Unless the individual is secure in his person
from improper physical restraints by his government "all
other rights are devoid of practical meaning.

112

1

Robert S. Walker, The Constitutional and Legal
Development of Habeas Corpus as the Writ of Liberty,
Oklahoma State University Publication, vol. 57, no. 9
(Stillwater, Okla.: Oklahoma State University, 1960), p. 5.
2

Bernard Schwartz, A Commentary on the Constitution
of the United States: Part III Right of the Person, 2 vols.
(New York: Macmillan Co., 1968), 1:11.
1

2

The Anglo-American tradition of pressing for rights
of personal freedom has resulted in concrete legal standards
and procedures.

Prominent among these is the writ of habeas

corpus which provides a process by which the regularity of
an incarceration may be tested.

The enduring significance

of the writ is that it checks any tendency the government
may have toward arbitrary imprisonment.
Habeas corpus unavoidably results in friction between
the executive and the judiciary.

Arrest and incarceration are

accomplished by the executive arm of government while the
habeas corpus process is administered by the judiciary.
Sometimes opposing intentions in carrying out their respective
functions can bring these two into conflict when one wants to
hold a man and the other seeks to free him.

In such cases it

is absolutely necessary that the judiciary be bold and
independent and steadfastly implement the habeas corpus
process with vigor.

There can be no exceptions.

Unprotested,

an unjust fate for any individual threatens the liberty of
all.

As Blackstone said, "if once it were left to the

powers of any . . . to impress arbitrarily whomever he .
thought proper . . . there would be an end of all other
3
rights and immunities."
The people of the United States wisely blessed
themselves with a government of delegated and limited

3

Henry Blackstone, Blackstone's Commentaries, ed.
St. George Tucker, 5 vols. (Philadelphia: William Young
Birds & Abraham Small, 1803), 1:135.

3

powers, an especially limited executive, an independent
judiciary, and a writ of habeas corpus in their Constitution
of 1787.

Theoretically, an individual living under this

system should be relatively immune from arbitrary
imprisonment.

Unfortunately, that has not always proven to

be the case.
The people of the states that ratified the Constitution were farmers who would have fallen down on their
pitchforks if they had known what would become of the
governmental system they instituted.

The power of the

executive paramount in Medieval times, restrained by their
efforts, has arisen like a phoenix to challenge for
preeminence again.

Society's continued exaltation of the

desideratum of efficiency made it inevitable that the
relative efficiency of the executive would allow it to
ignore various comparably inefficient legal and constitutional processes including habeas corpus--if only on
occasion in the beginning.

Given this attitude and the

right set of circumstances it was inevitable that even in
the United States people would be arrested and confined
arbitrarily by their government.

CHAPTER I
27 APRIL 1861: THE PRESIDENT'S ACTION
Shortly after the election of 1860 the federal union
over which Abraham Lincoln had been constitutionally chosen
to preside began disintegrating.

One after another, like

so many falling dominoes, the states of the South had been
led out of the Union and into rebellion by Southern fireeaters.

Firm believers in the "right of secession,"

these hard line Southern rights advocates had promised
themselves they would resort to the extreme politics of
secession if Lincoln won the presidency.

1

Adverse public

reaction to Lincoln's victory at the polls provided the
necessary impetus to finally overcome diminishing national
loyalty in South Carolina.

On 20 December 1860 by unanimous

vote a special "Convention of the People of South Carolina"
made secession, which previously had been only an old threat,
.

t h e new rea 1 1ty.

2

1

John G. Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A
History, 10 vols. (New York: Century Co., 1904), 2:306-314.
2

Ralph A. Wooster, The Secession Conventions of the
South (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1962),
pp. 11-25.

4

5

The secession of South Carolina initiated an evolving
crisis that soon developed into something without precedent
in the political history of the young American republic.
Every time another state followed South Carolina's lead
the crisis compounded itself.

The loss of each successive

state was a tragedy for the Union, but Virginia's defection
seemed the harbinger of total disaster.

If neighboring

Maryland had gone it would have left the national capital
in a catastrophic position isolated in hostile territory.

3

Beginning with his inaugural address Lincoln's
response had been measured.

Nevertheless, the situation

continued to deteriorate until hostilities finally broke
out in the middle of April.

The shelling of Fort Sumter

awakened the nation to the hard reality of the rebellion and
inured Lincoln toward taking drastic, even radical steps
toward quashing the South and restoring the Union.

As one

measure Lincoln seriously considered suspending the writ
of habeas corpus.

In an April twenty-fifth memo he

advanced the possibility of suspending the privileges of the
writ along with bombarding the cities of Maryland if that
state's legislature then assembling in extraordinary session

3william C. Wright, The Secession Movement in the
Middle Atlantic States (Cranbury, N. J.: Fairleigh Dickinson
University Press, 1973), p. 54 note 11.

6

should vote to "arm the people . . . against the United
States."

4

Two days later on 27 April 1861 without waiting for
any such cataclysmic development, the new president made
the bold move that he had been contemplating.

Apprising

General-of-the-Army Winfield Scott that "you are engaged in
repressing insurrection against the laws of the United
State," by executive order Lincoln "authorized" Scott
personally or through his subordinate officers "to suspend
that writ" wherever sufficient resistance was encountered
to render it necessary for preserving the public safety.

5

This meant that the United States Army under the
auspices and with the permission of its commander-in-chief
could take into custody any citizen whom it perceived to be
an enemy of the nation.

With the privilege of the writ of

habeas corpus suspended, the government would not need to
allow any open inquiry into anyone's alleged disloyalty, nor
would it be required to prefer formal charges.

Those

unfortunate enough to be seized would have no meaningful
legal recourse.

There would be little chance to seek redress

and none to appeal one's fate.

In theory people could be

held indefinitely, for as long as it served their president's
pleasure.
4

A. Lincoln to W. Scott
Lincoln, The Collected Works of
Basler, 8 vols. (New Brunswick,
Press, 1953), 4:344.
5
A. Lincoln to W. Scott
Collected Works, 4:347.

25 April 1861, Abraham
Abraham Lincoln, ed. Roy P.
N. J.: Rutgers University
27 April 1861, Lincoln,

7

It was only a matter of time until the first
prisoners would be taken and inevitable that a court case
would be made challenging the president's action.

It would

then be up to the judiciary to render its opinion as to who
could suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
But for the moment it was more than enouqh that for the
first time in the history of the United States of America
under the Constitution certain citizens were to be denied
by their president what has since been praised as the
"greatest of all muniment of Anglo-American liberty 116 and
analogized as the "shield of personal freedom. 117

The

Federal government was suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus just as the Constitution itself anticipated
might someday be felt necessary to do.

6

Edwin S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers
1787-1957 (New York: New York University Press, 1957), p. 144.
7

Schwartz, Commentary on the Constitution, 1:23.

CHAPTER II
THE HABEAS CORPUS PROCESS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW
Modern habeas corpus is a legal process whereby the
validity of the confinement of a person is examined.

This

involves the suing out of a formal writ of habeas corpus.

A

writ is any order issued in writing by a judicial authority
commanding the person to whom it is addressed to perform
or refrain from performing an act specified therein.

The

writ of habeas corpus is directed towards a person who is
detaining another for the purpose of testing in open court
that person's right to hold his prisoner.

Issued pursuant

to a petition, it can win immediate release from confinement
for one held without sufficient cause.

The writ commands

its recipient to appear in court at a specific time, to
produce the prisoner in question, to make known the day
and cause of the prisoner's detention, and to submit to the
court's judgment in the matter.

The inquiry process of the

writ does not decide the guilt or innocence of the prisoner
of any charge, but only determines if further restraint of his
liberty is possible within the law.
prisoner must be released.

If it is not, the

Significantly,the burden of

8

9

proof lies with the detainer.

1

The cardinal principle

behind the habeas corpus process is "that in a civilized
society, government must always be accountable to the
judiciary for a man's imprisonment."

2

The term "habeas corpus" and the legal process to
which it is applied have long been part of Anglo-American
jurisprudence.

They are of such great age that their

ultimate origin in the law may be irretrievably lost in
antiquity.

Nevertheless, undaunted by scant evidence, one

nineteenth century legal commentator has attempted, with
debatable success, to trace them farther back in time than
anyone else to a Norman process and beyond, even more
remotely, to a Roman praetorian interdict.

3

A more innovative approach, one similarly supported
by relatively little empirical evidence, has been taken by a
contemporary authority who after researching the matter
demurs on recognizing such specific ancestral instruments.

1

corpus Jurus Secundum, 101 vols. (Brooklyn: American
Law Book Co., 1936 and updates), 39:424; Henry Campbell
Black, ed., Black's Law Dictionary (St. Paul, Minn.: West
Publishing Co., 1951), p. 837; Ronald P. Sokol, A Handbook
of Federal Habeas Corpus (Charlottesville, Va.: Michie Co.,
1965), pp. 2-5.
2
3

Fay vs. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 1963 at 421.

Patrick MacChombaich de Colquhoun, A Summary of the
Roman Civil Law, 4 vols. (London: William Benning & Co.,
1856-1860), 3:551; William S. Church, A Treatise on the Writ
of Habeas Corpus (San Francisco: Bancroft-Whitney Co.,
1886), pp. 2-3.

10
Instead, taking a semanticist's tack, he searches for the
genesis of habeas corpus in the structure of the legal
language itself.

Literally translated from the Latin the

words "habeas corpus" mean "have the body."

Cast in the

imperative voice and enunciated by a court it is quite
conceivable that natural usage of the phrase could with
time have evolved into a discrete process whereby individuals
were commanded to present themselves before a judicial
authority.

In the earliest recorded case of this, one

dating from 1199, a party was commanded to 'have' another
appear before the court at Westminster.

Sufficient

instances have been documented of similar use of habeas
corpus during the ensuing century to indicate that soon
there was nothing nbvel or unusual about this.

Indeed, it

would appear that within a few years after it was first
utilized in this manner habeas corpus became a discrete
process.

Thus the phrase which was once, perhaps originally,

the term applied to a command process (indeed it was the
language of the command itself) became the name applied to
the process through which the court sought the presence of
parties essential to the conclusion of legal proceedings.
According to this interpretation habeas corpus was originally
"

. a kind of forcible summons. 114

4

Walker, Constitutional and Legal Development,
pp. 12-13.

11

Even at this primal stage of its evolutionary
development habeas corpus had acquired two basal characteristics, both of which yet remain fundamental to it.

First,

habeas corpus was a mesne process, as distinguished from an
original or final process.

A mesne process, as the name

implies, is any process or writ issued or entered into after
the commencement of a legal action but before the suing out
of execution.

It is a process of recourse.

Habeas corpus

was a process resorted to when the primary process failed
to yield the desired results.

For instance:

When a simple

summons failed to produce the desired party before a court,
habeas corpus could be tried.
process of resort.

It was then, as now, a

Secondly, habeas corpus was consociated

with the liberty of the individual.

Despite being made by

underlying means, this wholesome connection was nonetheless
crucial to the development of habeas corpus and the entire
concept of individual justice and personal liberty essential
to English jurisprudence.

Early on the English realized

that no man was secure if legal proceedings affecting any
man could be instituted and terminated in absentia.
Extending the summoning power of a process such as habeas
corpus was a logical means of securing adequate representation in court for contending interests.

Obviously without

such representation, whether made possible by habeas
corpus or some other means, justice for the individual

12
was less likely and every pretext of liberty, in turn, a
sham.

5

Although this rudimentary habeas corpus had its
redeeming features, the use to which it was being put at
this point in time was somewhat removed from the primary
purpose for which it has been employed more recently, that
of testing the warrant or regularity of the imprisonment.
However, in the interim developments occurred in habeas
corpus law that led inextricably in that direction.

Over a

number of years its summoning powers steadily increased in
raw strength as well as range of application.

Once able

only to summon the principals in a legal dispute, it later
came to be used to call parties not directly involved but
whose presence was desirable in order to aid the court in
arriving at a judgment.

Soon thereafter the summoning

power was again enlarged upon when judges began using habeas
corpus to gather juries.

It was in increments such as

these that habeas corpus eventually came to acquire its
ultimate and more familiar role in the law.

6

In 1215 there occurred a development in habeas
corpus law, an advance at once both illusory and concrete,

5
6

Ibid., pp. 15-16; Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1367.

walker, Constitutional and Legal Development,
pp. 14-15.

13
that would in time prove to have been momentous:

King John

met the barons at Runnymede, a pleasant meadow by the
Thames.

There on the green bank beside the winding river

where rushes grew in the clear water, he "smilingly though
reluctantly" signed the Magna Carta.

In its thirty-ninth

chapter that document specifically guaranteed that no man
could be imprisoned "unless by the lawful judgment of his
peers or the law of the land."

This implied, if it did not

actually inspire, a process for reviewing arrests and
detentions such as habeas corpus became.

It was regrettable

but of no particular importance that King John almost
immediately broke the agreement.

Once signed, the Great

Charter has ever since provided Englishmen with a basis
for claiming plethora of rights and liberties, including
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. 7
Habeas corpus was first used to inquire into an
incarceration early in the fourteenth century.

This

innovation begged new, clarifying terminology that would
reflect the expansion of power and application.

Thus the

phrase habeas corpus cum causa came into being.

An early

and particularly illustrative instance of just such an
application occurred in 1341 when Chancery directed via a
writ of habeas corpus cum causa that a prisoner be produced

7

church, A Treatise, p. 3; Magna Carta, chap. 39.

14

before the judges because based on the man's retention it
appeared as though he ought not to have been incarcerated.
To comply, the respondent had to have the body of his
prisoner (habeas corpus) with the reason for the man's
confinement (cum causa) before the judges' court at the
8
.
d h our f or t h eir
.
appointe
cons1'd era t·ion.

Exactly why a

new form of habeas corpus was devised to meet this need
can only be speculated upon.

Obviously it involved a

logical extension of the ever expanding summoning power of
habeas corpus.

What is certain is that this habeas corpus

was the immediate antecedent of the modern writ of
liberty.
For years thereafter in England the writ provided
relief from unjustifiable confinement for many individuals,
but only in instances where one subject held another, that
is in cases of private restraint, those not involving the
sovereign.

Not until the reign of Henry VII was habeas

corpus first successfully applied in a contest between a
subject and the Crown.

Unquestionably, this was the single

most significant development in the evolution of habeas
corpus as the writ of liberty.

All previous pale in

comparison; all subsequent have been mere procedural refinements.

One astute, if somewhat parochial, legal mind

eschewed all consideration of the history of habeas corpus

8

Walker, Constitutional and Legal Development, p. 18.

15
prior to this watershed, feeling such to be a subject fit
only for antiquarians whose ruminations regarding this
"cannot materially assist a constitutional lawyer."

9

Unfortunately the efficacy of the writ of habeas
corpus subsequently declined as a result of judicial
decisions prohibiting the seeking of relief via the writ in
cases where the commitment had been made by special command
of the King or Lords of the Privy Council, regardless of
the cause or absence of cause.

Continued abuses and evasions

of the remedy of habeas corpus once provided eventually led
to legislative action.

In a reform mood during the reign

of Charles II, Parliament passed the Habeas Corpus Act of
1679.

It recognized, regularized, and formally codified

habeas corpus as a means with which to seek relief in most
cases of questionable imprisonment.

This was a most praise-

worthy act, subsequent to which habeas corpus has become
'the most celebrated writ in the English law. 110
At about this same time the writ began coming into
its own in the England's North American colonies where
historically it had received relatively little consideration.
This occurred not because the colonials lacked concern about
individual security and personal liberty, but because

9

Rollin C. Hurd, A Treatise on the Right of Personal
Liberty and on Habeas Corpus (Albany, N. Y.: W. C. Little &
Co. , 18 5 8) , bk. 2: 4 5.
10

Corpus Jurus Secundum, 39:427.

16
previously the writ's process was hardly necessary.

The

colonials lived in close, intimate communities and this
affected the manner in which an accused criminal was
treated.

They were not usually incarcerated.

At the same

time, fleeing the law was a desperate measure because one's
possessions and property were readily available and liable
to attachment and a declaration of outlawry always loomed.
In short, the structure of society and the surety system
it employed made pre-trial imprisonment of the accused
largely unnecessary.

Even upon conviction jail sentences

were rarely imposed.

Judging from the record, colonial

authorities apparently preferred nearly any other sanction-fines, whippings, property settlements--to costly and
bothersome incarcerations.

Consequently, because denials

of personal freedom, either before or after trial, were
relatively rare events in the workings of the colonial
criminal justice system, little need for an instrument such
.
d . 11
as h a b eas corpus existe

This state of affairs did not long endure.

As has

been suggested, during the last half of the seventeenth
century the previously all but neglected habeas corpus
process began attracting unprecedented interest.

11

To a great

Robert S. Walker, The American Reception of the
Writ of Liberty, Oklahoma State University Political Science
Report, No. 1 (Sillwater, Okla.: Oklahoma State University,
1961), p. 6.

17

extent this happened because suddenly a number of people,
many quite prominent in their communities, were jailed by
their governments on questionable grounds and the habeas
corpus process offered the most expeditious and promising
means of relief.
Classically the disputes that led to these incarcerations were not between the people and their indigenous,
local government officials but involved an altogether
different level of government, the less familiar, imported
Crown appointed colonial officials, very often the Royal
Governor himself.

At this time the Crown was trying to

assert authority over the colonies.

Until the Restoration

the colonials had been allowed more-or-less to govern
themselves.

Too often they pursued a course that the Crown

found irritatingly independent.

But with the restoration

of Charles II, England's previously pressing domestic
problems no longer weighed as heavily, leaving time and
energy for establishing Crown administrative control over
the colonies.

New governors with new instructions and new

powers were sent out.

The resulting crackdown generated

predictable repercussions.

Resentment led to acts of

opposition and these led to jaii.
One example will suffice:
Tax Case.

12

12
the celebrated Ipswich

As part of his program to increase direct royal

Ibi'd., pp. 7 - 8 .

18

authority over the people in his jurisdiction, Massachusetts
colonial governor Sir Edmund Andros chose the classic method
of asserting power and control over people--taxation.

By

the whim of himself and his council the governor levied a
special tax on the towns of the colony.

Hearing of this,

the good people of Ipswich decided to ignore the requisition
because they doubted the authority of the governor and his
minions to assess the tax.

Aroused, the governor responded

by seizing the town's minister and five other prominent
citizens.
corpus.

They demanded and were denied a writ of habeas
At the ensuing trial the presiding judge informed

the defendents that they must not expect the laws of England
to follow them to the ends of the earth and informed them
that they had no more privileges remaining than not to be
sold as slaves.
a 'good verdict.'

Finally, he charged the jury with returning
They favored him.

The "Ipswich Six" were

· h ment. 13
f oun d gu1'lt y an d mete d a severe punis
This and other similar cases served to bring habeas
corpus out of musty law books into the courts and the
consciousness of thinking Americans.

The colonies were fast

leaving the time when more than a nodding acquaintance with
English law was a rarity.
with the law was beginning.

America's long time obsession
In the decades that followed

the habeas corpus process played an instrumental role in

13

Church, A Treatise, pp. 32-33.

19
some highly visible legal disputes not just in Massachusetts,
but in colonies as diverse as Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
New York, and New Jersey.

Clearly, when the time came that

they sorely needed the protection that only the habeas
corpus process could provide, the colonists were quick to
seize upon it and declare it theirs by birthright.

14

The concept of a legal legacy understandably appealed
to many concerned colonials.

15

Regardless of validity, any

claim to any legal right worked to their benefit if it
worked at all.

But there was more than just grasping at

straws and wishful thinking involved here.
basis in fact for the colonials' claim.

There was some

The charters of

nearly every colony guaranteed to every inhabitant and to
their progeny the traditional rights, liberties, and
immunities due any British subject.

Desiring to further

secure these benefits, the representative assemblies of
most colonies had early in their legislative histories
16
.
.
d upon d ec 1 ara t.ive ac t s con f 1rm1ng
·
·
1ns1ste
t h em.

Given a little thought the true nature of the
charter grants probably would have escaped none, not even
the most contentious colonist, although he might have been

14

15
16

1b1'd., pp. 32 - 35 .
Hurd, A Treatise, bk. 2:107.
Church, A Treatise, p. 31.

20
loath to admit it.

Despite the colonials' interpretation

of the grants notwithstanding (based as it was upon selfinterest) the truth of the matter was that the grants were
originally intended more to benefit the Crown than bless
the colonists.

The grants were just one part of an attempt

to help royal officials rule the colonies more efficiently by
establishing a more or less standard system of jurisprudence
modeled after the familiar British system.

In some cases the

system was imposed for the express purpose of supplanting the
old order (in New York the Dutch) .

17

But to the colonists,

primarily concerned as they were with their own self-interests,
the true inspiration for the grants was secondary, especially
since it did not benefit their cause.

To them all that

mattered was that the grants had been made.
Though made at different times for different reasons
the grants of rights in the various charters had one thing
in common.

All were expressed in vague, inexplicit language.

In none were specific rights and privileges enumerated.
This inevitably led to dispute.

Some felt that the charter

grants guaranteed extension to the colonists of the specific
benefits of the great liberty documents such as the Magna
Carta and the Habeas Corpus Act.

Others disagreed.

Addressing this point in his Annals, the learned Chalmers
looked back on this period and concluded that 'the colonials

17

walker, American Recption, p. 10.
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had a right to possess every immunity which Englishmen
within a distant and subordinate territory of the empire
could possibly enjoy.'

This included entitlement to

'personal security .

(and)

. to private property'

but excluded that 'of most importance of all . . .
personal liberty.•

18

That was not to come until later.

This then was the unhappy early history of habeas
corpus in North America:

It existed furtively, operated

ineffectively, and was recognized only occasionally.

The

checkered career of habeas corpus throughout the colonies
was exemplified in Massachusetts.
recognized that they had

The people of that colony

no specific guarantee in regard to

the availability of habeas corpus process, but they wanted
it very much.

In 1692, after considerable agitation, they

finally secured some access to its protection when their
assembly conferred the power of granting writs of habeas
corpus upon the justices of the superior court.

Their

victory and the career of habeas corpus under this law was
short lived.

Three years later a new royal governor (Lord

Bellamont) officially declared this act disallowed.

19

Once

again habeas corpus became the moot process in Massachusetts,
as it was throughout most of the colonies at that time.

18
19

church, A Treatise, p. 31.
Ibid., p. 33.
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This changed dramatically and permanently in 1711
when Queen Anne sent a bright young governor, Colonel
Alexander Spottswood, to Virginia.

Acting on the Queen's

instructions he issued a proclamation now regarded as
"America's first effective habeas corpus act."

20

Ever since,

with but a few notable exceptions, the fortunes of personal
liberty with regard to habeas corpus have been on the rise
in America.
During the remainder of the eighteenth century and
into the nineteenth the writ and its process became further
engrafted into the jurisprudence of the various colonies
(later states) both individually and as a group.

Four

colonies statutorily provided for the writ before the
22
.
21
Three followed suit after the war.
The
Revo 1 ution.
Northwest Ordinances, enacted under the Articles of
Confederation, promised the benefits of the writ in
perpe t ui' t y. 23

20

Six early state constitutions recognized the

walker, American Reception, p. 13.

21 ·
· ·
·
·
Virginia,
Nort h Caro 1 ina,
Sout h Caro 1 ina,
an d
Georgia. Ibid., p. 14.
22
23

.
k an d New Jersey.
Pennsy 1 vania,
New Yor,

Ibid.

Merrill Jensen, ed., The Documentary History of
the Ratification of the Constitution, vol. 1: Constitutional
Documents and Records 1776-1787 (Madison, Wis.: State
Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1976), p. 172.

23
writ.

24

Finally, in 1787 the writ achieved a new apex of

legitimacy and respect when it became the only common
law process to receive mention in the Constitution.

24

25

Massachusetts 1780, Connecticut 1818, Delaware
1792, Georgia 1777, New Hampshire 1784, and Pennsylvania
1790. Benjamin Perley Poore, comp., The Federal and State
Constitutions, Colonial Charters and Other Organic Laws of
the United States, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1877), 1:972, 259, 279, 234,
and 1307, and 2:1292, 1555.
25

U.S. Const. art. 1, sec. 9.

CHAPTER III
THE SUMMER OF 1787
The subject of habeas corpus was first brought before
the Constitutional Convention by delegate Charles Pinckney of
South Carolina.

On Tuesday 29 May 1787, the second full day

of business, he laid before the assembly a draft of his
design for a federal government.

Pinckney's constitution

was a hodgepodge of constitutional concepts gathered from a
variety of sources.

Many of these ultimately found a place

in the Convention's final document.

The sixth article of

this constitution dealt with the legislature, defining its
powers and their limits.

One of this article's last

clauses resembled a bill of rights such as was then common
in the constitutions of the confederated states.

It forbade

Congress to "grant any title of nobility . . . pass any
laws on the subject of religion . . . or abridging the
liberty of the press."

It also specifically prohibited them

to "ever'' suspend the "privilege of the writ of Habeas
Corpus . . . except in case of rebellion or invasion."
What, if anything, the other delegates thought of Pinckney's

24

25
proposal is not known because no response appears in the
record of the Convention.

1

The matter did not come before the Convention
again until later in the summer.

On August twentieth

Pinckney broached the subject for a second time.

Among a

series of proposals he submitted one provided that "the
privileges and benefits of the writ of Habeas Corpus . . .
be enjoyed

in the most expeditious and ample manner."

Suspension would be possible but only for a limited,
though unspecified, period of time.

On this point

Pinckney appeared willing to negotiate.

Significantly, the

license and responsibility for authorizing a suspension was
clearly granted solely to the legislative branch.

This

proposal was not original and the wording must have been
familiar to some of those present.

Except for the

vagueness about the time element and the elimination of a
few superfluous adjectives, Pinckney's second habeas
corpus proposal copied almost verbatim a provision in the
New Hampshire state constitution of 1784 which, in turn,
had been modeled after a provision in the Massachusetts
constitution of 1780.

Both Massachusetts and New Hampshire

allowed for suspensions of the writ, but each specifically
provided that the prerogative to exercise the power belonged

1

James Madison, Journal of the Federal Convention
(Freeport, N. Y.: Books for Library Press, 1970), p. 69.
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solely to the legislative branch.

Again the contemporary

. k ney. 2
record note d no response to Pinc

Eight days later the Convention considered an
article of a complete prototypal constitution prepared as a
report by its Committee on Detail.

The article dealt with

the judiciary but did not mention habeas corpus.

In the

course of the session several amendments were discussed
and acted upon.

During a pause between consideration of

this article's fourth and fifth sections the indefatigable
Mr. Pinckney rose once again to urge the propriety of
securing the benefit of habeas corpus in "the most ample
manner" exept on "the most urgent occasions when it might

2

New Hampshire 1784
Pinckney 1787
Massachusetts 1780
the
privilege
and
the
privileges and
THE privilege and
benefit
of the writ
benefit of the writ benefit of the writ
of
Habeas-Corpus
of
Habeas
Corpus
of habeas corpus
shall
be
enjoyed
shall
be
enjoyed
shall be enjoyed
in this Government
in this State
in this Commonin the most
wealth in the
in the most free,
expeditious
most free, easy,
easy, cheap,
expeditious, and
and
expeditious and
ample manner;
ample manner,
ample manner,
and shall not
and shall not
and shall not
be suspended
be suspended
be suspended
by the Legislature, by the Legislature, by the Legislature,
except upon the
except upon the
except upon the
most urgent and
most urgent and
most urgent and
pressing
pressing
pressing
occasions, and
occasions, and
occasions, and
for a limited
for a limited
for a limited
time not
time not
time not
exeeding twelve
exceeding three
exceeding
months.
months.
months.
Poore, Constitutions, 1:972 and 2:1292; Madison, Journal,
p. 559.

27

be suspended."

This time Pinckney suggested twelve months
3
as a definite time limit for any suspension.
Another South Carolina delegate, John Rutledge,
immediately gained the floor to declare his hope that the
new constitution would hold habeas corpus inviolable.

He

did not believe that any control over habeas corpus should
properly be included in the realm of the national government's activities as he was unable to conceive of a situation
where a suspension would be necessary in all the states
at once.

He hoped that the availability of habeas corpus

would remain solely a matter for the individual states
to decide.

Rutledge had been one of the committee of five

that had prepared the document then under consideration.
His swift reaction to Pinckney's proposal strongly suggests
that the omission of any mention of habeas corpus in the
prototypal constitution was intentional, and not any kind
. h t. 4
o f an overs1g

James Madison's notes provide the best record of the
Convention's proceedings, but at times they are vague to a
point that suggests imcompleteness.
occasion.

This was such an

Without any explanation Pinckney's third habeas

proposal, like the two that preceded it, was dropped.

3
4

Madison, Journal, pp. 449, 458, 618-619.
rbid., p. 619.
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Similarly Rutledge's remarks stimulated no recorded response
or acknowledgment.

Then just as suddenly Gouverneur Morris,

a prominent delegate representing Pennsylvania, offered a
motion providing that "the privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless where in cases of
rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it."
At this another delegate from Pennsylvania, James Wilson,
expressed his doubt that a suspension would be necessary
in any case as the judges already had the prerogative to
keep prisoners in jail or admit them to bail.

That was it.

According to Madison no further comments were made before
a roll call vote of the states was taken.

The first clause

of Morris' motion ("The privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended . . . ") passed unanimously
and the remainder ( . . . unless where, in cases of
rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.")
by a split vote.

This done, the Convention returned its

attention to the previous business.

5

Winning the Convention's approval virtually
guaranteed the Morris authored habeas corpus provision a
place in the final draft of the Convention's new constitution.
As was the case with all items approved on the convention
floor, it was referred to the "Committee on Style."

On

29
September eleventh this group distributed copies of their
version of a complete constitution.

The committee had

slightly altered the habeas corpus provision by substituting
the conjunction "when" for "where" and eliminating a couple
of commas.

More significantly, they changed the placement

of the habeas corpus clause within the document by removing
it from the judicial article and placing it instead in the
ninth section of the first, or legislative article.

So it

was that one of the eight specific prohibitions and
limitations the Constitution places on Congress became
that "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion
the public safety may require it. 116

This is how the

Constitution read when the Convention adopted it and when
the states ratified it making it the supreme law of the land.

6

rbid., p. 706.

CHAPTER IV
AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE HABEAS CORPUS CLAUSE
So diverse was the division of opinion with regard
to habeas corpus among the commentators of this day that one
antebellum attorney general of the United States concluded
in frustration that they were all 'at sea.'

1

Certainly

there is no disputing the clause's potential to confuse
even the knowledgeable.

Standing alone the habeas corpus

clause might seem the epitome of vagueness.

Indeed, the

case has been made that its originator intended just that.

2

But understanding the clause need not necessarily be trying.
Read with a mindfulness of its context in the Constitution
as a whole, and an awareness of the thought and discussion
that went into the forging of that document, neither the
meaning nor the import of the clause is ambiguous.
Despite the peculiar circumstance that it won
approval during a convention session devoted to consideration
of the judicial article, there should be no disputing that
the framers addressed the habeas corpus clause not to the
1

John H. Hatcher, "Martial Law and Habeas Corpus,"
West Virginia Law Quarterly and the Bar 46 (April 1940) :188.
2

sydney George Fisher, "The Suspension of Habeas
Corpus During the War of the Rebellio~" Political Science
Quarterly 3 (1888):472.
30
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judicial branch but to the legislative branch of government.
Without exception or objection every habeas corpus proposal
made prior to passage of the clause put forth by Morris
explicitly named the legislature as the body to be entrusted
with administering the suspending mechanism.

Nothing in the

record of the Convention positively suggests that this ever
changed.

In placing the clause under the legislative

article the Committee on Style did not exercise some
peculiar will of its own, but clarified and expressed the
collective will of the Convention.
That Congress received no mention by name in the
habeas corpus clause has no bearing and is not especially
extraordinary when context is considered.

The clause is

the second of eight prohibitions and limitations placed on
Congress that together comprise the ninth section of the
legislative article.

Among these provisions Congress received

mention by name in only two, the first and the last.
who would question that a clause stating:

Yet

"No bill of

attainder, or ex post facto law, shall be passed"

3

(which

follows the habeas corpus clause and which does not mention
Congress by name either) could be addressed to any organ of
the general government but Congress?

Thus, to impute

any control over the suspension of habeas corpus to the
judiciary or the executive rather than Congress would be as

3

U.S. Const. art. 1, sec. 9.
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fallacious as to suggest either of these branches of the
government could on their own conceive and bring into effect
a law, ex post factor or otherwise.
That the habeas corpus clause expresses a negative
should not be misunderstood.

It might seem that of itself

the outwardly prohibiting clause must vest Congress with
the power to control access to the writ of habeas corpus
by implication.

This would seem to follow logically from

two circumstances:

one, that the clause does not

affirmatively provide for the writ itself and, two, that
the words "habeas corpus" appear nowhere else in the
Constitution.

However, this notion is demonstrably wrong.

The powers granted to Congress were broad, but they were
not general.

In the strictest sense Congress had only

those powers enumerated in the Constitution.

According to

this interpretation there were no implied powers.

In any

event, in the case of habeas corpus no implication was
required because the Constitution did positively provide
for the writ, though, admittedly, in a somewhat orphic
way.

Not just once but twice the Constitution vested

Congress with the power to create and regulate the
federal courts.

4

It is in pursuit of this charge that

Congress regulates the availability of the writ of habeas

4

Ibid. , art. 1, sec. 8 and art. 3, sec. 1.
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as it does that of all legal writs and processes of the
federal court system.

5

From the record of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Convention comes further support for the
proposition that the habeas corpus clause is not the
constitutional source of being for the writ but rather that
the clause is only a qualifier on other constitutional
provisions that are the true fountainhead of the writ.

As

a group its delegates deserve credit for striving and
largely succeeding in creating a well organized and
relatively neat instrument of government, one admittedly
rich in ambiguity due to reticence, but blessedly lacking in
the redundant and the superfluous.
Accomplishing this was not always an easy task
because some delegates would have blissfully cluttered the
document with all sorts of irrelevant law.

For example,

once a delegate suggested 'that the liberty of the press
should be inviolably observed.'

But the proposal failed

when another delegate pointed out that such protection was
unnecessary as Congress could not threaten the press

5

The first session of the first Congress exercised
this power by passing the Judiciary Act of 1789. The act's
fourteenth section provided that "the courts of the United
States shall have power to issue writs of scire facias,
habeas corpus and all other writs . . . which may be
necessary." U.S. Statutes at Large, 1:81.
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because their enumerated powers did not include any
reference to regulation of the press.

6

In rejecting this motion the Convention demonstrated
a capacity to recognize the irrelevant.

If control over

habeas corpus had not been elsewhere granted in the
Constitution, then regulation of its suspension would have
been irrelevant in the same way as protecting the press
from Congress was unnecessary.

But the habeas corpus clause

had relevance because it related to other clauses that
granted Congress control over all writs, including the
writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to its power to "constitute
. . . ordain and establish" a federal court system.

7

Except for the habeas corpus provision Congress could do
with the writ as it pleased, when it pleased.

But because of

this clause a most desirable and definite restraint prevented
it from acting capriciously, thereby preserving the protection the writ provides except only in the most unusually
exigent circumstances of "rebellion or invasion" when it can
be suspended if "the public safety may require it." 8

6

Madison, Journal, p. 728; Arthur Taylor Prescott,
Drafting the Constitution: A Rearrangement of Madison's Notes
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), p. 740.
7

8

U.S. Const. art. 1, sec. 8 and art. 3, sec. 1.
Ibid. , art. 1, sec. 9.
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A valuable insight into what the habeas corpus
clause and its positioning within the Constitution means
can be gained by considering the following hypothetical
situation.

Suppose that the clause simply did not exist.

Would there then be any constitutional power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?

If so, where would

it lie?
One of the first men to reflect on these questions was a
delegate to one of the state ratifying conventions and he
concluded that the power would exist, that it would lie with
Congress, and that it would be unlimited.
found the prospect a bit chilling.

He, incidentally,

9

Fortunately so did the men of the Constitutional
Convention.

The constitution they proposed would empower

the national legislature (Congress) to "constitute .
ordain and establish" a system of federal courts and
consequent to this alone that body could provide for the
writ of habeas corpus, as they could any writ, in any manner
they pleased.

But the constitution writers also included

the habeas corpus clause, the wording of which was entirely
restrictive and contained no grant of power.

The clause did

not grant Congress the power to suspend habeas corpus

9

Jonathan Elliott, ed., The Debates in the Several
State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution,
5 vols. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1941), 3:449.
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because it already had that, but it did limit the exercise
of that power to express circumstances, namely invasion
and rebellion.

10

The men who spent the summer of 1787 in Philadelphia
becoming the collaborating authors of the Constitution had
some understanding of the habeas corpus clause based on their
discussions during the Convention, but others, most
especially the delegates to ratifying conventions of the
various states without whose stamp of approval the
Constitution would never have gone into effect, had to be
educated to an understanding.

In many ways these men were

a cautious, skeptical lot; suspicious of the consolidation
inherent in the proposed federal system and jealously
protective of the liberties they enjoyed as citizens of the
independent confederated states.

Typically they listened

to propaganda like Alexander Hamilton's facile observation
that the habeas corpus clause was among the most important
human rights provision in the new Constitution

11

(in fact,

it was practially the only) then sided with men of Patrick
Henry's ilk in demanding a bill of rights. 12

Preferring

lOFisher, The Suspension, p. 466.
11

Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay,
The Federalist on the New Constitution (Hallowell:
Masters, Smith & Co., 1857), p. 393.
12

Elli'ott, Db
ea t es, 3 : 461 .
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substance and understanding to assumption, these men naturally
examined the proposed constitution carefully.
the habeas corpus clause.

This included

The responses made to the questions

of these men, responses that largely assuaged their concerns,
help further illuminate and clarify the intent of the habeas
corpus clause.
In Massachusetts they inquired as to the difference
in wording between the proposed federal constitution's
habeas corpus clause and those in the constitutions of the
various states, most especially their own.
the obvious reply:

They received

that the provisions differed because

different men wrote them.

With all seriousness the

proponents of the Constitution explained that the habeas
corpus clause, although obviously different and markedly
shorter in length, provided significantly more protection
than another more wordy rendition might afford.
To its advocates the single sentence of the habeas
corpus clause sufficed and they offered no apology for its
brevity.

They insisted it provided greater protection for

the writ than even the highly regarded model habeas corpus
provision in the constitution of the state of Massachusetts
itself.

In that commonwealth the legislature could suspend

habeas corpus privileges as often as it cared, for as long
as a year, for any reason it deemed sufficiently "urgent
and pressing."

By comparison the Philadelphia constitution,

if ratified, would allow suspension of the privilege of the
writ only in the specific and extraordinary circumstances.

38

of "rebellion or invasion."

In that it would more strictly

limit conditions for a suspension of the writ's process,
the proposed federal constitution was praised as being a
superior protector of the individual's liberty.

Its

original phraseology contained no implications and its
brevity indicated a succinctness of expression, merely
an economy of words, not an abridgement of protection or
liberty.

13
Before the Virginia ratifying convention Patrick

Henry spoke of the habeas corpus clause in one installment
of his continued discourse opposing adoption of the
Philadelphia constitution.

In making his argument this

calculating and capable debater blatantly misconstrued both
the habeas corpus clause and the doctrine of reserved
rights.
Henry represented a faction that feared that
constitution would vest too much power in a remote central
government at the expense of state sovereignty and individual
liberty.

The powers proposed for Congress in particular

were too broad and unfettered for his tastes.

As Henry

viewed it the only protection for the individual from
potential tyrannic rule by Congress were the seven clauses
that along with the habeas corpus clause comprised the
ninth section of the first article.

13 Ibid., 2:105.

Although glad to have
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this "congressional bill of rights," as he referred to it
Henry deemed its restraints too "few and feeble," so weak;
he sniffed, "it would have been infinitely better to have
said nothing about it."

14

Henry wanted people to believe that under the
proposed constitution the legislative branch would be able
to do anything not explicitly forbidden to it.

Of course

this was not true; in reality, just the opposite had been
proposed.

The powers the Philadelphia constitution

contemplated vesting in Congress were limited and specifically
enumerated.

However, if Henry's thesis were given credence

it would reverse the proposition promoted by the advocates
of that constitution that "everything (power) is retained
(by the states) which is not given up (to the federal
government)" to "everything is given up which is not
retained.

1115

It would then follow that the only constitu-

tional restraints on Congress would be those in the first
article's ninth section and the prospects for liberty
would indeed pale next to the potential for a legislative
tyranny.

The inference of Henry's argument was obvious and

awesome:

the people were being deceived.

If Henry's

interpretation of the situation was correct the people were
being tricked because while publicly promoting a government

14
15

Ibid., 3:461.
Ibid.
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of limited powers the proponents of the Constitution were
secretly conspiring for one of unrestrained license.
In an effort to prove his point Henry cited the
habeas corpus clause.

He began by correctly pointing out

that except for the prohibitory restraints of the clause
Congress could suspend the writ in "all cases whatsoever."
Furthermore, he correctly noted that the clause did not of
itself in its negative language grant Congress control
over the writ.

He then insisted that this deficiency could

not be remedied, that no grant could be supplied to
Congress, "but by implication," an implication following
out of the habeas corpus clause.

Henry concluded that if

one implied power could exist, as he believed it did in this
case, then nearly any power Congress might want could be
acquired by that means.

16

But Henry erred and his error was one of omission.
He had either conveniently ignored or been ignorant of the
fact that Congress had control over habeas corpus pursuant
to its power to regulate the courts.

If Henry's interpreta-

tion of the habeas corpus clause as it related to implied
powers had been allowed to stand it would have been at the
peril of the whole Philadelphia constitution.

Moreover, it

called into question the integrity of those who were
promoting its ratification.

41
An extraordinary orator in an era when information
was exchanged and opinion molded by the spoken work,
Henry's remarks normally carried weight, but on this
occasion there were people present capable of recognizing
and refuting his artful argument.

William Randolph--

Governor of Virginia, delegate to the Constitutional
Convention, and a man of strong republican convictions-spoke with force and logic against Henry's specious argument.
He explained how the eight exceptions and prohibitions that
the constitution would impose on Congress applied not
to any general powers of Congress, which were mythical, but
to ''particular powers therein vested."

Offering by way

of example the first of those restrictive clauses, one
respecting the importation of slaves, Randolph explained that
this was an exception "not from a general power but from a
particular power expressly enumerated . . • the power given
them [Congress] of regulating commerce."

As for the second

prohibition (Randolph explained all eight clauses of the
restrictive ninth section) he rhetorically asked "where is
the power to which the prohibition of suspending the habeas
corpus is an exception?"

Answering himself, Randolph

contended that "by virtue of the power given to Congress to
regulate the courts, they could suspend the writ of habeas
corpus.

This is therefore an exception to that power." 17

17 rbid., 3:463-466.
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Once sufficiently informed to have a full understanding, the habeas corpus clause was not a crucial issue
to most people insofar as ratifying the Philadelphia
constitution was concerned.

The majority could comfortably

accept the clause and turn their attentions and questions to
other aspects of the document.

Although found lacking in

other areas regarding personal liberty and freedoms, the
constitution's guarantee of access to the process of the
writ apparently satisfied most.

It would seem that the

men of the ratifying conventions came to understand how the
Constitution respresented an assertion, not a diminution,
of the habeas corpus privilege.

Although inform only a

prohibition against a specific action by Congress (and a
conditional prohibition at that) the habeas corpus clause
was and is, when fully considered, a definite recognition
of each individual's right to the special protection only the
writ affords.

18

There always have been, still are, and always will
be unanswered questions regarding the origination of the
habeas corpus clause.

For instance, why were Pinckney's

proposals rejected, why did Morris' find favor, and what
did the choosing of one over the other mean?

These are

important because understanding the motivation of the

18

schwartz, Commentary on the Constitution, p. 25.
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lawmakers facilitates understanding the intent of the law.
But in the case of the habeas corpus clause the circumstances surrounding its origination are sufficiently obscure
because the relevant primary sources are so few and so
uniformly vague that the intent of those involved is
disputable.

Even what Morris (the man who introduced the

motion that ultimately became the habeas corpus clause)
intended is not known.

If he said so at the time he

made it, which is doubtful, it was not recorded.

If he

ever said so later, which is also doubtful, he was
misleadingly obtuse.

19

Only one thing is certain.

What Morris meant or even

what the Philadelphia Convention intended, assuming either
could be established, would not be final.

Neither the acts

nor intentions of the Constitutional Convention were binding
on the states.

The Convention simply offered a proposed

constitution which did not become THE Constitution and which
did not become THE law of the land until the states
passed favorably upon it.

It was the will of the people of

the individual states expressed through the ratification
process that created the Constitution.

In seeking to

determine the original intent behind any aspect of that
document, what the ratifiers understood it to be is

19

G. Morris to T. Pickering 22 December 1814,
Jared Sparks, The Life of Gouverneur Morris, 3 vols. (Boston:
Gray & Bowen, 1832), 3:322.
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''about decisive."

20

As has been amply shown from the record

of their debates, in both explicit and contextual
references thesemenuniversally understood that the power
to suspend habeas corpus was being vested in Congress not
in the executive or the judiciary or any combination thereof,
but in Congress solely and exclusively.
Setting aside any lingering doubt or open dispute
as to who the Constitution vested with the power to initiate
a suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
the indisputable fact is that it clearly did provide that a
suspension could be made.

To some people this was unacceptable.

They opposed the existence of any means by which the national
government could claim the power to suspend habeas corpus.
No man felt more strongly about this than Luther
Martin of Maryland.

Widely acknowledged as a 'bulldog of

federalism' Martin was a lawyer by profession and a classic
federalist by

persuasionr

Sent to represent Maryland at the

Constitutional Convention, he grew discouraged when it
became apparent that the new government was not being formed
as he wished upon" . . . principles truly federal, legislating
over and acting upon the states only in their collective or
political capacity, and not individuals."

Impotent to halt

this, Martin eventually walked out of the Convention in

20F.is h er, The Suspension, p. 471.
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protest accompanied by another Maryland delegate.

Once

gone, Martin wryly declared that he would "be hanged'' if
the people of Maryland agreed to the system of government
proposed by the Convention.

So certain was he that

Marylanders would reject the new plan, Martin mockingly
advised Maryland's two remaining unregenerate delegates
to stay in Philadelphia lest they also "be hanged.''
this instance events proved Martin wrong.

In

Despite

his opposition, Maryland ratified the Constitution and no one
was hanged.

21

In viewing the Philadelphia constitution, Martin
foresaw a potential for abuse that few others recognized.
It was Luther Martin's contention and lament that the
habeas corpus clause would one day become "an engine of
oppression" for the Federal government to subjugate to
its will individual citizens of various states.

22

From

the beginning Martin realized that the suspension of habeas
corpus could be an effective technique for controlling

21

Allen Johnson, ed., Dictionary of American
Biography, 20 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1928), 12:345; Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787, 4 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1966), 3:290; Jensen, Constitutional Documents, p. 230.
22

Farrand, Records, 3:213.

46

political opposition.

23

Consequently, he wrote and spoke

with eloquence, though little success, against the
status accorded habeas corpus in the proposed constitution.
Based on his understanding of that constitution,
Martin conceived of a scenario in which the habeas corpus
clause would be prostituted for political advantage.

The

catalyst for this unfortunate situation would be the more
inevitable than unlikely happenstance of an irreconcilable
difference between the Federal government and the people
of the state or states.

He predicted that:

. . . whenever a State should oppose its [the Federal
Government's] views, however arbitrary and
unconstitutional, and refuse submission to them,
the general government may declare it to be an act of
rebellion, and, suspending the habeas corpus act,
may seize upon the persons of those advocates of
freedom, who have had virtue and resolution enough to
excite the opposition, and may imprison them during
its pleasure, in the remotest part of the Union; so
that a citizen of Georgia might be bastiled in the
furthest part of New Hampshire, or a citizen of New
Hampshire in the furthest extreme to the south,
cut off from their family, their friends, and their
every connexion.24

23

·
.
.
h a b eas corpus i. n t h.is
For a d iscussion
o f using
manner see Gerald Irwin Jordan, "The Suspension of Habeas
Corpus as a War-Time Political Control Technique, A Study
of Suspension During the Lincoln Administration" (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles,
1941).
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Although a 'generous' soul, Martin,

'the notorious reprobate

genius,' was too often 'drunken' and 'slovenly.•

25

Certainly he was no saint, but assuredly on this occasion
with respect to the habeas corpus clause he proved to be
an amazingly accurate prophet.

25 ·
·
.
.
h y, 3 :345.
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CHAPTER V
EARLY SATURDAY MORNING 25 MAY 1861
Early on the Saturday morning of 25 May 1861 Luther
Martin's fears were realized when John Merryman of Baltimore
County, Maryland awoke to find his house surrounded by
uniformed soldiers of the First Regiment of Pennsylvania
Volunteers.

Within minutes the lieutenant commanding the

detachment had him under arrest.

Although Merryman may not

have been surprised, his neighbors apparently were.

His

arrest reportedly produced "considerable sensation" both in
the neighborhood of his farm, the Hayfields, and among his
many friends in Baltimore sixteen miles to the south.

1

It turnedoutthat Merryman had quite a reputation.
Subsequent to his arrest the nation's papers published
reports variously describing him as a "worthy and respectable,"
"wealthy and highly respectable," or "enterprising and useful"

1

J. Merryman, Petition to R. B. Taney, 25 May 1861,
Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Case No. 9, 487 (1861) at 145.
As printed in The Federal Cases Comprising Cases Argued and
Determined in the Circuit and District Courts of the United
States, 30 vols. (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1895),
17:144-153 hereafter referred to by legal citation only.
Baltimore Sun, 27 May 1861, p. l; New York Times, 29 May
1861, p. 1.
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49
citizen of his county.

That he had once served in his

state's legislature and currently presided over its
2
agricultural society was widely publicized.
Among his
friends, who undoubtedly influenced the press releases that
reported his arrest, John Merryman had ''always been esteemed
as a law abiding man and loyal to his government."

3

The United States Army held a very different opinion
of John Merryman.

Because he belonged to a local militia

unit, one of his many civic involvements, the Army viewed
Merryman as a radical militant armed with weapons belonging
to the United States government and intending "to use the
same against that Government."

In addition, the Army

contended Merryman had publicly "uttered and advanced
secessionist doctrines" for which they branded him a
provacateur.

In the Army's perception John Merryman was a

dangerous man, if not an actual traitor to his country.

4

2

Daily Missouri Republican, 26 May 1861, p. 2;
New York Evening Post, 27 May 1861, pp. 2, 3; Cincinnati
Daily Enquirer, 27 May 1861, p. 3; New York Times, 29 May
1861, p. l; New York Herald, 26 May 1861, p. 5.
3
4
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G. Cadwalader to E. D. Townsend, 27 May 1861;
Enclosure no. 2: Arrest Report J. Miltmore and w. H. Abel,
n.d.; Enclosure no. 4: G. Cadwalader to R. B. Taney,
26 May 1861, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 4 series,
68 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1880-1900), ser. 2, 1:574-576.
(Hereafter referred to as
ORR.)

50
Although he later expressed keen indignation at
being taken from his own house, family, and bed at the
distressingly late hour of two o'clock in the morning,
Merryman suffered his arrest calmly.

5

Prudently, he did not

resist the soldiers.

They simply seized him and carried

their prisoner away.

After a brief wait in the nearby

town of Cockeysville, Merryman and his escort caught the
''down train" to Baltimore.

By eight o'clock they arrived

in the city where Merryman was transferred to a hack for the
final leg of his journey.

Throughout his ordeal Merryman

refused to talk with any of the curious civilian bystanders
who witnessed his being carted off to jail.

By mid-morning

the tall, handsome country gentleman found himself occupying
an undignified cell in the guardhouse of the Federal
government's Fort McHenry. 6

5

J. Merryman, Petition to R. B. Taney, 25 May, 1861,
Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Case No. 9,487 (1861) at 145.
6 Baltimore Sun, 27 May 1861, p. 1.

CHAPTER VI
.MERRYMAN AND MARYLAND
In 1861 the name of "Merryman" had been long known
and well regarded in Baltimore County, Maryland.

The family

had emigrated there from Herefordshire, England, via
Virginia over two hundred years earlier.

Throughout the

ensuing generations Merrymans had sustained a prominent and
useful role in the County's social history.

Most were farmers,

but some had business interests in nearby Baltimore.

One

such Merryman was among the most prominent gentlemen of his
day in the city.

He helped to secure the incorporation of

Baltimore and afterwards served as president of the first
city council.

Because of men such as him it was once said

of the Merrymans, with no small measure of hyperbole, that
"no family has a more direct inheritance in the history and
progress of Baltimore. 111
John Merryman was born in 1824 at the family homestead, "Hereford Farm," twenty miles north of Baltimore city.

1

Frangs Culver, "Merryman Family Part II," Maryland
Historical Magazine 10 (1915):176-177; Howard, Monumental
City, p. 688; Biographical Cyclopedia of Maryland, p. 312.
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Both his father and his grandfather (after whom he was named)
had been born there.

Merryman's father pursued the quiet

life of a farmer, but as a youngster John seemed to aspire
to wider horizons.

At fifteen he ended his formal education

and entered a hardware business in Baltimore.

Not long

thereafter a maternal uncle noticed the youngster's
commercial interests and offered him a position in his
counting house in the West Indies.

Young Merryman accepted

and went to the islands, but returned to Maryland the next
year.

At that point another uncle persuaded him to take

charge of several small farms.
career in agriculture.

Thus began Merryman's

Within two years Merryman had taken

a wife, settled into farming, and started a family.
married well.

He

Through his wife's family John Merryman

gained access to many valuable connections and title to
"Hayfields" a 560 acre farm near Cockeysville in central
Baltimore county.

2

As a squire of "Hayfields" John Merryman became an
established figure in the public and agricultural affairs
of Baltimore County during the decade before the Civil War.
He hobnobbed with the best and most reputable of people-Carrolls, Bosleys, Ridgleys, and Worthingtons to name but
a few.

He dabbled in politics running for the state

2

rbid., pp. 312-313; Culver, "Merryman Family," p.
297; Howard, Monumental City, pp. 689-690.
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legislature as a Democrat in 1855.

Although raised a Whig,

the increasing hegemony of the Know-Nothings in Maryland
politics disturbed Merryman.

He lost, as did almost every

Democratic candidate in that election.

Two years later

Merryman could have made that race again, but he chose
to stand instead for the county commission.

This time

Merryman won in a landslide and his fellow commissioners
named him president of their board.

As a gentleman

farmer, Merryman naturally became associated with the
Maryland State Agricultural Society.

He took an active

part in the affairs of the society, serving as vice
president for Baltimore County in 1855 and a term as
president of the state organization beginning in 1857.
Merryman was not merely a practitioner but also a student
of agriculture, which he considered a high calling.
own operation was a highly acclaimed model.

His

Experts once

judged his breeding stock to be among the best in the
country. 3

In sum, John Merryman had developed into a man

involved with and important to his community, one who had
the people's respect and one who actively sought after
positions of leadership.

* * * *

3
p. 313.

rbid., p. 690; Biographical Cyclopedia of Maryland,
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Early in 1860 the two great, distinct, and long
contending geo-political constituents of the United States-the North and the South--were on the verge of civil war,
yet hostilities, only months away in reality, still seemed
only a remote possibility.

For most Americans choosing

sides in the still peaceable if increasingly acrimonious
dispute was a simple function of geography.

However, in

border areas like Maryland, those neither absolutely
Northern or Southern in socio-political persuasion, the
choosing would prove increasingly more difficult and less
resolute.

In time as vitriol eventually gave way to

violence, opinions would change.

But while choosing sides

remained more an expression of political opinion rather
than a military exercise, a majority of Marylanders
believed their state to be mostcloselyallied with the
South.

4

Like the South, Maryland permitted slavery

(although the institution was dying there)

5

and the future

4william J. Evitts, A Matter of Allegiances:
Maryland from 1850 to 1861 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1974), p. 25.
5

Between 1820 and 1860 the number of free blacks in
Maryland increased eighteen fold (4,509 to 87,189) while the
number of enslaved blacks decreased more than 20 percent
(107,397 to 83,942). By comparison during the same period
in the nation as a whole the number of free blacks barely
doubled (233,634 to 458,070) as did the nation's slave
population (1,538,022 to 3,953,760). U.S., Bureau of the
Census, Negro Population in the United States 1790-1915
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1918),
pp. 844, 857; also refer to Walker Lewis, Without Fear or
Favor: A Biography of Chief Justice Roger B. Taney (Cambridge,
Mass.: Riverside Press, 1965), p. 525 note 362.
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of that institution was undeniably the focus of contention.
Hence, many Marylanders conceived of themselves as living
in a Southern state and they habitually referred to Maryland
as such.

6

Consequently, up to this point in almost every

episode of the continuing sectional dispute the people of
Maryland tended to sympathize with the South.

This included

John Merryman whose sentiments would always be unreservedly
with the South.

7

John Brown's October 1859 raid on the Federal arsenal
at Harpers Ferry, Virginia, had shocked the entire nation
and especially Maryland.

Even after the first outrageously

exaggerated reports were amended to reflect the less terrible
truth of that event, people in such states as Maryland
remained particularly upset.

Although Brown failed miserably

in this intended purpose (to initiate a nation wide slave
rebellion) his actions did serve to revive every white
Southerners fear of Negro insurrection.

The favorable way

in which many Northern abolitionists came to regard Brown
only exaccerbated the bitter feelings between the contending
sections of the nation.

6
7
8

8

On the eve of the Civil War,

Evitts, Matter of Allegiances, p. 25.
Biographical Cyclopedia of Maryland, p. 312.

Evitts, Matter of Allegiances, pp. 3-128;
George L. P. Radcliffe, Governor Thomas H. Hicks of Maryland
and the Civil War, Johns Hopkins University Studies in
Historical and Political Science, no. 19 (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1901), p. 15.
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Southerners had not forgotten that Brown "received so much
sympathy from many; no open condemnation from any of the
leading members of the dominant [Republican] party."

9

There was good reason that Brown's raid had a
special effect on the people of Maryland.

They were doubly

embarrassed about what had happened, once for their
neighboring sister state of Virginia because she had
required federal assistance to take care of the emergency
and again for themselves because the attack had originated
from a base in their state.

10

Remember, this was an era

when state loyalties like state governments could contend
with the Federal government for the hearts and minds of men.
The very idea that men from another state had entered their
state with the intent of forcibly and violently upsetting
the social order shocked Marylanders; sense of propriety and
state loyalty.

They reacted as if their state's physical

integrity and sovereignty had been violated.

There was a

point of honor involved.
The men of Maryland responded by forming militia
companies at a rate faster than the state could supply them
with arms.

Apparently, they intended to prevent a repeat

of the Brown episode or to handle such an eventuality

9

A. Stephens to A. Lincoln, 30 December 1860,
Lincoln, Collected Works, 4:160-161 note 1.
10

Kennedy Farm southwest of Frederick.

57
without federal assistance.

The immediate demand all but

depleted the state's arsenals.

With a view toward meeting

any emergency the state legislature approved an inordinately
large ($70,000) appropriation for the purchase of additional
arms and accoutrements.

11

Eventually the governor even
12
requested more arms from the Federal government.
In

Maryland the most telling and obvious legacy of the attack
on Harpers Ferry was to arouse the people's martial spirit.
Within weeks after the raid the state was well on its way
to becoming an armed camp.

It was a fearful process, one

fraught with potential danger, that would continue until
the outbreak of the Civil War.
The men of Baltimore County responded with no less
fervor than those in any other part of Maryland.

Between

late 1859 and the spring of 1861 they organized a number
of new militia units.

Some bore colorful names or adopted

distinctive uniforms or both.

The "Garrison Forest Rangers"

affected fringed green hunting outfits and resurrected the
name of· a militia company that had existed in the seventeenth
century.

One of the county's larger units, with more than

one hundred men in its ranks most of whom were staunch
supporters of the Union (people of such persuasion

not being

entirely unknown) aptly called themselves the "Union Rifles."
11 Radcliffe, Hicks, p. 15.
12

wright, Secession Movement, pp. 378-379.
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The "Minute Men" of Reisterstown, one of the later groups
to be organized, appropriately adopted the blue cockade as
their emblem.

A cavalry unit, the "Baltimore County

Horse Guard," nattily attired themselves in blue frock coats
with buttons bearing the Maryland state seal, gray pants,
and black slouch hats.

An elite unit, especially with

regard to the social status of its officers, the Horse
Guards well dressed amateur soldiers enjoyed posing for the
camera dressed in their rather dashing and very professional
appearing uniforms.

Other militia companies organized in

Baltimore County during this period were the "Maryland
Mounted Guard," the "Orangeville Horse Guard," the
"Reisterstown Riflemen," the "Morgan Rifles," and the
"Towson Guards."

13

In some of these units a definite political ideology
predominated among the membership.

Just as there was a

number of units, so too was there a variety of political
opinions.

These may be conveniently, if not precisely,

lumped into two camps and labelled "Union" and "states
rights."

For instance, the Union Rifles were nearly all

"staunch 'Union men.'"

Eventually, their captain tendered

the services of the Union Rifles to the Federal government.

13

Erick F. Davis, "The Baltimore County Horse Guard,"
History Trails, Quarterly of the Baltimore County Historical
Society 10 (Winter 1975-1976) :5-6, 9-10; Evitts, Matter of
Allegiances, p. 157.
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The offer was accepted and the Union Rifles were mustered
into the U.S. Army as Company G of the First Regiment of
Maryland Infantry, U.S.A.

On the other hand, the Garrison

Forest Rangers played a partisan role in the spring of 1861
before disbanding.

Subsequently, many of its forty-eight

members followed their captain south to participate in the
hostilities as part of Company G, First Maryland Infantry,
C.S.A.

14
On more than one occasion men of like political

persuasion

formed

militia companies for the apparent

purpose of counterbalancing the presence of established
units among whose membership a divergent sentiment prevailed.
This most often occurred when Southern sympathizing men
banded together to form a militia company, even though
one already existed in their neighborhood.

Invariably the

existing outfit had a Union or less activist orientation.
One example was what happened in Reisterstown in the
west central part of the county.

There in November of

1861 Southern sympathizing activists formed a group, the
Minute Men, even though the town already had a well organized

15
. company, t h e Reisterstown
.
mi·1·1t1a
R1"fl emen.

14
15

oavis, "The Horse Guard," pp. 9~10.
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Eight miles directly north of Baltimore city in
Towsontown an infantry company calling itself the Towson
Guards formed during the fall of 1859 in apparent direct
response to John Brown's raid.

The state of Maryland armed

the unit in June of 1860 and attached it to the 46th
Infantry Regiment, Maryland Militia.

They drilled weekly

for almost a year before hostilities broke out.

When the

company disbanded after the outbreak of hostilities many of
its fifty members enlisted in the Seventh Maryland Infantry,
U.S.A.

16
But many men who lived in this part of central

Baltimore County sympathized with the South.

In mid-January

1861 a number of similarly minded 'state's rights gentlemen'
gathered at the Odd Fellows Hall in Towsontown to consider the
formation of a cavalry company 'for the defense of their
homes and state.'

Within a few weeks they had organized a

unit according to the militia laws of Maryland, elected
officers, appointed a committee to petition the state for
arms, and adopted a name--the Baltimore County Horse Guard.
The next month under bond of $2,000 the state supplied them
with weapons consisting of fifty sets of thirty-six caliber
Whitney revolvers, Ames cavalry sabres, belts, cartridges,
boxes, and holsters.

They were attached to the First

Regiment of Cavalry, Maryland Militia.

16 b'd
I l . , pp. 9 - 10 .

The Horse Guard
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consisted of fifty-three rank and file, two surgeons, two
buglers, a quartermaster, an ensign, three corporals, three
sergeants, three lieutenants, and a captain, Charles
Rl"d g 1 ey. 17

The first lieutenant had some previous militia

experience having served as third lieutenant of another
militia unit thirteen years earlier.
18
Merryman.

His name was John

The Horse Guard met weekly at the Odd Fellows Hall
in Towsontown to discuss business, military tactics, and,
undoubtedly, politics.

After each meeting they drilled on

horseback in a nearby vacant lot under the tutelage of a
captain of the regular Army.

These gatherings continued

until the second week of April 1861.

19

* * * *
President Lincoln responded to the 12 April 1861
shelling of Fort Sumter by issuing a call for 75,000 state
militia to help put down the rebellion.

20

Several states

declined to honor the requisition, but others were eager to

17

rbid., p. 5; Baltimore County American, 18 January
1861, p. 2.
18 ·
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comply.

Within a day the Massachusetts Sixth Regiment

was mustered, loaded into railroad cars, praised, prayed
over, and shipped off to the defense of their nation's
capitol via New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore.

21

In Baltimore public sentiment opposed the use of
force to coerce the South, recruitment of troops for that
purpose in Maryland, and the passage of troops through the
state.

22

At the time the quickest and most efficient way

to get men to Washington from the North was by rail.

The

problem was that all the direct lines funneled through
.
23
Ba l timore.
In the form of several hundred Pennsylvania militiamen and the companies of regular Army artillery, the
vanguard of Northern troops responding to President Lincoln's
call reached Baltimore on Thursday 18 April 1861.

Almost

simultaneously came word of Virginia's secession the
previous day.

The predictable result was an arousal of the

21

John G. Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln:
A History, 10 vols. (New York: Century Co., 1904), 4:90;
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April, 1861 (Baltimore: N. Murray, 1887), pp. 42-43;
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volatile passions smoldering in Baltimore.

The first troops

arrived from Harrisburg on the Northern Central Railroad
at about two o'clock in the afternoon.

They disembarked

at the Bolton Station and marched through the city to the
Mt. Clare Station of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad where
they could board another train for the last leg of their
journey to Washington.

A crowd gathered to watch the

spectacle and heartily express its disapproval.

They had

the good sense not to challenge the regular Army units,
but they harrassed the raw, unarmed militia without mercy.
Except for the assistance of the municipal police, the
transfer might have become a bloody affair.

As it turned

out these troops were subjected to nothing more harmful
than some verbal abuse and a few rankling verses of
"D'lXle.
.
"24

In retrospect it is now apparent that on this
occasion the city and people of Baltimore narrowly escaped
a truly violent episode.

But at the time officials in

Baltimore were hardly appreciative of their good fortune.
Even after having two weeks to mull it over, the city
marshall in a report to his superiors had nothing more
astute to say about the events of April eighteenth than
to observe that the troops had "experienced no more

24

Brown, Baltimore, pp. 31, 36-37, 41; Harold R.
Manakee, Maryland and the Civil War (Baltimore: Maryland
Historical Society), p. 31; Evitts, Matter of Allegiance,
p. 177.
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annoyance than might have been expected."

25

Obviously,

the near riot of the eighteenth did nothing to inspire
increased vigilance on the part of some Baltimore authorities;
quite the opposite, it may have lulled them into a false
sense of complacency.

It is unfortunate but true that the

events of April eighteenth "no doubt dimmed fear of trouble"
26
.
h
.
.
at a time
wen
trou bl e was imminent.
The next morning the Massachusetts Sixth Regiment
(eleven companies or about seven hundred well armed,
accoutered and equipped men) arrived in Baltimore.

Every-

where during their trip they had been treated as heroes and
greeted with "the wildest enthusiasm. 1127
the case in Baltimore.

That was not to be

It was Friday 19 April 1861, exactly

eighty-six years to the day since Massachusetts Minutemen
lined up on the green at Lexington to resist the march of
British regulars on Concord and suffered the first casualties
of the Revolutionary War.

On this anniversary of that

memorable battle Massachusetts militia would again die for
their country and in doing so once more mark the beginning
of a great war with the spilling of their blood.

25

But this

G. Kane to C. Howard, 18 May 1861, ORR, ser. 2,
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time the role played by the men of Massachusetts would be
reversed.

This time they were the resisted not the resisting;

they were the invaders, not the invaded.

28

When the Massachusetts troops attempted to change
trains, as the Pennsylvanians had done the day before, a
bloody melee broke out between them and a mob of locals.
So fierce was the rioting that it required nearly two hours
for the units to make their way through the streets of
Baltimore from the President Street station to the Camden
Street station though the distance between the two points
was little more than a mile.

By the time the disturbance

ended, shortly after the train for Washington departed with
the sore and shaken survivors, sixteen people (four soldiers
and twelve citizens of Baltimore) lay dead.

Additional

casualties included thirty-six militiamen and an undetermined
29
. · 1 ians
·
·
·
· ·
·
numb er o f civi
su ff ering
serious
inJuries.

On this

day Baltimore had more than lived up to its reputation as
'Mob City.' JO
The official investigations and inquiries that
followed generated a considerable body of material useful to

28
29
30
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those interested in reconstructing the events of this day.
Over the years several authoritative narratives have been
prepared.

31

But for present purposes a blow by blow account

of the fighting is unnecessary, nor is an assigning of
blame.

However, it should be noted that the city officials

of Baltimore did nothing overt to encourage the riot;
rather, they did everything in their limited power to quell
' t • 32

l

Nothing speaks more directly to this point than the

unsolicited testimony of the captain of one of the
Massachusetts militia companies most involved in the fighting
that day.

Captain John Dike had nothing but praise for the

mayor and other city authorities who intervened at their own
peril on behalf of his beleaguered troops.

Though wounded

himself, this officer bore no grudge against either the
mayor or his associates, whom he believed "should be exonerated
from any blame or censure."
little good.

33

This declaration did these men

Federal authorities later jailed them without

benefit of legal recourse.

34
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For the rest of the afternoon that day Baltimore
fairly pulsed with indignation.

The tragic manner in which

a well-known merchant became the last casualty of the
fighting only served to excite the passions of all but the
.
1 ve d an d insensitive.
.
. .
most uninvo

35

The mob continued to

carouse about the city's streets all afternoon.

36

Meanwhile

some of the more reflective citizenry gathered in small
groups discussing what had happened and debating what should
be done next.
On a sidewalk near the Bank of Baltimore John
Merryman held the rapt attention of several men, when a
prominent lawyer joined the group.

The lawyer had remained

safely "occupied all the forenoon" in his office while the
rioting raged outside in the streets and was now out taking
in the aftermath.
another's politics:

He and Merryman knew one another and one
Whig and Democrat.

Merryman turned to

the newcomer and told him that he had a plan by which more
Federal troops could be prevented from corning to Baltimore.
His interest piqued, the lawyer asked what that might entail.
Merryman responded by declaring that if he had twenty men he

35 R b
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would go and destroy some of the railroad bridges along
the rail lines leading into the city from the North.

37

Initially the lawyer agreed with Merryman as to the
probable workability of his plan, commenting that it was
the wisest proposal he had heard that day.

Recounting this

later the lawyer realized the disloyalty that could be
imputed to what he had said, was chagrinned about it, and
quickly added in his own defense "that very little wisdom
was said on that occasion."
lawyer had his reservations.

But even at the time the
To the sidewalk group he

proclaimed that he could not support any action unless
its purpose was purely apolitical having "the character of a
police movement . . . for the purpose and sole purpose of
preventing bloodshed, and suspending the movements of . . .
troops temporarily until this excitement subsides. 1138
Merryman assured him that such was the only object
he intended and suggested that the Whiggish lawyer should
join him in the proposed venture, since they agreed as to
its practicality and intent.

But hardly one to be so

cleverly maneuvered into involvement in such a radical
scheme, the lawyer retreated a bit and declined to join
Merryman saying that he had no guarantee as to what else
it might lead.

37
38

rbid.
rbid.

Yet in the next breath he assured Merryman

69
and all present that he would have no indisposition to
involve himself in such an action if he could be sure that
it would be "literally carried out in the manner proposed."

39

At this juncture another man joined the group,
diverting attention away from the contentious lawyer.
Marryman turned his attention and powers of persuasion
on the newcomer.

The proposed scheme and the gist of the

entire discussion were recapped for the benefit of the late
arrival.

According to the lawyer's own recollection, this

man heard it all out and then suggested that Merryman should
take his idea to the Mayor's office "and act if they acted
at all, on authority and not take it on their own
·
.,40
responsi'b 1· 1 ity.

Immediately after this wise suggestion was proffered
another gentlemen joined the group.
Grason.

His name was Richard

He and the lawyer were brothers-in-law.

The

lawyer knew Grason lived out in the country like Merryman,
knew that Grason's politics matched Merryman's more than
his, and knew that Merryman would probably approach people
like Grason with hopes of involving them in his plan.

The

lawyer also knew that Merryman had "something to do with a
troop of horse. "

39

41

What he did

rbid., p. 195

apparently not know was

70

that his brother-in-law held the same rank as Merryman
in the same troop of horse, the Baltimore County Horse
Guard.

42

Yet despite being somewhat ignorant of the

situation, the lawyer was nevertheless solicitous of his
brother-in-law's well being and informed him why he had
declined to join Merryman and advised him to do likewise.
Grason agreed with his brother-in law and assured him
that he would never do anything that could be construed as
an act of hostility toward the government.

43

Nevertheless,

the next morning Grason in the company of Merryman left

.
44
t h e city.
Late in the afternoon of the nineteenth the mayor,
the governor, and several prominent citizens spoke to the
huge and unruly crowd that gathered in Monument Square in
the center of Baltimore after notices announcing a town
meeting were posted.

Governor Hicks followed the others to

the rostrum where he made "a remarkable and uncharacteristic
speech.

1145

When he declared, as he often had, that he hoped

the Union would be preserved, the crowd reacted angrily
with "vehement shouts of 'Never,' "Never,' groans and

42 Ba l timore
.
.
County American,
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43 Evi. d ence, p. 195.
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hisses. 1146

Shaken 'in the face of that wild mob' Hicks'

teeth supposedly chattered as he searched for words more
in line with what the crowd wanted to hear.

47

He succeeded

in redeeming himself somewhat by proclaiming that he
preferred a peaceful separation of the two sections of
the nation to the use of force to hold the South in the
Union.

Gesturing with his right arm, Hicks declared he

would have it torn from his body before raising it against
the South.

48

Amid cheers the governor bowed and excused

himself after which the gathering quickly began breaking up.
A sizeable portion of the crowd followed Hicks as he made
his way back toward his hotei.

49

But fearing for his own

personal safety if he stayed there, the governor chose
instead to spend the night at the mayor's house.

46
47
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About midnight a delegation led by the mayor went
. h Governor Hies.
. k 51
to meet wit

They feared that the efforts

to persuade the authorities in Washington to cease bringing
troops through Baltimore were failing because no reply had
been made to their earnest communications which included a
telegram.

52

Increasing their anxiety were reports that more

Northern troops were on the way.

These men fervently

believed that if Federal volunteers tried to pass through
Baltimore on the morrow more blood would be shed and
additional lives lost.
a desperate plan.

They were desperate and they proposed

They wanted to make further transportation

of troops through Baltimore impossible by burning key
bridges on the major rail approaches from the North. 53
Whether any of these men had talked with Merryman,
or heard of his plan through others, or, indeed, whether
Merryman ever went to the municipal authorities as it was

51

Those accompanying the mayor were: Marshal Kane,
former governor E. Louis Lowe, and the mayor's brother
John C. Brown. G. Brown, Report of Mayor Brown May 1861,
ORR, ser. 1, 2:13.
52
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(Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1948), 2:571. A
problem understanding the meaning of the telegram and the
reason the other communications were not immediately
answered are discussed in Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, 4:122-125.
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Accounts of the meeting by Brown, Kane, Lowe, and
Brown appear in ORR, ser. 1, 2:12-15. G. Brown discusses
the meeting and other events of that evening in Baltimore.
pp. 57-59.
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suggested he should, is not known.

Any relation between

John Merryman's sidewalk strategy session and the mayor's
delegation's entry into the governor's bedroom can only be
speculated upon.

Burning a few bridges was a simple and

obvious strategy that could likely have occurred independently to many.

But it is also very likley that Merryman's

plan in particular somehow came to the attention of the
city officials.

And it is not at all unlikely that "the

first suggestion of burning the bridges emanated . . .
[from] John Merryman."

54

Regardless of how they came by the idea of burning
the bridges, those bringing the proposal to Governor Hicks
were determined to implement the plan.

They were quite

confident of their authority to carry it out within the
city, but apparently felt needful of the governor's approval
to extend the action beyond the corporate limits of
Baltimore.
bedside.

It was for this reason that they came to his
This was not the governor's first introduction

to such a plan.

Earlier in the evening the mayor had

mentioned the possibility of burning some bridges, but
dismissed it as unnecessary under prevailing conditions.
However, in the few hours since that talk conditions had

54E vi'd ence, pp• 19 4 I
55
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o

G. Brown, Report of Mayor Brown,
ser. 1, 2:12-13.

v

55
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changed.

The latest intelligence reports (warning that

additional troops were enroute to Baltimore) suggested that
there was little time left to consider alternatives.
Throughout the meeting the governor never rose but
remained beneath the covers while the proposal was put to
him.

Evidently Hicks lacked the strength, or desire, or

both to successfully oppose the unanimous will of those
gathered about him.

Exactly what he said is arguable.

He

certainly did not give a definite "no" and it is unlikely
that he gave a definite "yes," but it would seem that he
must have made some sort of affirmative remark or gesture,
. d d oing
.
t h oug h h e 1 a t er d enie
so. 56
From an unsympathetic entry in the diary of Watkins
Glenn, editor of the pro-Southern Baltimore Exchange, comes
a believable but unauthenticable recounting of the governor's
tribulation.

According to Glenn, who according to all

accounts was not present in the governor's bedchamber that
night, Hicks was reluctant to say anything but supposedly

56

Accounts of what Hicks said with regard to
burning the bridges vary. The mayor and his associates
unanimously agree that Hicks acceded to their plan. ORR,
ser. 1, 2:12-15. Hicks was adamant that he did not consent
to the destruction of any bridge. He twice denied it,
once in a message to the state senate and later in an
address to the people. Radcliffe, Hicks, pp. 56-57.
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twisted the sheet over his head, rolled, groaned, and finally
moaned,

'Oh! Yes, Go ahead and do it. 157
The only thing certain is that while the governor

went back to sleep, Mayor Brown went to arrange for the
destruction of the bridges.

About 2:30 a.m. a squad of

Baltimore municipal policemen and Captain J. G. Johannes'
company of the City Guard accompanied by a few armed
volunteers left to set fire to the bridges of the Northern
Central Railroad at Melvale, Relay House, and Cockeysville.
Simultaneously another police squad and company of the
Baltimore City Guard departed by special train to burn the
Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad's bridges
at Harris Creek and the Gunpowder and Bush rivers.

Some

unauthorized private demolition teams also joined in the
work that night.

The job required more effort than anyone

probably expected and some of the bridges were only
partially destroyed, but by mid-afternoon on Saturday
Baltimore's rail connections with the North had been
effectively severed.
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Saturday, while the railroad bridges around
Baltimore smoldered, John Merryman donned his uniform,
strapped on his side arms, mounted his horse, and rode to
Towsontown.
Merryman.

It was part of a long day in the saddle for
That morning he had come from Baltimore; he

would return there before nightfall.

In Towsontown the

Baltimore County Horse Guard was assembling to ride to the
aid of Baltimore.

A large crowd had gathered in the

village to hear and discuss reports of the previous day's
rioting.

Shortly, the Horse Guard formed up and rode away.

The mounted group stopped briefly to deliver three cheers
before the office of a local paper that had just printed
an extra edition largely consisting of an inflammatory
editorial proposing 'that Northern troops shall not pass
unharmed through the state of Maryland for the purpose of
subjugating the South.

After delivering three hearty

huzzas they trotted off down the York road toward
Baltimore, each member of the Horse Guard wearing a silk
secession badge pinned to his coat.

59

* * * *
In Baltimore 'the war spirit raged throughout the
city among all classes Saturday.'

Such was the conclusion,

reached presumedly unhappily, of the editors of the normally
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Davis, "The Horse Guard," p. 5.
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.
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60
pro-Union
Ba l timore
American.

Mayor Brown agreed.

Looking

back on this weekend some years later, Brown, who was as
close to the

situation

as anyone, offered the somewhat

jaundiced opinion that on Saturday the excitement frenzy
61
among Baltimore's citizenry had actually increased.
Obviously, Saturday's events were in no way as
spectacular and certainly not as violent as Friday's, but,
on the other hand, there was no appreciable slackening in
the rapid pace with which they were breaking.

In mid-

morning the city council met and voted a half million
dollar appropriation for the defense of Baltimore.

Within

hours a consortium group of local bankers made credit for
this considerable sum available to the mayor to be spent at
.
d.iscre t.ion. 62
h is

About this time word came from the delegation sent
late the previous day to wait upon the president.

As hoped,

after meeting with the Baltimoreans and hearing them out,
Lincoln agreed to seek an alternate route for his troops,
one avoiding Baltimore.

Shortly afterward Brown received

the president's formal letter regarding this which he

60

Baltimore American, 22 April 1861 as quoted in
Brown, Baltimore, p. 65.
61 b'd
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acknowledged with his personal promise to preserve the
peace.

The pledge was contingent on no further troops

attempting to pass through his city.

63

Later that day when local militia units from the
surrounding area began arriving in Baltimore, Brown,
probably motivated by Lincoln's conciliatory initiative,
dismissed most, but not all, from the romantic duty they so
anxiously sought.

These men had rallied to the rescue of

a beleaguered city of their fellow Marylanders.

They were

but the first of numerous groups of militiamen and freebooters from every part of Maryland that would be attracted
to Baltimore in the week following the rioting.

Brown

presumedly sent most of the early arrivals away because he
realized that the one thing Baltimore did not need at this
time was more armed men in her streets.

Besides develop-

ments had rendered their services largely unnecessary.
Brown informed the volunteers of Lincoln's promise, thanked
them for their concern, and, as diplomatically as possible,
.

sen t t h em pacing.
k
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20 April 1861, Mearns, Lincoln Papers, 2:574.
64

Brown, Baltimore, p. 64; Clark, "Baltimore and
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This was apt and responsible handling of a
touchy situation, but not Brown's final action of the day.
Incongruously, he authorized another delegation to be sent
to Washington and issued an appeal for Baltimore residents
to donate arms for the defense of their city.

65

why Brown took these two steps remains arguable.

Exactly
They were

hardly consistent with the reconciliation that Lincoln had
initiated and could easily be percevied as belligerent.
However, they were more indicative of the spirit of
antagonism toward the North and everything associated with
it that would prevail in Baltimore that weekend and would
continue to exist there in varying degrees and be expressed
in various ways in the weeks to come.
At eight o'clock that evening the Horse Guard
trotted into Baltimore's Monument Square.
sent away as were most of the other units.

They were not
Instead, along

with a company of Maryland Guard, they were detailed to
Whetstone Point near Fort McHenry.

There was fear of

confrontation or worse, conflict between the people of
Baltimore and the most conspicuous Federal presence in
town, those troops garrisoning the fort.

66

Municipal

authorities wanted the two militia units to serve as a
buffer between the "Baltimore mob" and the Federals.

65
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Brown, Ba lt'imore, p. 63 .
Evidence, p. 63; Brown, Baltimore, p. 66.

Thanks,

80
at least partially, to the Horse Guard nothing violent
happened at Whetstone Point, though some harsh words were
exchanged between the commander of the fort, who feared
he was about to be attacked,

67

and the leader of the militia

units, who found protecting the ungrateful Federalists an
.
.
68
o d 1ous assignment.

Elsewhere, north of the city, during

that night more bridges were burned and some telegraph wires
were cut.

69

Sunday morning, 21 April 1861, dawned fine and clear
in Baltimore.

The mayor and three prominent citizens rose

early enough to catch a special 7:30 train for Washington.
In the middle of the night Mayor Brown had received a
telegram from President Lincoln.

Suddenly anxious "to

consult . . . relative to preserving the peace of Maryland,"
Lincoln implored the mayor and the governor (a duplicate
message was sent to Hicks) to "please come immediately."
He even offered to send a train for them if necessary.
Brown sent a reply asking if he should come alone, the
governor being long gone to Annapolis.

A telegram answering

in the affirmative came quickly, whereupon Brown and the
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three 'whom he summoned to attend him' hastened off to the
'
1 capi' t a1.
nationa

70

By this time Lincoln's closest

military advisors had been sent reports telling how the
burning of the bridges and cutting of the telegraph had
severed communications and halted transportation between
Baltimore and points north.

71

Meanwhile on Sunday morning Baltimore was rife with
rumors that kept the populace agitated.

One had it that

seven hundred Virginians were arriving by steamer.

No

sooner had this been proven false than a lone rider galloped
up to police headquarters and breathlessly announced that
a train carrying three thousand Northern troops had been
halted seventeen miles north of town by a burned bridge.
Word spread rapidly and the men of Baltimore dropped everything and began preparing to defend their city from the
apparently impending attack.

Church services were inter-

rupted, a military headquarters was established, and
gunshops were broken into and their arms indiscriminately
passed out.

Rumors persisted.

One held that the Northerners

had advanced on foot to Pikesville via the Reisterstown
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road (placing them within eight miles of Baltimore) and were
continuing to move forward.

This inspired five hundred

not especially well organized nor armed men to leave the
city intent on meeting the attack.

Fortunately, this rumor

. h out b asis.
. 72
a 1 so prove d t o b e wit
Early that morning the Horse Guard had packed up
after their relatively uneventful bivouac and returned to
Townsontown.

With them they carried orders to patrol the

York road as far north as Cockeysville.

Soon after under-

taking this task they found the rider's report to be
substantially true.

Indeed, a train carrying 2,500

Pennsylvania volunteers down the Northern Central Railroad
on their way to Washington had been halted by a burned out
bridge over the Western Run near Cockeysville.

With

further advance impossible, the Pennsylvanians had made
camp in the fields of a nearby farm.

Meanwhile, a few miles

away Captain Ridgley established a headquarters for the
Horse Guard in Towsontown at Ady's Hotel.

The ensign of the

state of Maryland was run up over the hotel; while down
the street at the Odd Fellows Hall the American flag,
which normally flew there, was struck.
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The Pennsylvanians that were perceived to be such a
threat to the people of Baltimore were, to the United States
Government, the First Regiment Infantry.

This was a three

month volunteer outfit that had been organized (the term
is used loosely) for Federal service in Harrisburg earlier
on the same day it was sent into Maryland.

74

This "army"

was too poorly prepared and equipped to maintain itself in
the field, much less mount an attack on anybody.

Probably

no more than half its men were armed and none had much more
than crackers to eat.

Soon a number were sick.

would die and be buried in camp.

Several

Reportedly, the Baltimore

city marshal had several wagons of bread and meat sent out
to the camp once it became apparent that these men posed
.
75
no rea 1 treat
h
to th e city.
Initially, at least, the
Pennsylvanians did not know of the rioting on the nineteenth
and apparently had no intention of forcing themselves on
Baltimore.

A friendly lot, they received those Marylanders

who approached their camp "cordially."

One constituent

unit of the Pennsylvanian force, a militia outfit from
Lancaster, gave a particularly hearty greeting to some members
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of a Baltimore City Guard unit that came out to have a
look.

These men had met previously and, reportedly, their

meeting on this occasion was every bit as genial as any
before.

76

In sum it would seem that the "army" encamped

near Cokeysville posed more of a threat to its own men
than it did to the people of Baltimore.

In reality it

certainly caused them more pain, suffering, and death.
Armed and in full uniform the Towson Guard turned
out that Sunday in their village square.

The sheriff of

Baltimore County deputized both the Towson Guard and the
Horse Guard and charged the two units with joint responsibility 'to preserve the peace and order' by arresting any
person showing a disposition to riot.

Logically dividing

the duty, the Towson Guard undertook to patrol the roads
in and around town on foot while the mounted Horse Guard
scouted as far north as the Pennsylvanian's camp.

77

The

cooperation between these two rival units was in action,
not spirit.

Some of the Horse Guard, notably John Merryman,

wanted nothing to do with the Unionist Towson Guard. 78
That night a number of the Pennsylvania volunteers
deserted.

Their disheartening weekend experience with the
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military had been more than enough.

Each of the Maryland

militia units patrolling the area took several of these
runaways into custody and confined them in the Towsontown
jail.

A few days later Captain Ridgley released these men

on condition that they return to their homes and 'have
nothing more to do with the army to which they belonged.'

79

In all probability this was precisely what they intended
to do.

During the same night the Towson Guard had peaceably

disarmed and turned back, but did not detain, a number
of Baltimore rowdies on their way to harass the beleaguered
Pennsylvania volunteers.

80

* * * *
Lincoln and his military advisors had given up on
trying to bring troops to the defense of Washington by
having them fight their way through Baltimore.

This

decision, initially promulgated by the president at his
Saturday meeting with the first Baltimore delegation and
later included in his letter to Mayor Brown, was repeated
at Sunday's hastily arranged meeting between Lincoln and
his advisors and Mayor Brown and his attendants.

79
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personally receiving Lincpln's word on this matter, Brown
and company quickly concluded the discussion and after
81
.
.
b ac k to Ba 1 timore.
·
excusing
t h emse 1 ves 1 ef t to catc h a train
At the station just as the train was about to depart
Brown received a telegram.

It apprised him of the news that

Baltimore had received earlier in the day regarding the
large body of Northern troops encamped near Cockeysville.
At once Brown and his party hastened back to the White House
where Lincoln immediately granted them another interview.
When informed of the situation President Lincoln acted
surprised and required hardly any persuasion before
agreeing to order the unwanted troops out of Maryland.

82

However, acceding to the wishes of the Baltimoreans
in this matter was not the major concession it might first
appear to have been.

Just as Johm Merryman figured and the

Pennsylvanians discovered, the destruction of a few
strategic bridges north of Baltimore could render further
use of the railroads in that vicinity virtually impossible.
In reality the Federal government had little alternative
but to re-route the reinforcements in transit to the capital.
However the soldiers were to be diverted only, not stopped
altogether.
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Lincoln never wavered in his determination to speed
troops to the defense of Washington, only on bringing them
there via Baltimore.

As he later told a delegation of

Baltimore citizens, the government's soldiers were neither
birds nor moles
state.

who could fly over or burrow under their

Warning Baltimore to keep its rowdies at home,

Lincoln declared that "geographically" and "mathematically"
troops had to cross Maryland.

83

Admittedly the president

was allowing Baltimore a small victory.

But despite the

earnest, sometimes violent protestations emanating from
that city Lincoln intended that Northern troops would
tread upon Maryland soil.

This they had to do if they

were to reinforce Washington, which they did.

* * * *
From the moment they became aware of the Pennsylvanians
encamped near Cockeysville, concerned people in Baltimore
quite understandably wanted more detailed information about
the situation.

They did not know the Pennsylvanians'

intentions and feared the worst.

Hence, one of their first

responses was to establish a special headquarters "where at
intervals despatches were received and messengers arrived

83
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88
bearing rumors of the movements of the Pennsylvanians."

84

But being somewhat geographically removed from the scene
of the action no one in Baltimore could possibly be in as
good a position to know what was happening as that enjoyed
by Captain Ridgley of the Horse Guard, whose men were
formed into a picket line along the road north from
Towsontown towards Cockeysville.

85

As it happened Ridgley was more than just able and
ready to see what the Pennsylvanians were up to--he was
anxious.

Thus Ridgley charged one of his most trusted

subordinates, a man intimately acquainted with the countryside around the Pennsylvanians' camp, with the task of
responsibility for keeping an eye on the Northern interlopers.

So it was that John Merryman took several of the

Horse Guard's best troopers and established an advanced
observation post at Merryman's farm (Hayfields) nearer
still to the Pennsylvanians' camp.
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A line of communication

between these field units and officials in Baltimore was
established.

By Monday Steuart was receiving dispatches

from Captain Ridgley.
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A member of the Horse Guard

carried messages from Towsontown to Baltimore by
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horseback.
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Meanwhile Merryman and Ridgley enjoyed more

efficient communications via a telegraph line linking
Hayfields and Towsontown.
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On Monday, 21 April 1861, a Major Belger of the
regular Army arrived at the camp of the Pennsylvanians.

He

had come from Washington to Baltimore with Mayor Brown and
his party by rail the previous day,
to the fields near Cockeysville.

90

thence he had gone

With him he carried the

written orders of General Scott directing the Pennsylvanians
to retreat from Maryland.

These orders were composed with

the intention of fulfilling the promise President Lincoln
made to Mayor Brown that no more Federal troops would
attempt to pass through Baltimore.

The Pennsylvania First

was to return to Harrisburg as a show of good faith.
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Learning of this development John Merryman boldly
rode into the Pennsylvanians' camp and met with the major
who frankly stated his business.

In response a heartened

Merryman supposedly volunteered the services of his troops
to assist the Pennsylvanians in their movement and offered

88
89

Creamer, Testimony, p. 9.
rbid., p. 7.
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s. T. Wallis, Statement signed by G. Brown,
21 April 1861, Brown, Baltimore, p. 73.
91

s. Cameron to Officer in Charge and W. Scott,
Orders, 24 April 1861, ORR, ser. 1, 2:584.
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to slaughter some of his own cattle for food if they
needed.

92

Probably out of pride, neither of these offers

was accepted.

Not everyone was as gladdened by the

prospect of the retreat as was Merryman, although undoubtedly
some of the Pennsylvanians were anxiously looking forward
to a good hot meal.

Back in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, state

officials reportedly were "decidedly against withdrawing"
and "the mass of people highly indignant" about this move.

93

When word of the Pennsylvanians' impending retreat
reached Baltimore orders were issued for the Horse Guard to
follow and observe it.

They were to report if any of the

Pennsylvanian soldiers were left behind at any place in
Maryland.

More importantly, the Horse Guard was instructed

to 'destroy all the bridges at intervals of one or two
miles between Cockeysville and the state line.'

Between

those two points the Northern Central Railroad followed the
winding Gunpowder river, crossing it and its many tributaries
two dozen or more times.

To burn all those bridges would

have been excessively destructive.

Recognizing this, these

same orders elsewhere suggested not bothering with any of
the bridges north of Parkton because they were 'not

92

navis, "The Horse Guard," pp. 6-7; Biographical
Cyclopedia of Maryland, p. 312.
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New York Herald, 24 April 1861, p. 3.
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important.'

The orders concluded with a caution to the

Horse Guard that they should not 'commit or permit any hostile
act against

the retreating troops.'
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These orders bore

the signature of 'G. H. Steuart, Major General.'
Prior to the rioting in Baltimore, George H.
Steuart had been a captain in the United States Army.

A

West Point graduate, he had spent much of his military
career soldiering on the frontier--fighting Indians and
disciplining the Mormons.

In Baltimore during the emergency,

Steuart resigned his regular Army commission whereupon he
became Major General of the First Light Division, Maryland
Volunteers.
to the South.

Later in the spring of 1861 Steuart defected
During the war he led both infantry and

cavalry units for the Confederate Army with distinction and
rose to general rank.

95

On Sunday when an attack on Baltimore appeared
imminent, Steuart reportedly took charge of the immediate
efforts to organize some defense for the city.

96

Unfortunately,

the exact source of constituted authority behind this
assumption of command, if any, escaped note at the time.

94D
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Curiously, when the city's police board met later that day
and chose the man that they wanted to invest with overall
command of the many groups of men who were organizing to
defend the city they offered another man (Issac R. Trimble)
the job, not George Steuart.
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In any case, whatever was

Steuart's precise capacity on April twenty-first, his
sympathies lay unreservedly with the South.

During the next

few days Steuart established communications with Confederate
authorities in Virginia.

Between them they established a

mutually advantageous trade.

Steuart furnished them with

reports on the military situation in Maryland and they in
return sent him arms taken with the capture of Federal
arsenals in their state.

98

Some of these may have wound up

in the possession of the Horse Guard.
Steuart's orders were addressed to Captain
99
Ridgley commanding the Horse Guard in Towsontown.

He,

in turn, passed on to Lieutenant Merryman, whom he knew

97

c. Howard to I. R. Trimble and I. R. Trimble to
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Letcher, 25 April 1861, ORR, ser. 1, 51:34-35; G. H. Steuart
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could be relied upon to enthusiastically implement them. 100
In the days that followed, Merryman repeatedly cited these
orders as the source of authority for the actions he took.

101

In one instance he showed the paper and the orders written
on it to a civilian resident of the county.

102

Whether

Merryman had Steuart's original order or a copy is not
k nown.

. d . 103
Apparen tl y, on 1 ya copy h as survive
Late Monday or early Tuesday (different accounts

vary) but in any case some time, though not a great deal
of time, after two o'clock, Monday afternoon, when the
Pennsylvanians boarded their train and it pulled out of
Cockeysville heading north, John Merryman set about the
task of burning the bridges and cutting the telegraph along
the Northern Central Railway.

Although there is some

discrepancy about precisely when the job was begun,
by Tuesday it was well underway.

104

To this project Merryman detailed a small number of
men.

The exact number is debatable, but probably no more

than seven or eight of the Horse Guard were actually

100
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Later, in attempting to divest himself of

any culpability for the affair, one of these men claimed
that he and his fellows acted under orders and as a
company.

106

The claim had its merit.

But there is nothing

to suggest that any member of the Horse Guard was the least
coerced into participating, while there is much to suggest
that the men involved actually relished the work.
A sergeant, Charles Cockey, assisted Merryman.

He

helped with directing the men and when Merryman divided
his small command Cockey actually supervised the burning
of several bridges and the cutting down of a number of
telegraph poles on his own.

107

It would appear that

Sergeant Cockey was somewhat confused about the exact
origin of the orders he was carrying out at Merryman's
behest.

He variously told people that they came from the

governor, the mayor, and Steuart.

108

Merryman personally was most involved in the
burning of two bridges.

Like all the bridges torched by

the Horse Guard, these were located in the north end of
Baltimore County, closer to Harrisburg than Baltimore,
105

oavis, "The Horse Guard," p. 7; Evidence, p. 64.

l0 6 Ibid.
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near the town of Parkton almost twenty-five miles out of
Baltimore and only half a dozen miles from the MarylandPennsylvania state line.
On Tuesday morning at the"Burns Bridge" over the
Little Gunpowder river two local residents heard Merryman
order the burning of that structure and direct his men to
cut down a few nearby telegraph poles.

The locals had no

stomach for what was happening and wanted to leave.

But

taking pistol in hand Merryman persuaded them to not only
stay but also help.

After declaring that he had authority

to act, Merryman personally put a torch to the bridge.

109

At the other bridge (accounts are vague but it was
probably a major one crossing the North Branch of the
Gunpowder near Parkton) Merryman again led the way.

First,

he detailed several of his company to assault the telegraph.
Then he ordered a couple of bystanders to overturn a cask
of water kept at the bridge in case of fire.
reluctant, they complied under duress.

Although

Merryman was

commanding with drawn sword and some of his men had pistols.
Camphene was poured on the bridge and everything set
aflame.

110
John Merryman obviously enjoyed this duty in a

perverse way.

Alternately drawing pistol then sword,

109 I b'd
9
l
., p . .
llOibid., p. 11.
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repeatedly citing his authority, Merryman proclaimed and
acted out his determination to stop the invasion of
Maryland by Northern troops.

At the time, given the

circumstances, to Merryman the issues seemed simple and
straightforward and dictated similarly direct tactics on
his behalf in response.

'G

d m them' he purportedly

cursed at one point, 'we'll stop them from coming down
.

l

h ere an d stee 1 ing ours aves.

was his and he relished it.
easily vanquished.

, 111

For the moment success

The enemy seemed weak and

The Pennsylvanians, Merryman disparaged

with black humor, "were so badly scared that several of
them fell dead when they heard that the Baltimoreans were
coming. 11112
The most authoritative figure is that John Merryman
and the Horse Guard set fire to five bridges:

the major

one near Parkton and four less significant structures to
the north.

113

Several of the fires at the smaller bridges

were extinguished by locals, but the larger bridge burned
114
and collapsed.
Although significant, the damage suffered
by the Northern Central Railway in no way approached what

111
112
113
114
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potentially could have been inflicted upon it.

Dozens of

bridges and trestles between Baltimore and the Pennsylvania
line escaped the torch.
speculation.

Exactly why is a matter of

To Merryman's credit he may have been

exercising the restraint his orders allowed him.

Then

again, the small size of his command, its limited resources,
the apparent opposition of some locals, and other unknown
complications and problems might have combined to make any
further destruction on Merryman's part impossible.

In

reality he could well have been more frustrated than
reserved.

In any case this was the last act carried out

by the Horse Guard as a company.

According to some sources

these actions inspired Merryman's arrest four and a half
weeks later.

115
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CHAPTER VII
A MOST UNUSUAL ARREST
Merryman's arrest had been most unusual.

Although

a civilian and resident of one state (Maryland), he had
been seized and detained by military personnel acting on
the orders of an officer commanding in another (Pennsylvania).
The military had neither requested a proper warrant with
which to arrest Merryman nor exercised minimal courtesy
by informing the civil authorities of its intent.

Instead,

acting secretly by cover of darkness before anyone could
object they simply grabbed their victim and tossed him into
an Army stockade.

Such an action raises obvious questions

of constitutional propriety.

There also is the not incon-

sequential matter of exactly why and for what John Merryman
wound up behind bars.
The belief has been popular that John Merryman was
arrested because of what ''loyal Baltimoreans" told the Army
about him and his role in obstructing the passage of
1
Federal troops through Maryland.
But this is a misconception;
1

Harold M. Hyman, A More Perfect Union, The Impact of
the Civil War and Reconstruction on the Constitution (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), p. 82; Lewis, Without Fear or
Favor, p. 447; Bernard Steiner, Life of Roger B. Taney
(Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins Co., 1922), p. 493.
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a logical but unsupportable assumption.

There is no hard

corroboratory evidence and much that contradicts it.
Actually, Merryman's arrest resulted from quite different,
although related, circumstances and for altogether different
reasons.
Yet it is certainly undeniable that almost any
relatively alert, minimally informed, newspaper reading
resident of Baltimore or Baltimore County could have told
the Army some interesting things about Merryman.

His

attitudes and his activities had hardly been secreted from
the people of the community.

As an officially recognized

unit of Maryland's state militia system, the Horse Guard's
membership roll was a matter of public record.

Merryman's

involvement with the Horse Guard and the company's political
proclivities were common knowledge, having been reported in
the local press.

2

But potentially most damning of all was

the brazen openness with which Merryman burned the bridges.
As a result several people who were not at all in sympathy
with his cause knew the worst that he had done.

However,

there is no record of anyone actually going to the Army with
specific information about Merryman prior to his arrest
(although several people gave damaging testimony about

2

The Baltimore County American and the Baltimore
Argus printed articles on Merryman and the Horse Guard.

100
him later)

3

and much to suggest that this was unneces-

sary.
Even if someone had gone to the Army about Merryman,
nothing might have come of it because in practice being
informed upon was alone not always enough to result in
one's arrest.

For example, only days before they seized

Merryman the Army received a sworn statement in which a
resident of a Baltimore County accused a dozen of his
neighbors of a nefarious, possibly treasonous act.

The

informant claimed "positive knowledge" that the twelve men,
whom he named, had participated in the destruction of a
railroad bridge near the town of Bush River on April
4
twenty-sixth.
Here was an instance in which the Army had
been supplied with everything necessary to make a case or
at least seek arrest warrants:

names, dates, specifics,

and a witness to swear to all of it.

But nothing came of it.

There is no record of any of these men being taken into
custody either with or without a warrant.

5

This might have

reflected on the informant's reputation or the veracity of
the facts alleged in his statement.
have been a hoax.

3

The whole thing could

Such things happened and they were an

Creamer, Testimony.

4

J. W. Hofman, Report, May 1861, ORR, ser. 2,
1:573-574.
5

ORR, ser. 2, 2:224-234.
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embarrassment to all involved.

6

The point is that mere

allegations alone did not always result in the Army
immediately seizing someone.
In John Merryman's case the Army had a much better
source than any local informant.

It had an unimpeachable

source, one in which it had every confidence--itself.

The

orders that culminated in Merryman's arrest originated with
7
Major General William Keim commander of the Second
8
Division of Pennsylvania Volunteers.
Keim had held several
public offices but had no military experience before he
accepted his commissionon20 April 1861~-the day after the
worst rioting in Baltimore and the very day that John
Merryman rode to that city with the Horse Guard, and the
same day that the train loaded with Pennsylvania troops
was sent into Maryland and halted near Cockeysville by the
burned bridge.

These troops, the First Regiment Infantry,

were attached to Keim's command.

10

During the two days

they camped near Cockeysville they were watched over by

6
J. A. Dix to Wm. Seward, 5 October 1861, ORR,
ser. 2, 1:575.
7

S. Yohe to Capt. Heckman, 21 May 1861, ORR, ser. 2,

1:575.
8
9

Dyer, Compendium, p. 270.

u.s.,

Bureau of the Census, Negro Population, p. 450.

lODyer, Compendium, p. 270.

102
John Merryman and the Horse Guard and presumably they
watched in return.

This reciprocal surveillance and the

fact that Merryman brazenly rode into the Pennsylvanians'
camp on at least one occasion left the two units and most
especially their officers at least casually acquainted.

It

is altogether possible, in fact quite likely, that Merryman
formally introduced himself to the Pennsylvanian officers
when they met face to face.

Indeed, considering the

cordiality of the meeting, it would have been strange if
Merryman had not done so.

Unfortunately for Merryman, this

courtesy may have led to his incarceration some weeks later.
It was likely the Pennsylvanians learned exactly who he was
and where he lived from Merryman himself.
When the First Pennsylvania went back up the
Northern Central towards Harrisburg it was to be the first
leg of a new route to Washington, D.C. via Harrisburg, York,
Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Annapolis.

11

Had they

completed that journey it is unlikely that they and Merryman
would ever have met again.
to jail.

Merryman might never have gone

But the Pennsylvanians did not continue on to

Washington.

Theygotno further than Camp Scott near York

where they remained for several weeks~

11

2

s. Cameron to Officer in Command and W. Scott,
Orders, 21 April 1861, ORR, ser. 1, 2:584.
12

Dyer, Compendium, p. 1577.
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In the middle of May General Keirn's superiors
assigned him the responsibility of securing the Northern
Central Railroad for the use of the government.

Consequently

Keirn ordered troops under his command into Maryland to
assume positions along the route of the railroad.

The First

Pennsylvania was part of the force sent to central Baltimore
County.

13
An important aspect of protecting the railroad

involved preventing any disloyal activity by partisans
living along the line.

On May twenty-first Keirn directed one

of his colonels, Samuel Yohe of the First Regiment, to
disarm a company of men in the Cockeysville area.

The

colonel, in turn, issued written orders to one of his captains
directing him and his men "to seize the arms of the company
near you'' and arrest its captain if found "in arms against
the Government."

As these orders descended the chain of

command no names were mentioned, but the use of the
definite article "the" suggests that the colonel had a
specific company in mind and that the captain would know
what he meant.

In any event the lieutenant assigned the

chore took a patrol and went out and arrested John Merryman. 14

14

G. Cadwalada to E. Townsend, 27 May 1861,
Enclosure #1: S. Yohe to Capt. Heckman, 21 May 1861,
Enclosure #2: J. Miltirnore and W. Abel, Arrest Report, n.d.,
ORR, ser. 2, 1:574-575.
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This was either one incredible coincidence or else the
lieutenant knew exactly who was wanted.
As has already been mentioned, Merryman's arrest
created quite a sensation, but it also created a good deal
of confusion, some of which remains.

The Baltimore press

immediately jumped to the conclusion that Merryman's arrest
resulted from his part in burning the bridges along the
Northern Central a few weeks earlier.

Apparently, Merryman's

incendiary activities were so well known that the logical,
although incorrect, connection was quickly made and
reported almost as a matter of fact.

The Baltimore American

attributed Merryman's arrest to his "having led the party
that followed the Pennsylvania troops from Cockeysville,
and burned and destroyed the bridges between that point and
. l.ine. "15
th e P ennsy 1 vania

Concurring, but using more care-

ful wording, the rival Sun reported that the charge upon
which Merryman was arrested "is said to have been a
participation in the burning of the bridges on the Northern
Central railway between Cokeysville and the Maryland line."
Other newspapers elsewhere in the country immediately

15 Baltimore American, 27 May 1861, p. 1.
16

Baltimore Sun, 27 May 1861, p. 1.

16
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repeated and thereby promulgated this misconception. 17
Some historians have since helped perpetuate it.

18

The action that culminated in Merryman's arrest
was not prompted by his or the Horse Guard's part in the
bridge burning, but by their possession of certain arms.
When organized, the Horse Guard was regularly issued
pistols and sabres by the state.

Later, they illicitly

received a batch of rifles which were distributed as far
as they would go among the membership.

This issue was

most likely made in Towsontown sometime during the weekend
of April twentieth-twenty-first.

19

Where these weapons came from remains a mystery.

20

It must be remembered that at the time there was a relatively
large number of arms in circulation.

People had looted the

gunshops of Baltimore and seized the United States arsenal
at nearby Pikesville as well as other government arsenals
in Virginia and further south.

21

There is some indication

that the rifles acquired by the Horse Guard came from, or

17

Missouri Republican, 26 May 1861, p. 2; New York
Evening Post, 27 May 1861, p. l; New York Herald, 26 May
1861, p. 5.
18 Lewis,
.
. h out Fear or Favor, p. 44 7.
Wit
19 Evi. d ence, p. 61.
20

one man who received a rifle later testified that
he did not know its source.
Ibid.
21
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through, Baltimore.

This strongly suggests that General

Steuart had something to do with providing the weapons
because the Horse Guard was operating under his command
and he was then cultivating a relationship with Virginia
Confederates that would include an agreement for them to
. wit
. h arms. 22
supp 1 y h 1m

No matter where or how they came by them, the
Horse Guard apparently had rifles stolen from the Federal
government and the Army knew it.

Members of the Pennsylvania

First might have actually seen such arms in the possession
of Merryman or his men when they met at the Pennsylvanians'
camp near Cockeysville on April twenty-second.

The purpose

of the mission that brought these same soldiers to Merryman's
house the night he was arrested was to repossess arms that
were held illegally.

"Seize the arms" their orders began.

"By all means get the arms," they reiterated.

23

As it

happened, the only thing seized was Merryman.
Merryman's home was neither the first or only one
invaded.

Earlier soldiers had searched the homes and

22

wright, Secession Movement, p. 70. Steuart did
receive at least 351 rifles from Virginian authorities
sometime between April twentieth and twenty-fifth. G.
Steuart to J. Letcher, 24 April 1861, ORR, ser. 1, 51:34-35.
23

S. Yohe to Capt. Heckman, 21 May 1861, ORR,
ser. 2, 1:575.
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businesses of several other prominent members of the Horse
.
d some ri. f 1 es. 2 4
Guar d and con f iscate
were not bothered.

h ran k and f i. 1 e
Te

They had been told by their officers

to give up their rifles if requested, but most were never
asked.

Some managed to keep them indefinitely as souvenirs.

25

The point is that the Army's arrest of Merryman
stemmed not from any part he played in burning any bridges,
but from the rifles that came into the possession of his
unit.

Never were the burned bridges mentioned:

not in the

orders, not in the arresting officer's report, and not by
anyone connected with the immediately ensuing litigation.
This is not to say that Merryman did not participate in the
destruction of the bridges, because he did.

Nor is it to

say that the government never discovered the worst that
Merryman had done, because they eventually did.

26

It is

only to say that when they took him into custody the
Army apparently did not know about the worst that John
Merryman had done.

24 Evi'd ence, p.

25
26

77.

Ibid. , p. 6 2.

Grand jury testimony revealed Merryman's role in
burning the bridges. Evidence. Merryman was indicted on
a charge of treason.
Indictment of J. Merryman, 10 July 1861,
U.S. vs. John Merryman, United States District Court,
District of Maryland, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
(Hereafter referred to as U.S. vs. John Merryman.)
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Another irony of Merryman's arrest is that the
orders that came down the chain of command from General
Keim to Colonel Yohe to Captain Heckman to Lieutenant Abel
in no way described John Merryman as a person to be
arrested.

Actually, they only alluded to arresting anyone.

Their primary objective was to secure the seizure of the
arms in the possession of the militia unit to which John
Merryman just happened to belong.

The only arrest they

contemplated was that of the company's captain, and his
only if he were found "in arms against the Government."

27

A captain John Merryman was not, though he was a lieutenant.
Yet even if it had been an honest and simple case of
mistaken identity, Merryman was most certainly not "in arms
against the Government" when taken into custody, but rather
by all accounts he was in bed.
In seizing John Merryman the Army had apparently
trampled on the constitutional rights guaranteed to every
citizen by the fourth amendment.

Merryman's right to be

secure in his house and person against unreasonable search
and seizure, which the Constitution decreed "shall not be
violated," had been ignored.

The required arrest warrant,

which was to issue only on "probable cause supported by

27

S. Yohe to Capt. Heckman, 21 May 1861, ORR,
ser. 2, 1: 5 7 5.
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oath or affirmation" had never been sought.

28

Such

niceties as these incontrovertible points of constitutional
law the Army simply ignored.
If any of the Army officers involved--General Keim,
Colonel Yohe, Captain Heckman, or Lieutenant Abel--had
complied with the fourth amendment and sought a warrant
to legitimize the Army's action of the night of May
twenty-fifth, it is doubtful that John Merryman would have
been arrested.

A proper warrant would have described

"the place to be searched, and the persons to be seized. 1129
According to the orders Keim transmitted down the chain
of command weapons were to be seized not people, unless it
were absolutely necessary and then only the captain of the
company and him only "if in arms against the Government."
Somehow between the captain and the lieutenant the original
objectives became muddled because arresting John Merryman
did not follow from the general's orders.

Meanwhile,

Charles Ridgley the real captain of the Horse Guard and who,
according to the general's orders, was at least conditionally
liable to arrest, remained free.

A proper warrant issued

consequent to the original orders of General Keim would
have provided only for Ridgley's arrest, thus obviating

28
29

U.S. Const. amend IV.
Ibid.
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the mix-up that put John Merryman in Fort McHenry, if not
the judicial-executive conflict that ensued.

CHAPTER VIII
SATURDAY, 25 MAY 1861
Whatever the reasons for his incarceration, given
the circumstances the most logical legal recourse for
remedying the situation was for Merryman to apply for
relief via a writ of habeas corpus.

If John Merryman

could procure such a writ it would entitle him to a public
hearing in open court disclosing the facts of his predicament.

His custodian (General George C. Cadwalader head

of the Department of Annapolis commanding at Fort McHenry)
would have to show sufficient cause for continuing
Merryman's confinement or, failing that, be required to
release him.
To get this hearing, Merryman had to first file a
petition asking that a writ of habeas corpus be issued.

1

On Saturday morning 25 May 1861 a brief statement was
composed in Merryman's jail cell.

It recounted Merryman's

arrest and charged that it had been carried out "without
any process or color of the law whatsoever."

According to

the petition, Merryman was indignant at the impudence of

1

Hurd, A Treatise, bk. 2:211-213.
111

112
his captors who, it was claimed, "pretended" no legal right
to hold him.

The Army, the statement pointed out, had "no

warrant from any court, magistrate, or other person having
legal authority to issue the same . . . to justify such
arrest," and they knew it.

Obviously, Merryman's rights

under the Constitution had been violated on several counts.
As for the charges against him, Merryman related being told
his arrest stemmed from his allegedly being "captain of some
company in Baltimore County."
had never held that rank.

This was denied.

Merryman

Charging General Keim with

personal responsibility for initiating Merryman's arrest
and General Cadwalader with personal responsibility for
continuing his detention, the petition closed with a plea
"that the writ of habeas corpus may issue . . . to the end
that . . . the . . . petitioner be discharged and returned
to liberty."

2

Merryman signed and dated the document.

3

During the morning after his arrest various friends
and relatives tried to come to Merryman's assistance, but
only his brother-in-law and two lawyers were allowed any

2

J. Merryman, Petition to R. B. Taney, 26 May 1861,
Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Case. No. 9, 487 (1861) at 145.

3

rn the original petition the text is of a different
hand than the signature and date. J. Merryman, Petition
to R. B. Taney, 26 May 1861, Ex parte Merryman, Case files,
U.S. Federal District Court, U.S. Courthouse, Baltimore,
Maryland.
(Hereafter referred to as Ex parte Merryman,
original case file.)
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communication with the prisoner.

After consulting with

Merryman, one of his lawyers, George Hawkins Williams,
left Fort McHenry with his client's statement of the case
in his possession.

He proceeded to the U.S. commissioner's

office where he swore out, "on the Holy Evangely of
Almighty God," an affidavit attesting to the truth of the
"matter and facts" in Merryman's petition, bore witness
to its signing and, finally, testified that to the best
of his knowledge the petitioner still languished in
. ·1 . 4
Jal

4

G. H. Williams, Affidavit before J. Hannan,
25 May 1861, Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Case No. 9, 487
(1861) at 145.

CHAPTER IX
"THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL"
Although other of Merryman's constitutional rights
had been abrogated, the right of having "the assistance of
counsel for his defense 111 was not denied.

This was common

practice in the early months of the war and several
explanations for this "commendable permissiveness" have
been advanced.

It may have reflected "class conditions and

the localistic focus of internal security operations."

Not

knowing how long the detention of allegedly disloyal persons
would continue, the typical jailer could hardly have been
expected to be strict with a local resident, especially
one of prominence as was often the case, remanded to his
It would have been natural not to deny any

custody.

reasonable request to a prisoner who might any day be freed
and returned to his position in society.

Then again this

practice might have reflected a "respect for civil law's
orderly process" so engrained in Americans that it survived
even in times as exceptional as the spring of 1861.
Finally, because no one had any experience in handling such

1

U.S. Const. amend. VI.
114
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matters, since the situation was unprecedented, nobody knew
exactly how to respond to a request for a lawyer.

All

things considered, a demand to see a lawyer must have seemed
reasonable.

Understandably the tendency would be to allow
2
counsel for those who could afford it.
Two attorneys represented John Merryman in his
difficulties with the United States government.
George H. Williams and George M. Gill.
Democrats.

They were

Politically both were

Professionally both were prominent members of the

Baltimore bar.
Soon after his admission to the bar, George Hawkins
Williams had assumed a place in the front rank among the
lawyers of Maryland.

His ability to cope with the most

involved legal intricacies, along with his persuasive
force and eloquence before a jury, brought him recognition
as a complete lawyer.

Harvard educated, Williams maintained

a scholarly interest in classical studies and proficiency
in several languages throughout his life.

Like all of

his father's family, many of whom had long been established
among the leading businessmen in Baltimore, Williams was a
strict Jeffersonian Democrat.

But while "possessing the

most decided political opinions and convictions" he rarely
took an active part in politics.

2

3

Hyman, Perfect Union, p. 92.

3 Biographical Cyclopedia of Maryland, pp. 248-249.
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Beside serving as counsel to Merryman, to whom he
was related by marriage,

4

Williams also represented at

least three other men arrested by the Army.

George

Worthington, Harrison Scott, and Alfred Matthews, "all
influential and respectable citizens" of the Cockeysville
area, were seized four days after Merryman by Pennsylvania
Volunteers, who carried them off to York, Pennsylvania.
According to newspaper reports, the three had allegedly
been among the group that accompanied Merryman on his
bridge burning foray in April.
to Philadelphia.

5

From York they were removed

After six more days of incarceration a

hearing on the writ of habeas corpus petitioned for in
their behalf came up before Judge John Cadwalader of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
He just happened to be the older brother of General George
Cadwalader who was holding John Merryman.

Counselor

Williams travelled to Philadelphia to participate in the
case, but fearing mob violence left town the day before
the hearing.

An associate appeared in his stead at the

session in Judge Cadwalader's court.

Little legal expertise

was required since the secretary of war had ordered the
unconditional release of the men at the last moment thus
rendering the habeas corpus hearing moot.

4
5

Guard.

As for Williams'

rbid., 553.

None of these men were charter members of the Horse
Baltimore County American, 18 January 1861, p. 1.
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fears, they proved unfounded.
hearing were few and peaceable.

Those who gathered for the
6

Merryman's other lawyer, George M. Gill, had built
one of Maryland's largest legal practices on an "exact
knowledge of the law . . . and conscientious regard for the
best interests of his clients."

In the spring of 1861 those

clients included the City of Baltimore.

Gill's prominence

extended beyond the legal field into business and the
community.

Originally a Whig, later a Democrat, Gill

was known as a

man of "very pronounced . . . political

views. 117

As a member of Merryman's legal team, Gill made
8
an important point during the habeas corpus hearings.
le remained active on Merryman's behalf until bail could be
i::-ranged.

9

6

Baltimore Sun, 4 June 1861, p. l; New York Tribune,
~ay 1861, p. 5; New York Times, 5 June 1861, p. l;
York Herald, 2 June 1861, p. 5; Boston Herald, 3 June
, p. 3. A grandson of Judge Cadwalader has reported
it used to be said in the family that 'if judge John
ssued the writ, he would damn well have made his
er obey it.' This quote appears in Lewis, Without
)r Favor, p. 534.
7 .
· 1 Cye 1 ope d.1a o f Mary 1 an,
d
B1ograp h 1ca
pp. 290 - 29 1.

8

rt was Gill who during the first court session
Colonel Lee from leaving the courtroom and kept the
moving along by suggesting that Lee should be asked
i brought John Merryman.
Seep. 147 below.
Baltimore Sun, 15 July 1861, p. 1.
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Arrests such as Merryman's continued for the
duration of the war,

10

but access to lawyers by those

arrested was not always allowed.

As the conflict entered

its first winter the government issued orders to some of
the stockades holding political prisoners that led to a
severe abridgement of their constitutional right to counsel.
Inmates were informed that the Lincoln administration would
"not recognize anyone as an attorney for political prisoners"
and warned that any attempt by any means by anyone to gain
his freedom by any legal maneuver would be looked on with
''distrust."

Barely bothering to veil its bald threat, the

government promised that violation of this directive would
be considered further reason for continuing a man's
.
11
d etention.

lOit has been estimated that as many as 38,000
people were held as political prisoners at one time or
another during the war.
Government records reveal the
names of 13,000. J. G. Randall and David Donald, The Civil
War and Reconstruction (Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1961),
p. 301; J. G. Randall, Constitutional Problems Under
Lincoln (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1951),
pp. 152-153 note 25.
11

F. W. Seward to M. Burke, 27 November 1861, ORR,
ser. 2, 2:153; Notice addressed to political prisoners-in Fort La Fayette: S. Hawley, 11 November 1861, ORR,
ser. 2, 2:156.
--

CHAPTER X
SUNDAY, 26 MAY 1861
John Merryman was well into his second day of
confinement when, even though it was Sunday, one of his
lawyers, George Williams, returned to Fort McHenry.

On

behalf of his client, he sought and was granted a meeting
with General Cadwalader.

During this interview Williams'

first requested, then demanded, permission to see and make
copies of the papers by which the Army held John Merryman.
The General refused.

Miffed at this rebuff, Williams

departed for the U.S. commissioner's office to swear out
his second affidavit of the weekend; this one relating
his encounter with the General.

1

A few hours later Williams arrived in Washington,
D.C. with the affidavit he had sworn out earlier that day,
the affidavit he had attested to the day before, and
John Merryman's statement.

Together they met every
2
requirement for a writ of habeas corpus.
He took them

1 G. Williams, Affidavit before J. Hannan, 26 May
1861, Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Case No. 9, 487 (1861) at
145.
2

Hurd, A Treatise, bk. 2:213-214.
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directly to a house at 23 Indiana Avenue, the permanent
Washington residence of Roger B. Taney, the chief justice
of the United States Supreme Court.

3

3

navid M. Silver, Lincoln's Supreme Court (Urbana,
Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1956), p. 97.

CHAPTER XI
ROGER BROOKE TANEY
Roger Brooke Taney came from a family that had done
well in America.

Within a generation after coming to the

colonies as indentured servants his ancestors prospered and
became fairly well-to-do tobacco growers in southern
Maryland.

Over one and a quarter centuries a succession

of Michael Taney's (the first born son was traditionally
christened Michael) inherited, maintained, and expanded the
family's holdings in Calvert County.

Life for the Taney's

was amiable, business adequately remunerative, and in
general they enjoyed what material benefits and social
prestige their locality could bestow.

1

When Michael V sired his second son in 1777 he
named the baby for his father-in-law Roger Brooke.

2

A

traditionalist, Michael V had opposed the repeal of
primogeniture and fully intended to leave the family's
ancestral holdings to his oldest son, Michael VI.

3

In

1

carl Brent Swisher, Roger B. Taney (New York:
Macmillan Co., 1935), pp. 1-7.
2 Lewis,
.
Fear or Favor, p . 5.
3 Ibid., p. 7; Samuel Tyler, Memoir of Roger Brooke
Taney (Baltimore: John Murphy & Co., 1872), p. 34.
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previous generations younger sons had recieved land acquired
elsewhere, but the economic dislocations of the Revolution
(which the Taney's supported) made it impossible to provide
4
for additional heirs in this manner.
So it happened that
Michael V's second and subsequent sons received only a name,
an education, and training in a profession.

Second son

Roger Brooke Taney attended Dickinson College, read for
admittance to the bar, and in 1799 at the age of twenty-two
hung out his shingle.

5

It proved a propitious choice of

careers, as a result of entering the law young Taney would
become the first of his family to gain more than local
prominence.
Collateral with beginning his career in the law,
Taney became involved in politics.

Almost simultaneously

he won his first case and, through the influence of his
father and friends, election to the lower house of the
state legislature as a Federalist.
was his family's peers:

6

Taney's constituency

the country gentlemen of southern

Maryland who rode to the hounds for sport; ate, drank, and
dressed well by habit; and found cash a desirable but
dispensable accessory to aristocracy.

7

4 swisher, R. B. Taney, pp. 10-11.
5

Tyler, Memoir, p. 56.

6

swisher, R. B. Taney, pp. 29-32; Lewis, Without
Fear or Favor, pp. 33-36.
7

swisher, R. B. Taney, pp. 2-3.
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The planters of southern Maryland were land poor.
Chronically short of cash, they lived on credit extended
against their future crops.

Agent's commissions, interest

rates, high transportation costs, and their own extravagant
lifestyles combined to further complicate maintenance of
solvency.

Often remedial financial arrangements were made,

usually with outsiders because the planting region lacked
the capital.

These outsiders may have resided as close as

Baltimore, or more distantly in New York, or New England, or,
like much of the market for tobacco, clear across the
Atlantic in England or France.

Other than the financial

relationship, the planters had little in common with these
people.

The necessity of these arrangements did not preclude

a resentfulness among the planters of the moneyed aristocracy
and outside financial institutions.

Part of the planter

class by blood and background, Roger B. Taney was thoroughly
familiar with this situation by the time he reached manhood.

8

After completing his education, professional
training, and political apprenticeship Taney did not stay
long on his native soil in southern Maryland.

Perhaps he

sensed the approaching economic decline of the region.
Obviously, there was relatively little professional opportunity for a young lawyer in that agrarian society.

Any

vacillation on his part was settled by the results of the

124
1800 election.

Taney suffered an awful drubbing at the

polls and suddenly his political career in his home county
looked as dim as did his professional prospects.
decided to relocate.

Taney

He considered Baltimore, but chose

Frederick in Washington County in the western part of the
state.

There he had some friends and better prospects for

immediate professional advancement.

9

As an outsider in Frederick it was difficult for
Taney to attain political position--at least at first.
However, although it was politics that would repeatedly
bring Taney to prominence, it was the law that would always
furnish the main thread for the fabric of his life.
Frederick Taney's legal career began in earnest.

10

In
There

he developed his extraordinary abilities as a lawyer.
His life changed.

11

In his twenty-two years of residence

in Frederick Taney built a practice that extended throughout
the county and the state, acquired a wife, started a family,

9

Tyler, Memoir, pp. 83, 94-95.

1 °For a detailed account of Taney's legal career in
Frederick see Edwards. Delaphine, "Chief Justice Roger B.
Taney--His Career at the Frederick Bar," Maryland Historical
Magazine 13 (1918).
11

Taney became 'a great technical lawyer' and a
skilled advocate. Quote from Bernard Steiner, Life of
Roger B. Taney (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins Co., 1922),
pp. 540-541; see also Lewis, Without Fear or Favor, p. 68.
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and began to break his life-long affiliation with the
Federalist party.

12

He also began his involvement with

local banking by taking an active part in the organization
and management of the Frederick branch of the Farmer's Bank
of Maryland (which shared a brick building with his law
offices) and working toward banking and currency reforms
during a term in the state senate election to which he
won only after residing in the community for several years.
Over the years demand for Taney's professional
services increased.

In time it became apparent that if he

wanted to rise to the top of his profession, as seemed to
be his destiny, he would have to move to Baltimore.

While

Taney had been in Frederick, Baltimore had boomed to become
second only to New York among the nation's cities.
14
he made the move.

In 1823

After joining the Baltimore bar Taney

rapidly rose to prominence thanks to a combination of his
abilities and the death or retirement of some of the bar's
more established members.

15

In the meantime Taney

continued in local banking by serving as counsel

12

Ibid., pp. 60-79, 43-44; Swisher, R. B. Taney,
pp. 101-102, 53-81.
13

Ibid., pp. 83-84; Lewis, Without Fear or Favor,

p. 69.
14

swisher, R. B. Taney, pp. 106-107; Lewis, Without
Fear or Favor, p. 80.
15Ibid., p. 82.

13
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for Baltimore's largest bank, the Union Bank of
Maryland.

16

In Baltimore Taney's professional reputation grew,
reaching a high point in the fall of 1827 when he was
offered the attorney generalship of Maryland.

It was a

great honor, more so because he and the governor were
anything but political allies.

Years later Taney revealed

that this was the only political office to which he ever
. d . 17
aspire

Thrilled, Taney accepted, though the job

18
. d t o b e more t·ime consuming
·
th an remunerative.
·
promise
Of course, he could still pursue his lucrative private
practice on the side, but from this point forward his time
would be increasingly devoted to public service.

This would

cost Taney money and comfort, especially in his later years
when he experienced some embarrassing financial difficulties.
In the presidential election of 1824 Taney reluctantly came to support the doomed candidacy of Andrew
Jackson.

It took him a while because Taney had to overcome

the vestigial Federalism inherent in his political soul

16

Ibid., p. 89

17

Roger B. Taney, "Roger B. Taney's 'Bank War
Manuscript,'" Maryland Historical Magazine (June and
September 1958): June 117.
18
19

Lewis, Without Fear or Favor, pp. 99-100.
Ibid., pp. 260-261.

19

127

before he could support Jackson.

In any case, that year

20
.
. th e e l ectioneering.
.
.
Taney too k no active
part in

But

by 1828 he had become an enthusiastic and highly visible
supporter of Jackson, having chaired the Jackson Central
Committee of Maryland in the interim.

Now a confirmed

Democrat, Taney cheered his candidate's vindication at the
polls.

His efforts on Jackson's behalf were noticed, but

Taney did not immediately receive a reward.

Finally, in

an 1831 reorganization of the cabinet Jackson tapped Taney
. d States. 21
to b e t h e new attorney genera l o f t h e Unite

Jackson and Taney shared a belief that the nation's
largest financial institution, the federally chartered
Bank of the United States, was too powerful, potentially
dangerous, and therefore should be done away with.

Once

an admirer of the bank because he thought it promoted sound
22
.
currency prac t ices,
Taney h a d come t o resen t an d f ear

the pressure it could exert on smaller, local banks such
as those with which he had become involved.

The bank of

the United States could crush any local bank almost any

20

swisher, R. B. Taney, p. 121; Steiner, Life of
R. B. T., pp. 84-85.
21

swisher, R. B. Taney, pp. 122-123, 126-192; Lewis,
Without Fear or Favor, pp. 121-122, 124; Taney, 'Bank
War Manuscript,' pp. 117-118.
22S'l
i ver, Lincoln's Court, p. 14.
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time it chose.

23

That it had not yet done so was of little

comfort to men of Taney's and Jackson's mind.

What had

happened was that some of the bank's personnel used their
inside positions for personal gain through means that verged
on fraud.

Taney once represented an innocent victim and

one of the bank's unprincipled employees in a suit to
recover damages that Taney fought to the Supreme Court but
lost.

24

Granted, in the interim the bank had upgraded

the ethics of its people, but that one episode greatly
affected Taney and would affect the ultimate fate of the
bank.

When Congress sent a bill extending the bank's

charter, Taney made himself useful by helping Jackson
draft a presidential veto message.

25

In the subsequent political struggle to determine
the bank's future, the so-called ''Bank War," Taney continued
to serve his president well.

For the next wave of the

assault against the bank, Jackson wanted to deny it the
deposits of federal funds.

However, due to a provision

in the bank's existing charter, which still had several
years to run, this could not be done without the complicity

23

Lewis, Without Fear or Favor, pp. 89, 133-134.

24

swisher, R. B. Taney, pp. 89-91; Steiner, Life
of R. B. T., pp. 105-106.
25

Lewis, Without Fear or Favor, pp. 159-165;
Swisher, R. B. Taney, p. 194.
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of the secretary of the treasury.

The current holder of

that office refused to oblige Jackson, and so was removed
and replaced by another who proved equally uncooperative.
Into the breech stepped Taney.

Nominated to be Jackson's

third secretary of the treasury in a matter of months,
Taney oversaw the emasculation of the bank by cutting off
the government monies it normally received and diverting
them to favored "pet'' banks such as the Union Bank of
Maryland, in which Taney yet retained a small financial
interest.

When Congress next assembled, the bank's

friends in the Senate retaliated by blocking Taney's
confirmation.

It was a first.

Never before had a

president's cabinet level nominee been rejected.

But this

attempt at revenge was hollow because the damage had
already been done.

The Bank of the United States would

never again be the same.

26

For Taney there was nothing to do but return to
Maryland and his long neglected private practice.

His

political friends, the state's Jacksonians, greeted him
like a conquering hero and feted him in a series of banquets.
But there were many in Maryland who looked with disfavor on
Jacksonian politics and policies, especially the Bank War.
In the fall elections they carried the state, although
nationally the Jacksonians won and increased their majority

26

Taney, 'Bank War Manuscript'; Lewis, Without
Fear or Favor, pp. 172-179.
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in the House.

This was of little consolation to Taney for

whom the election results in Maryland were a personal
embarrassment that bode ill for his future in politics in
his home state.

27

Fortunately for Taney, General Jackson was not one
to forget a foot soldier injured in his service.

Shortly

after the New Year he submitted Taney's name to the Senate
as a nominee for associate justice of the Supreme Court.
An opening had been created by the arranged resignation of
eighty-two year old, deaf and more than ready to retire
Justice Duvall.

Years before he had presided over Taney's

first case and ever since he had watched with approval his
rise to prominence.
During the confirmation hearings anti-Jacksonian
senators focused attention on Taney's role in the late Bank
War.

They charged that he had been a "pliant instrument" of

the president; the implication being that having no mind
or principles of his own Taney, therefore, was unfit to
sit on the nation's highest court.
had been no such thing.

This was unfair.

Taney

Actually he may have been more an

influence on Jackson than Jackson was on him.

But whether

co-conspirator or mere henchman, the distinction meant little
to those who felt that Taney had been a willing accomplice

27

rbid., pp. 127-137.
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in either case.

Unfortunately for his immediate ambitions

at the last moment of the session, the Senate, neither
forgetting nor forgiving, rejected Taney's name once
again.

28

Of course he had no way of knowing it at the time,

but for Taney this would prove one of those rare "blessings
in disguise."
Four months later on 6 July 1835 the death of the
venerable John Marshall instigated a search for a new chief
justice of the United States Supreme Court.

There were many

prominent public figures anxious to succeed Marshall, who
during his term had made the Court a force with which to be
reckoned.

Some, though eminently qualified, had been too

long of the wrong political persuasion

to hold any hope of

getting Jackson's nod; others had the right political
ideology, but were not competent.

Then there was Roger B.

Taney who met every political and professional requirement
for the job.

Public speculation on the matter did not end

until December when Jackson sent Taney's name to the Senate.
Although Taney never admitted it until much later, Jackson
had saved his good friend the agony of not knowing by
informing him several months before that the nomination
.
29
was h lS.
28 rbid., pp. 238-239; Swisher, R. B. Taney, pp. 311314. Taney is probably due considerable credit for planning
as well as directing the Bank War. Refer to R. B. Taney to
A. Jackson, 5 August 1833, Andrew Jackson, The Correspondence
of Andrew Jackson, ed. John Spender Bassett, 7 vols.
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington,
1929-1935), 5:147-148.
29 Lewis, Without Fear or Favor, pp. 242-243.
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Confirmation, as Taney knew better than any man who
ever aspired to a presidential appointment, was another
matter.

The Senate was evenly split between Jacksonian

and opposing forces until a last minute resignation and
replacement swung the tenuous balance in the Jacksonian's
favor.

But notwithstanding the ostensible advantage,

doubt remained even among Taney's supporters.

Some tried

to defer the vote.

The maneuver failed, the vote was
30
taken, and Taney won handily (29-15).
Taney, who was in Annapolis lobbying before the

Maryland legislature at the time, did not know of his
victory until the congratulations began pouring in the
next day.

Ever the gentleman, his first response was
31
to compose a gracious letter of thanks to Jackson.
Eleven

days later Taney took his oath of office, and after another
eleven days he commenced his judicial career by presiding

30

rbid., pp. 246, 248; Swisher, R. B. Taney,
pp. 317-318. Some who opposed Taney's nomination and led
the fight to block his confirmation later admitted their
error when Taney proved to be worthy successor to Marshall.
Henry Clay, for one, told Taney personally: 'Mr. Chief
Justice, you know that, in my place in the Senate before
your nomination to the office you now fill was submitted
to that body, as well as during its consideration, I said
many harsh things of you . . . But I now know you better .
. . I am now convinced that a better appointment could not
have been made. As quoted by American Bar Association
Journal 17 (December 1931) :786.
31 R. B. Taney to A. Jackson, 17 March 1836,
Jackson, Correspondence, 5:390.
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over the regular April session of the United States Circuit
.
.
32
Court in
Ba l timore.

32

Lewis, Without Fear or Favor, pp. 248-249;
Swisher, R. B. Taney, pp. 323-325.

CHAPTER XII
SUNDAY AFTERNOON, 26 MAY 1861
In a quarter century of service as chief justice of
the United States--"a time of bitterest controversy
ripening into tragical conflict 111 --Roger Taney had seen
a lot of legal documents, but none quite like those brought
before him by John Merryman's lawyer on Sunday afternoon
26 May 1861.

After reading them he took a pen and made a

f ew mar k s on

2 h
· ·
.
th e petition;
t en on a piece
o f f oo 1 scap

he wrote out an order directing the clerk of the United
States Circuit Court for the District of Maryland, Thomas
Spicer, to issue "as prayed . . . in this case" the writ
of habeas corpus "in the usual form."

Specifically, Taney

named General George Cadwalader as correspondent to whom
the writ should be directed and made returnable at eleven
o'clock in the morning of the next day in Baltimore at the
federal court "before me, Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States. 113
lHughes, "R. B. Taney," p. 785.
2

For an explanation of the markings that Taney made
see pp. 213-215 below.
3 R. B. Taney, Order for a Writ of Habeas Corpus,

26 May 1861, Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Case No. 9,487
(1861) at 146.
134
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Accordingly the clerk issued a writ directing the
general to bring John Merryman and appear in court at the
prescribed hour to "certify and make known" the cause of
his "caption

and detention."

The writ ended with a gentle,

but foreboding admonishment to the general that he be
prepared to "submit to • • . and receive whatsoever the
Chief Justice should determine."

4

About four o'clock

that afternoon this writ was served on General Cadwalader
at Fort McHenry by a deputy United States marshal.

4

5

T. Spicer, Writ of Habeas Corpus, 26 May 1861,
Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Case No. 9,487 (1861) at 146.
5

Baltimore Sun, 27 May 1861, p. 1

CHAPTER XIII
A PRELIMINARY BOUT: MAJOR MORRIS
VS. JUDGE GILES
The Merryman habeas corpus writ was not the only one
addressed to Fort McHenry in May of 1861.

Earlier in the

month Judge William F. Giles of the United States Circuit
Court for the District of Maryland in Baltimore issued a
writ of habeas corpus consequent to a petition by the
parents of John George Mullen.

Young Mullen, a minor, had

falsely represented his age and enlisted in the U.S. Army
without his parents' consent and, apparently, much against
their wishes.

Wanting to void his son's obligation to the

Army the boy's father took the matter to court.

A writ was

issued and delivered to Major W.W. Morris the then newly
installed commander of Fort McHenry where the boy was
.
d .1
statione

A career officer of no special distinction,

Morris had graduated last in his class at West Point and
spent forty years in the regular Army fighting Indians and

1

Baltimore Exchange, 3 May 1861, p. l; Baltimore
Sun, 6 May 1861, p. 4; Baltimore American, 3 May 1861, p. 1.
Habeas corpus had been used as a means of testing the legality
of military inductions since the War of 1812. See Sokol,
Handbook, p. 25.
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Mexicans before the secession crisis called him to
.
2
Ba 1 timore.

The major took the writ, read it, and handed

it back to the deputy marshal that had served it with the
brusque reply 'that he would see the Court and the Marshal
damned before delivering up one of his men! •

3

The major's unceremonious response to the Mullen
writ quickly came to the attention of the local press.

4

In fact, much to Judge Giles chagrin, the newspapers had
the story before he did.

Consequently, Giles had the

disconcerting experience of reading the major's insulting
remarks in the morning paper, as did everyone else in
Baltimore.

5

Not surprisingly Major Morris never appeared in
Giles' court as the writ required.

This robbed the judge of

his best chance to personally take the major to task.
Although denied and slighted, there was little in his power
that the judge could do about it.
2

6

However, this being an

Boatner, Civil War Dictionary, p. 570.

3

J. Gittings, Affidavit before J. Hannan, 2 May 1861,
Attorney General's Papers, National Archives, Washington,
D.C.
4

Baltimore Daily Exchange, 3 May 1861, p. 1.

5

Giles apparently read the Exchange article of
3 May 1861. See W. F. Giles to W.W. Morris, 7 May 1861,
Atty. Gen. Papers.
6

contempt.

After three days Giles could have cited Morris for
Hurd, A Treatise, bk. 2:242.
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extraordinary circumstance, Giles made a fittingly extraordinary response.

He reduced his opinion in the case to

writing and handed it out to the local press.

7

Giles later

defended this action by styling it an effort to prevent any
unintentional misrepresentation of what he had said in
court that day.

8

As a result of this highly irregular

proceeding and quite apart from any rationalization for it,
to say that the Mullen habeas corpus case was "tried in the
press" does not merely constitute a figure of speech
because it literally was.
After prefacing his statement with a recounting of
the details of the case, Giles tartly remarked how never
before in his thirty-three years "at the bar and on the
bench" in Maryland had the writ of habeas corpus "failed
to produce obedience to its mandate."

He praised the

protection that the writ normally provided and the wisdom
of the Founders for including it in the Constitution.

Then,

after paraphrasing the habeas corpus clause, Giles offered
three observations of varying astuteness:

one, Granting

that the Constitution provides for suspending habeas corpus
in times of rebellion, he insisted that no such state of

7

Giles' statement appeared in the Baltimore Daily
Exchange, 4 Mayl861, p. 1 and Baltimore Sun, 6 May 1861, p. 4.
8
Papers.

w. F. Giles tow. W. Morris, 7 May 1861, Atty. Gen.
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affairs then existed in Baltimore; two, that the government
had made no proclamation declaring a suspension of habeas
corpus; and three, that "no competent authority," and by
this Giles clearly meant Congress, had acted on the
suspension.

9

The first observation was highly judgmental and

would be challenged.

In the second Giles had a valid point.

Even in official and military circles the Lincoln administration had not widely publicized the suspension and it certainly
had made no public announcement.

But in his third observa-

tion Giles was incontrovertibly correct.
acted nor had it been consulted.

Congress had not

That a mere officer of

the U.S. Army had the temerity to poach on what Giles
believed to be Congress' exclusive domain galled the judge
to no end.
Giles ostensibly made his position known in order
to avoid trouble, not create it.

So with some forbearance,

but even less choice, he went easy on the major.

Rather

than cite him immediately, Giles allowed Morris until the
middle of the coming week to show cause why he would not
be held in contempt of court.

Giles' statement closed

with an apparently sincere plea for reconciliation, but
on his terms, "that no unnecessary conflict of authority

9

Baltimore Daily Exchange, 4 May 1861, p. 1.
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may be brought in, between those owing allegiance to the
same government, and bound by the same laws."

10

Though it surprised him to see Judge Giles' remarks
in the newspaper, reading them diminished neither Morris'
composure or determination.

He presumed the article to be

authentic and responded by setting his thoughts on the
matter to paper.

These he communicated to Judge Giles

via the more regular medium of a private letter.
Morris prefaced his remarks by personally assuming
complete responsibility for the course he had chosen.

He

informed Giles that he had acted on his own accord,
completely without instructions from or consultation with
anyone.

This, in fact, was the case.
As well it should have, Morris' demeanour changed

dramatically between reflexively cursing at a deputy
marshal and thoughtfully addressing a federal judge.

In

respectful and moderate language, the major begged to differ
with Giles on whether the state of affairs in Baltimore
justified a suspension of habeas corpus.

Morris conceived

of it as a ''question of fact, rather than opinion" that
rebellion existed in Baltimore and he cited the record of
recent events in the city as proof.

For some time, Morris

charged, the city had been "entirely under the control of
revolutionary authorities."

lOibid.

He cited attacks on soldiers
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in the streets; some had been killed.

Supply of Fort

McHenry had been interfered with, and intent to capture
it publicly proclaimed.

In downtown Baltimore a man

wearing the uniform of Maryland had cut down the Union flag
from above the Federal offices.

Elsewhere the state

legislature was meeting in special session to debate "forms
of

abrogating the federal compact."

As far as he could

see and everywhere he looked Major Morris saw rebellion.
And he had no compunction about using that word as he knew
no other term applicable.
Morris professed respect for the law in general and
habeas corpus in particular, which he regarded as "the very
basis of free government."

But he also felt obliged to

concern himself with what he considered to be the hard
realities of the situation.

In this case the exigency of

the moment made him feel compelled to ignore some of the
niceties of the law.

Morris had no lack of confidence in

his legal position, but then he had no legal training either.
Nor did he have any pretensions about his motivation for
ignoring the Mullen writ.
announced.

It was "expediency," he frankly

Morris feared that in the hands of an

"unfriendly power" the writ of habeas corpus could reduce
the garrison of Fort McHenry more effectively than "all of
the appliances of modern warfare."

Thus diminished, the

fort could become easy prey for the 'Baltimore mob' which
he believed coveted it.
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Like judge Giles, Major Morris claimed to genuinely
regret their conflict.

But this did not mean that he was

about to submit himself to the court's will--not yet.
However, to his credit the major promised that he would
bring the soldier in question and willingly appear in
court to answer for himself when the "present excitement
passes away."

11

Unfortunately it so happened that Major

Morris passed away before the excitement. 12
Judge Giles accepted Morris' letter as the major's
formal reply to the Mullen writ and filed it with the court
clerk as such.

He did not accept the implicit challenge

of the letter and continued the exchange by refuting the
major's assertion that rebellion existed in Baltimore.
However Giles could not resist the opportunity to have the
last word.

Before effectively closing the case, he

repeated his regret that the major had deemed it his duty
to "practically" suspend habeas corpus, a power which he
believed belonged to "Congress alone." 13

But Judge Giles

11

w. w. Morris to W. F. Giles, 6 May 1861, Atty.
Gen. Paper.
12

.
.
Boatner, C.ivi· 1 War Dictionary,
p. 570 . Mu 1 len
was quietly released from duty. See Freund/Swisher,
The Taney Period, p. 844.
13

w. F. Giles tow. W. Morris, 7 May 1861, Atty.
Gen. Papers.
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could do not more than register his objection.
do no more because he lacked enough clout.

14

He could

As a circuit

court judge Giles had neither the prestige to command
obedience to his paper or the physical resources to impose
his will.

14

Giles sent a copy of the case file to U.S. District
Attorny Wm. Addison who forwarded it to his superiors in
Washington for their consideration. Wm. Addison to E. Bates,
8 May 1861, Attorney General's Letterbooks, National Archives
Washington, D.C.

CHAPTER XIV
MONDAY MORNING, 27 MAY 1861
Precisely at eleven o'clock on Monday 27 May 1861,
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney assumed the bench in the
courtroom of the United States Circuit Court for the
District of Maryland.

Beside him at Taney's special request

sat Judge William Giles of the circuit court.
before them was filled to capacity.

The hall

A large number of

interested spectators and a respectable attendance of
Baltimore's bar had gathered to witness the session.
Counsel for the principals, George M. Gill and George
Hawkins Williams on behalf of John Merryman and William
Meade Addison representing the United States, were present.
Shortly after the hour a sword-packing officer, resplendent
in full dress uniform with red sash, presented himself
before the court.

He identified himself as Colonel Lee,

aide-de-camp to Brevet Major General Cadwalader.

1

1

At

Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Case No. 9,487 (1861)
at 146; National Intelligencer, 30 May 1861, p. 2;
Baltimore American, 28 May 1861, p. l; New York Herald,
28 May 1861, p. l; Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, 28 May 1861,
p. 3; New York Times, 31 May 1861, p. 2.
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least one on-looker wondered if it were proper for the colonel
to be wearing a sword in the courtroom.

2

The colonel announced that he represented the
general and brought his written statement as his return
on the writ of habeas corpus directed to him the previous
day.

The colonel revealed that engagements prevented the

general from leaving the fort.

With no further remarks the

colonel began reading from the prepared statement that in
firm but polite terms explained the general's position.

3

Cadwalader denied any personal responsibility for
Merryrnan's predicament.

The arrest,

he

pointed out, had

been made without his "knowledge or by his order or
direction."
it.

General Keirn of Pennsylvania had authorized

About this Cadwalader said he could do nothing because

Keirn was not within the limits of his command.

As for his

voluntarily discontinuing Merryrnan's detention, Cadwalader
offered little hope.

The prisoner had been remanded to his

custody and, characterizing himself as merely an honest and
humane jailer rather than any kind of persecutor of John
Merryman, Cadwalader expressed his intention to fulfill his
duty.

2

McHenry Howard, Memo, 5 May 1919, Steiner, Steiner,
Life of R. B. T., p. 493.
3

Baltirnore Sun, 28 May 1861, p. l; Missouri
Republican, 29 May 1861, p. 2.
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The Army's charges against Merryman involved
"various acts of treason," and being "publicly associated
with and holding a commission as lieutenant in a company
having in their possession arms belonging to the United
States, and avowing his purpose of armed hostility against
the Government."

Cadwalader further asserted it could be

clearly established that Merryman had often made "unreserved
declarations of his association with this organized force;
as beinq in avowed hostility against the Government and
in readiness to co-operate with those engaged in the
present rebellion."
Cadwalader's statement reiterated his intention to
keep Merryman under lock and key.

Then in one blockbusting

sentence he informed the court of the authority with which
he had been vested by the president "to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus for the public safety" in such cases.

This

was "a high and delicate trust," to be executed "with
judgment and discretion."

However Cadwalader believed

it preferable any errors be "on the side of the safety of
the country."

"Most respectfully," the general asked the

chief justice's "consideration" of the necessity for
cooperation "in the present trying and painful position in
which our country is placed" lest due to "any unnecessary
want of confidence in each other increase in our embarrassments."
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In closing the general requested the chief justice
to temporarily postpone further action on the Merryman
matter.

He wanted time to receive further instructions

from the president.

Upon receiving these the general

promised to renew communications with the court.

4

Finished, Colonel Lee handed the general's statement to the court clerk and announced that he had done his
duty.

The crowd, which had listened attentively, watched

as he quickly prepared to leave.
prove that easy.

But his exit was not to

One of Merryman's lawyers, George Gill,

stood and suggested to the court that Colonel Lee should
inform everyone present if he had the body of John Merryman
as commanded by the writ.

5

Justice Taney took the point

well and proceeded to interrogate the colonel
"Have you brought with you the body of John
Merryman?"
"I have," replied the colonel, "no instructions
except to deliver this response to the court."
"The commanding officer declines to obey the writ?"
"After making that communication," rejoined the
suddenly laconic officer in an obvious effort to avoid being

4

G. Cadwalader to R. B. Taney, 26 May 1861,
Ex parte, 17 Fed. Case No. 9,487 (1861) at 146.
5 Ba 1 timore
.
Sun, 28 May 1861, p. 1
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badgered into saying something inappropriate, "my duty is
ended, and my power is ended."
With that the colonel, red sash and sword, retired
from the room.

6

Momentarily Taney spoke:

"General Cadwalader was

commanded . . . to produce the body of Mr. John Merryman
before me this morning," he recounted, "that the case might
be heard and the petitioner be either remanded to custody
or set at liberty; if held on insufficient grounds."
Unfortunately the general had "acted in disobedience to
the writ. 117

Thus Taney immediately took a "scrap of yellow

paper" and in a "quavering" hand wrote out an order that
a writ of attachment be issued against General Cadwalader

8

"for contempt in refusing to produce the body of John

6 The precise wording of the exchange between Taney
and Lee differs little from one source to another. Tyler,
Memoir, p. 644; Baltimore American, 28 May 1861, p. l;
Baltimore Sun, 28 May 1861, p. l; National Intelligencer,
30 May 1861, p. 4; New York Herald, 28 May 1861, p. l;
Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Case No. 9,487 (1861) at 146.
7 rbid.; Baltimore Sun, 28 May 1861, p. 1.
8

Based on a personal examination of the original
papers by W. Calvin Chestnut, "The Work of the Federal
Court of Maryland," Maryland Historical Magazine 37
(1942):363.
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Merryman according to . . . command. 119

The citation was

dated due returnable the next day at noon.

10

9 order for a Writ of Attachment: R. B. Taney
27 May 1861, Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Case No. 9,487
(1861) at 146-157.
lOThe text of the Writ of Attachment was printed in
Baltimore Sun, 29 May 1861, p. 1.

CHAPTER XV
MAN IN THE MIDDLE: GENERAL GEORGE CADWALADER
For a man innocently drawn into the middle of a
conflict not at all of his own making, General George
Cadwalader acquitted himself admirably.

On no account

could either the press or his superiors justifiably
criticize his handling of the Merryman affair.

Instead he

received praise as "a sound lawyer" and "a good soldier. 111
As a good soldier he followed orders, and as a sound lawyer
he looked after his client's best interests which included
representing them about as well as possible under the
circumstances before the chief justice of the United States
Supreme Court.
George Cadwalader was a member of one of Philadelphia's
most prominent families, a lawyer by profession, and a
soldier on occasion.

At the outbreak of the Mexican War

he volunteered his services and was commissioned as a
brigadier general.

During that conflict Cadwalader saw

considerable action and for his contribution at Chapultepec
his superiors brevetted him to the rank of major general.

1 New Yor k Times,
.
29 May 1861, p. 4.
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After the war Cadwalader returned home and resumed his law
practice.

Some years later when Lincoln issued his call

for volunteers, Cadwalader responded by offering the nation
his services again.

On 19 April 1861, the day of the worst

rioting in Baltimore, the governor of Pennsylvania appointed
him major general of state volunteers.

2

Though he had been commanding at For McHenry less
than two weeks before John Merryman was brought to him on
May twenty-fifth,

3

this was not the first instance of

General Cadwalader's involvement in the military detention
of a civilian at that post.

Prior to Merryman's arrest the

Army had detained other Marylanders of suspected loyalties.

4

On occasion these prisoners wound up at Fort McHenry where
the senior officer had to accept custody of them as duty
and the Articles of War required.

No officer commanding

guard facilities could "refuse to receive or keep any person

2

The National Cyclopedia of American Biography,
vol. 12 (New York: James T. White, Co., 1904), p. 269;
Boatner, Civil War Dictionary, p. 212.
3cadwalader was made head of the Army's "Department
of Annapolis" of 15 May 1861. W. Scott to G. Cadwalader,
15 May 1861, ORR, ser. 2, 1:571.
4

For instance Ross Winans, a prominent businessman,
was arrested on 15 May 1861 in Baltimore. W.W. Morris
to "Ass. Adjutant General, 16 May 1861, ORR, ser. 2, 1:571.
Three men were arrested on or about 18 May 1861 in
Perryville. C. P. Dare to F. J. Porter, n.d., ORR,
ser. 2, 1:573.
--
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commanded to his charge by an officer belonging to the
forces of the United States."

5

When Cadwalader arrived

at McHenry there was at least one civilian prisoner in its
6
stockade.
Less well defined in law than accepting prisoners
was the duty Cadwalader drew to administer an unusual
quasi-judicial process involving the negotiated release of
these political prisoners.

Terms of parole would be

established and those agreeing to them released.

7

Normally

men taken captive by the Army were more interested in
securing their freedom than in achieving political martyrdom,
while for its part the government only wanted some assurance
that they would desist from further disloyalty.

Thus the

purpose of the arbitrary arrests was more prophylactic than
punitive, intended more to overawe potential troublemakers
than to punish those who had actually done or said something
8
considered disloyal.
Through negotiations with the Army and
other Federal authorities a prisoner could regain his

5

Rules and Articles of War sec. XIV, art. 17;
John F. Callan, comp., The Military Laws of the United
States (Philadelphia: George W. Childs, 1863), p. 74.
6

G. Cadwalader to E. D. Townsend, 16 May 1861, ORR,
ser. 2, 1:572.
7
8

The release of Ross Winans is recounted in Ibid.
Hyman, Perfect Union, p. 80.

153
freedom usually conditioned on the signing of an oath of
allegiance and in some cases bail.

The irregularity,

indeed the illegality, of this pracice went unquestioned.
When the Pennsylvania volunteers brought John Merryman
to Fort McHenry, Cadwalader handled the immediate situation
competently and with amazing apparent foresight, though
there was no reason that Merryman would become a "cause
celebre."

As required Cadwalader accepted Merryman as a

prisoner.

He also secured a written account signed by the

arresting officers of the crimes with which Merryman was
to be charged.
general.

This satisfied the military code, but not the

Wanting more information on the Merryman case,

he "directed" the two arresting officers to furnish "more
specific charges and specifications

. against the

accused with the names of witnesses by which it was expected
to prove them and the nature of their testimony. 119
The fact that he made this request suggests some
things about George Cadwalader.

It strongly indicates that

though he had considerable military experience and was
acting in a military capacity at the time, he had not
succumbed and developed a military mentality.

The typical

professional soldier, as for instance Major Morris, would
have been unlikely to ask for additional information

9

G. Cadwalader to E. D. Townsend, 27 May 1861,
ORR, ser. 2, 1:574.
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relating to Merryman's arrest once the demands of the
military code had been satisfied.

But, being essentially

a civilian and professionally a lawyer, Cadwalader apparently
immediately recognized that the charges against Merryman
were nothing but "vague and unsupportable accusations. 1110
He knew that if the government wished to keep Merryman out
of circulation it would be advantageous to develop prosecutable
charges to lodge against him with the witnesses and evidence
to prove them.

In 1861 mere disloyalty was not a crime.

If the information Cadwalader requested had been supplied
to him in time, it would have given him the basis on which
he might have secured a legitimate warrant for Merryman's
arrest.

At the least it certainly would have enabled him to

better answer the inquiry of a writ of habeas corpus.
Cadwalader never revealed exactly what prompted him to make
his request other than to say that he intended to forward
information to Army headquarters "for the instruction of the
general-in-chief."

11

However, in asking for the additional

information it would appear that Cadwalader harbored some
personal dissatisfaction with the way Merryman's arrest was
handled, and an early recognition that successfully holding
that man prisoner might well require more than a secure cell.

lOThe quote is from R. B. Taney in Ex parte Merryman,
17 Fed. Case No. 9,487 (1861) at 147.
11

G. Cadwalader to E. D. Townsend, 27 May 1861,
ORR, ser. 2, 1:574.
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When Merryman's lawyers appeared at Fort McHenry
later in the morning after his arrest, Cadwalader readily
allowed them to see their client.

He may or may not have

been motivated by respect for the sixth amendment's
guarantee of the right to counsel enhanced by his own
professional bias to see that a man in trouble received
qualified legal advice, but Cadwalader was undoubtedly
animated by a sense of social or class affinity.

Like

Merryman, Cadwalader and his subordinate officer were
considered 'gentlemen of social position.'

Recognized as

being 'capable of appreciating the circumstances of the
case,' they were applauded for being well disposed to relieve
their prisoner of 'everything needlessly offensive or
unpleasant.'

As was the practice early in the war,

Cadwalader tried to make the conditions of Merryman's
incarceration as tolerable as possible under the circumstances.
This included, in time, liberal visiting privileges for his
f

.
d s. 12
am1·1 y an d f rien

It was during this first meeting between Merryman
and his counsel that the decision was made to seek a writ
of habeas corpus.

12

Exactly who first proposed this course of

The above quote was attributed to the Baltimore
Sun and appeared in the New York Evening Post, 3 June 1861,
p. 2. The typical arrest in Maryland during this period
was carried out with "every consideration shown to the
gentlemen detained." C. P. Dare to F. J. Porter, 19 May
1861, ORR, ser. 2, 1:573.
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action is anybody's guess, but the final decision must have
been Merryman's, he being the client.
was is no matter.

Whoever's idea it

What is important is that when Merryman's

lawyers left him Saturday morning they took with them his
signed petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

This indicated

a determination to spurn the "normal" negotiated release and
a refusal to be intimidated.
It would be difficult to identify exactly when
General Cadwalader became aware that such a decision had
been made.

However, the next day when one of Merryman's

lawyers, George Williams, returned to the fort requesting an
interview with General Cadwalader it quickly became apparent
that the general was still in command of the situation, even
if he was unaware of Merryman's strategy.

When asked by what

authority Merryman was being held, Cadwalader made no
comment.

When requested to provide copies of the papers by

which Merryman was held, he politely but steadfastly refused.
Even if he did not yet know of the decision, these questions
alone should have been enough to alert him that Merryman
was not contrite and that he and his counsel had little
interest in negotiating.
on the lawyer's part.

The meeting was plainly a gambit

Actually he probably held little hope

of getting much cooperation from Cadwalader.

What he wanted,

and got, was for the general and hence the Army and the
Lincoln administration to make a commitment to a posture
that could be construed as interference with the judicial
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process.

Yet even if Cadwalader had not been aware of so

transparent a ploy (and there is no reason to believe that
he was not) he could hardly have answered much differently.
After all Cadwalader did not have enough information to
satisfy himself.
lawyer?

How could he have satisfied Merryman's

Of course none of this really mattered because by

this point it must have been clear to all parties involved
that Merryman and his lawyers intended to take the matter to
court.
As a military officer General Cadwalader must surely
have felt well armed to meet this challenge.

Earlier, on

May sixteenth, his superiors had specifically empowered
him "to arrest persons and to hold them prisoners though
they be demanded by writs of habeas corpus. 1113

But the

civilian and lawyer in Cadwalader accepted this authority
warily, agreeing with his superiors that it was "certainly
a high and delicate trust."

At the time Cadwalader promised

he would act with "prudence and discretion" in such matters,
but he seemed to be hoping that it would never come to
pass.

14
When the deputy marshal delivered the writ of habeas

corpus to FortMcHenry, General Cadwalader accepted its

13

E. D. Townsend to G. Cadwalader, 16 May 1861, ORR,
ser. 2, 1:571-572.
14

G. Cadwalader to E. D. Townsend, 16 May 1861, ORR,
ser. 2, 1: 5 7 2 .
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service, read it carefully, and prepared his response.

One

contemporary commentator aptly described it as a "model of
military excellence" and "a merciful rebuke. 1115

Unlike

Andrew Jackson, who faced a similar situation in New Orleans
during the War of 1812, Cadwalader showed no truculence toward
16
the court, but made a respectful return on the writ.
Cadwalader must have appreciatively noted that the
writ did not ask any truly hard questions of him.

Its

primary inquiry was that he "certify and make known the day
and cause of capture and detention of John Merryman."

This

he easily complied with by quoting from the statement he
received from the two arresting officers.

That arrest,

Cadwalader smugly noted, was not made "with his knowledge, or
by his order or direction," but by others whom he named and
whom he specifically pointed out were not subject to his
command.

In essence Cadwalader claimed that he personally

had nothing to do with Merryman's plight.
Although he attempted to exculpate himself from any
wrongdoing, Cadwalader was not contrite.

Quite the contrary,

he expressed no remorse for the Army's actions.

Neither was

he conciliatory toward the court, he frankly declared that
he was not about to release Merryman.

15
16
p. 302.

He informed the chief

New York Tribune, 30 May 1861, p. 6.
Randall and Donald, Civil War and Reconstruction,
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justice of his authority to suspend habeas corpus in such
cases and his intention to do so in this one.

Continuing in

this assertive manner, Cadwalader boldly asked the chief
justice's assistance in exercising what he termed in a
phrase cribbed from his own orders, this "high and delicate
trust."

Cadwalader wanted the court to hold itself in

abeyance until he could receive further instructions from
his superiors.
However it must be pointed out that in replying to
the writ Cadwalader was more than a little disingenuous with
the chief justice.

Although he willingly answered the writ's

inquiries into the circumstances surrounding Merryman's
arrest and confinement, he had absolutely no intention of
meeting any of its three demands.

The writ "commanded" him

to appear in court, to bring John Merryman with him, and to
accept whatever the court might decide.

Instead, Cadwalader

sent a surrogate with a weak, unsubstantiated excuse for his
absence and kept Merryman securely under lock and key.

As

for submitting to whatever the court might determine, what
would be was plain to all and plainly in conflict with the
general's determination to hold John Merryman prisoner.
Cadwalader's return on the Merryman writ may not have
been absolutely complete in every strict legal sense, but
at the same time it was at least arguably passable.

It was

all right that Cadwalader had not appeared in court in
person.

Instead, he responded in writing, which was the only
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alternate manner acceptable.

17

In his letter the general

duly stated the time and cause of Merryman's capture and
detention as was required.
Merryman as commanded.

However, he did not produce

But that too was allowable as long

.
as an accepta bl e reason f or not d oing
so was provi. d ed. 18
Cadwalader gave a reason, after a fashion, for not producing
Merryman.

It involved his wanting to wait for further

instructions from the president.
bility.

The key was its accepta-

But in any case he deserved a presumption of

rectitude in this.

It was only a technicality,but according

to legal custom an official acting in the line of duty
deserved the benefit of the doubt.

19

In this case that

meant the benefit of time for Cadwalader to confer with
his superiors.
The word from the general's superiors for which
Taney would not wait eventually arrived.
supported his course of action.

They completely

Cognizant of the high

level to which the issue had been escalated through the
involvement of the chief justice, but refusing to be
intimidated, they reiterated to Cadwalader his power to

17
18

Hurd, A Treatise, bk. 2:239-240.
Ibid., pp. 243-244.

19 M d'
a ison vs. Mott, 12 Wh eaton, 1 9 at 33 (1827);
refer to Hymen, Perfect Union, p. 84.
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decline to produce prisoners in response to writs of habeas
corpus "no matter who issued them."

Incidentally, the

brass extended him discretionary power to release any
prisoner whose arrest he judged had been made without
2
. .
.
su ff icient
evi. d ence o f gui. 1 t. O At one time
Ca d wa 1 a d er
might have considered doing this for John Merryman, but
now no such disposition existed.

Instead, as if invoking

the proposition that might is right, General Cadwalader
retired behind the substantial walls of Fort McHenry and
would have no further formal communication with any one
concerning John Merryman.

20

E. D. Townsend to G. Cadwalader, 28 May 1861,
ORR, ser. 2, 1:576-577.

CHAPTER XVI
TUESDAY MORNING, 28 MAY 1861
Tuesday 28 May 1861 marked the thirty-ninth day
since Washington Bonifant had been made United States
marshal for the district of Maryland by Abraham Lincoln. 1
Early on that morning the Republican appointee and his
deputy took the writ of attachment for contempt of court
issued late the previous afternoon by Chief Justice Taney
and proceeded through the streets of the city to Fort
McHenry.

They intended to serve the writ on General George

Cadwalader, commandant of the fort and like themselves a
subordinate to the president of the United States.

The

writ included the traditional warning that the marshal
could fail in this mission only at his own peril.
Standing before the gate of the fort Marshal
Bonifant suddenly became aware of his more immediate jeopardy
in the form of 'a sharp-pointed and very ugly looking piece
of steel in close proximity to his head.'

On the other end

of this bayonet and its attached musket stood a 'grim
warrior' dressed in 'unromantic garb of the regular service.'

1

National Intelligencer, 20 April 1861, p. 1.
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The soldier held his equipage in the menacing position of
'charge bayonet.'
Outwardly undaunted, Marshal Bonifant requested that
he might enter the fort.

In reply the threatening soldier,

described as 'a veritable Tueton,' gravely informed the
marshal that no entrance was allowed to him or any one else
without a pass from the commanding officer.

Finding the

sentry 'inexorable,' Bonifant sent for the sergeant of the
guard.

He silently accepted the marshal's card and his

explanation that he had come in pursuance of a court order to
serve a writ of attachment on the general.

Taking the card

and the information the seargeant disappeared into the fort
only to shortly reappear.

The message had been delivered and

back came the general's reply.

It was terse.

General

Cadwalader had received the marshal's card, related the
seargeant, but he had nothing to say.

An 'astonished'

Bonifant received this intelligence while still outside
the gate through which he had futilely sought passage.
There was nothing for him to do but retrace his steps and
report the episode to the chief justice.

2

Meanwhile on the morning of Tuesday 28 May 1861
Roger B. Taney awoke to the day on which he would render

2

Baltimore Sun, 29 May 1861, p. l; Baltimore
correspondent of Philadelphia Sun in New York Evening Post,
29 May 1861, p. 3.
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one of the most controversial decisions of his long career
in the judiciary.

As always when presiding over his

circuit court in Baltimore he was staying at his daughter's
house.

3

There, among his family, the surroundings were more

familiar and comfortable for the frail eighty-four year old
widower.

Recalling this day Taney later confessed having

had a special appreciation of the "grave responsibility"
the case placed on him and a recognition as to what duty
required of him.

Taney also remembered steeling himself

for the occasion by becoming determined to "meet the
question directly and firmly without evasion--whatever
might be the consequences."

4

One of the consequences might have been jail.
It has been said that on leaving his daughter's house
that morning Taney remarked that he thought it likely that
he might be imprisoned at Fort McHenry before nightfall.

5

This apprehension on his part (if indeed it ever really
existed) has been characterized as "the overexcited fear of
a partisan."

6

However such a conclusion is highly

3 Lewis, Without Fear or Favor, p. 451.
4

R. B. Taney to F. Pierce, 12 June 1861, Franklin
Pierce, ''Some Papers of Franklin Pierce 1852-1862,"
American Historical Review 10 (January 1905):368.
5
6

Tyler, Memoir, p. 427.
Hyman, Perfect Union, p. 84.
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prejudicial against the chief justice.

Admittedly, he

never was arrested, but that fact is not the issue.

The

question is, did Taney's fears have a rational base or
were they rooted in paranoia?
Although the chief justice was quite elderly, a
fact his critics regularly noted, no responsible and
knowledgeable contemporary observer, friend or foe, ever
seriously questioned Taney's intellectual abilities or the
state of his mind.

To the contrary the frailty of Taney's

physical constitution contrasted markedly with the
robustness of his mental powers.

7

He undoubtedly was aware

and appreciative of his delicate situation with regard to
the Merryman matter.

The government had asserted a right

to arrest and hold citizens even in contravention of the
civil courts and was actually doing so to John Merryman
despite significant opposition from a normally respected
quarter.

Once the government fully established its

precedent, how big--or small--of a step would it be to
arrest the chief justice if the only requirement was an
assertion that it had been done for "the public safety?"
Leaving his daughter's house that morning knowing what
the gist of his ruling would be,

7
8

8

Taney could imagine the

Lewis, Without Fear or Favor, pp. 6, 472.

Taney had prepared a statement of his ruling,
see p. 170 below.
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unfavorable response it would receive in the secession
diminished Union.

He might even have anticipated what some

overexcited partisans among his critics would soon be
considering, that "it may be necessary to teach him [Taney]
. that a Judge of the Supreme Court of the United States
can be just as obnoxious to the laws against treason as
J on
h Merryman

can b e.

.,9

On balance Taney's notion that he

might be arrested was not that fanciful.
Burdened with such thoughts and concerns, the chief
justice leaned on the arm of his grandson and namesake,
Roger B. Taney Campbell, as he made his way to the court
house that Tuesday morning in May of 1861.

Crossing to the

east side of St. Paul Street, the two were met by an
estimated crowd of two thousand locals.

The throng

obligingly parted to let the two men through.

Neither cheers

nor jeers greeted the chief justice, only silence, although
certainly there was much emotion pent up in the crowd.

But

respect for Taney and his office apparently precluded any
demonstrations by the assembled citizenry, most of who had
come in support of the chief justice and in hope of seeing
the U.S. Army get its just deserts. 10
9

New York Tribune, 2 June 1861, p. 6, and 31 May
1861, p. 4. For a further discussion of whatever consideration the Lincoln administration may have given to Taney's
arrest see pp. 290-292 below.
10

McHenry Howard, Memo, 5 May 1919, Steiner, Life
of R. B. T., pp. 493-495; National Intelligencer,
30 May, 1861, p. 2; Daily Missouri Republican, 30 May,
1861, p. 3; Baltimore Sun, 29 May 1861, p. 1.

CHAPTER XVII
TUESDAY NOON, 28 MAY 1861
Just before noon on Tuesday 28 May 1861 the bailiffs
opened the doors to the Federal courtroom in Baltimore's
"Old Masonic Hall.'

Almost instantly the hall filled with

curious citizens and a score or more of prominent local
attorneys.

The disappointed, those who could not find

seats, had no choice but to go home or wait outside.
chose to wait.

Most

They entirely filled the block of St. Paul

Street between Lexington and Fayette Streets.

Judicial

history seemed in the offing and the people of Baltimore
wanted to witness it.

1

Precisely at noon Roger B. Taney took his seat on
the bench.

The quiet respect that a

judge

customarily

receives settled over the room and remained until, momentarily, Taney's own voice broke the silence.

Judge Giles

was absent, he explained, called away on some church duty.

1

National Intelligencer, 30 May 1861, p. 2;
Daily Missouri Republican, 30 May 1861, p. 2; New York
Times, 29 May 1861, p. l; Baltimore Sun 29 May 1861, p. l;
Baltimore American, 29 May 1861, p. l; Chestnut, "Federal
Court in Maryland," p. 363.
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He would hear the case by himself, Taney declared, but in
his capacity as the chief justice of the Supreme Court
rather than as a district court judge.

Of itself this

would have precluded further participation by Giles as an
officer of the court.

2

After quickly dispensing with these preliminaries,
the chief justice wasted no time in getting to the heart
of the matter at hand.

Addressing the marshal, Taney asked

him if he had the return to the writ of attachment issued
against General Cadwalader.

Rising, Marshal Bonifant handed

the chief justice a folded piece of paper.

This he opened

and handed in turn to the clerk of the court, whom he
directed to "read this; read it aloud."

3

The clerk complied:

I hereby certify to the Honorable Roger B. Taney,
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, that by virtue of the within writ of attachment to me directed on the 27th day of May, 1861, I
proceeded on this 28th day of May, 1861, to Fort
McHenry for the purpose of serving the said writ.
I sent in my name at the outer gate: the messenger
returned with the reply "that there was no answer to
my card," and therefore could not serve the writ
as I was commanded. So answers
WASHINGTON BONIFANT,
U.S. Marshal for the District of
Maryland 4
2National Intelligencer, 30 May 1861, p. 2;
Baltimore Sun, 29 May 1861, p. l; Baltimore American,
29 May 1861, p. 1.
3 Ibid.
4

w. Bonifant, Return on Writ of Attachment, 28 May
1861, Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Case No. 9,487 (1861) at
147.
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As the clerk's voice faded with the recitation of
Bonifant's title, "a buzz of anxious expectation" filled
the courtroom.

The spectators, though restrained, could

hardly contain themselves.
"Then no answer has been made to the writ?" asked
the chief justice while restoring order.
Marshal Bonifant did not respond.

Instead he

deferred to his deputy who elaborated somewhat on what had
happened outside Fort McHenry earlier that day.

"There was

no reply, sir," explained the deputy, "except that 'there
was no reply to my card,'" he concluded quoting from the
marshal's statement.

The deputy had reiterated to the chief

justice how no one had been permitted to enter even the
outer gate.
"Well," drawled the chief justice clearly perturbed
that this pertinent bit of information might be lost, "you
should state that.

The fact does not appear in your

return."
The deputy took the return and amended it to comply
with this suggestion by adding another sentence:
not permitted to enter the gate."

"I was

Quickly completing this

task he handed the corrected return back to the chief
justice.
During this brief interlude Taney had a chance to
collect his thoughts.

"It is a plain case gentlemen," he

announced as if thinking aloud, "and I shall feel it my duty
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to enforce the process of the Court,"

With this remark

he took up a piece of paper and read from a prepared
statement.

5

He ordered the attachment against General Cadwalader,
Taney explained, "because upon the face of the return,
the detention of the prisoner was unlawful" on two grounds.
First, that under the Constitution the president "cannot
suspend the writ of habeas corpus, nor authorize a military
officer to do it."

Second, that no military officer could

rightfully arrest or detain any civilian for any offense
against the laws of the United States except "in aid of
the judicial authority, and subject to its control."

If

the military did so arrest anyone, they had to immediately
deliver the prisoner over to "the civil authority to be
dealt with according to the law."

For these reasons Taney

ruled John Merryman "entitled to be set at liberty, and
discharged immediately from imprisonment."

Then, expressing

concern that any oral statement might be misunderstood,
Taney explained why he had not said anything substantial
the day before and hinted that he would not have anything
else to add at this time.

In keeping with this, he promised

a more elaborate written opinion expounding the constitutional

5

National Intelligencer, 30 May 1861, p. 2;
Baltimore American, 29 May 1861, p. l; Baltimore Sun,
29 May 1861, p. 1.
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basis of his decision, and file it with the clerk of the
court before the end of the week.

6

At this point the chief justice did a strange thing.
Only moments after decrying oral statements as potential
creators of misunderstanding, Taney finished reading his
prepared statement, set it aside, and began speaking
extemporaneously.

One witness maintained that the chief

justice ''never varied from his manner of calm dignity"

7

in

the whole course of the Merryman affair, but a more
objective observer reported that at this moment he was
obviously ''greatly affected and displeased."

8

Taney was displeased with no less than President
Abraham Lincoln, with General George Cadwalader, and to a
lesser degree with Marshal Washington Bonifant.

He reminded

the marshal of his power to deputize a "possee comitabus''
with which to seize and bring before the bar anyone
resisting a lawful order of the court.

But the resisting

power in this instance being so "notoriously superior" to
anything the marshal could summon, Taney conceded that the
court lacked the means to force service of the writ of

6

R. B. Taney, Statement, 28 May 1861; Ex parte
Merryman, 17 Fed. Case No. 9,487 (1861) at 147.
7

McHenry Howard, Memo, 5 May 1919, Steiner, Life
of R. B. T., pp. 493-494.
8

Baltimore correspondent of Philadelphia Sun in
New York Evening Post, 29 May 1861, p. 3.
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attachment on Cadwalader.

He really had no choice but to

excuse the marshal from pursuing the matter any further,
which he did.

But if he could have it his way, Taney

declared, he would indeed order up a posse of sufficient
strength to force the general's compliance.

Taney vowed

that if he ever got Cadwalader into court he would punish
him to the limits of the law and he mentioned both "fine and
imprisonment."

But realistically the chief justice had to

concede the judiciary's impotence.

After threatening, all

he could do was register his protest.

Taney concluded his

oral remarks by repeating his intention to draft a formal
legal opinion.

Only now, instead of merely filing it with

the court clerk, he promised to send a copy directly to the
president with a record of the proceedings and a "call upon
him to perform his constitutional duty to enforce the
laws,

. to enforce the process of this Court. 119

9Not all sources indicate that Taney made his
extemporaneous remarks after reading his prepared statement.
Tyler, for instance, seems to be under the impression that
the remarks preceded the statement. The Circuit and District
Court Reports leaves the same impression. However the
newspapers of the day are very positive in reporting that
the remarks were made after the statement was read.
In any
case, although the precise wording varies somewhat from
source to source, in general, they all agree as to the gist
of what Taney said. Edward McPherson, The Political History
of the United States During the Great Rebellion (Washington,
D.C.: Philip & Solomons, 1865), p. 115; Brown, Baltimore,
pp. 89-90; New York Tribune, 29 May 1861, p. 7; Baltimore
American, 29 May 1861, p. l; Tyler, Memoir, p. 645;
Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Case No. 9,487 (1861) at 147.
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Both the chief justice's ruling in Merryman's
behalf and his remarks gladdened the partisan crowd that
packed the courtroom.

As the rap of Taney's gavel adjourned

the court, many gave voice to their sentiments making
"heartfelt

exclamations of approbation."

such a man,' someone cried out.

'Thank God for

'God grant that he may

live many years to protect us,' implored another.

And,

reportedly, there were many other similar remarks made.

10

Within minutes the courtroom emptied, the spectators
vacating it almost as quickly as they had filled it at noon.
With the case effectively closed, there was no more action
and no real reason to remain.

Yet, curiously, outside

on St. Paul Street a small crowd, a remnant of the throng
that had gathered there earlier that day, stood quietly facing
the courthouse.

11

lO Dai·1 y Missouri
·
. Repu bl"1can, 30 May 1861 , p. 2 ;
Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, 29 May 1861, p. 3.
11 National Intelligencer, 30 May 1861, p. 4;
Baltimore American, 29 May 1861, p. 1.

CHAPTER XVIII
1 JUNE 1861: THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S OPINION
On 1 June 1861 Roger Taney filed his promised
opinion in Ex parte Merryman which he commenced, in
lawyerlike fashion, by establishing his jurisdiction.
Citing the Judiciary Act of 1789, Taney noted that it
granted to "the Courts of the United States, as well as to
each Justice of the Supreme Court," in which capacity he was
sitting, "power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the
purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment."

This

he had done on behalf of John Merryman.
After explaining that he travelled to Baltimore to
hear the case solely for the convenience of General Cadwalader,
Taney recounted the facts and circumstances surrounding the
Merryman case beginning with the arrest.

In doing this he

relied almost exclusively on Merryman's version without
scruple because, he noted, nobody had denied or challenged
"any of the facts alleged in the petition."
The Army's refusal to produce a copy of the warrant
authorizing Merryman's detention irked Taney as it had
Merryman's lawyers.

To the chief justice, it appeared as

though John Merryman had been arrested "upon general charges
174
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of treason and rebellion."

Worse, the Army had failed

to produce any sworn statements, physical evidence, or
witnesses to support their vague charges.
On top of this, General Cadwalader had refused to
comply with a regularly issued writ of habeas corpus on
the ground that he had been "duly authorized by the
President to suspend it."
justice's sensibilities.

This greatly offended the chief
Taney recounted receiving this

news "with some surprise," as he believed it "one of those
points of constitutional law upon which there was no
difference of opinion . . . that the privilege of the
writ could not be suspended, except by act of Congress."
In addition, that Lincoln had effected the suspension without officially notifying either the courts or the public,
and that it was being administered at the discretion
of individual Army officers only further increased the
chief justice's exasperation.
Reaching into history for an applicable precedent,
Taney recalled President Jefferson's behavior during the
Burr conspiracy and found it exemplary.

When, in Jefferson's

opinion, it became necessary to suspend habeas corpus he
claimed no power as president to do so, but instead sent
a request to that effect with supporting evidence to
Congress so they could act on the matter.

Never in the

ensuing debate did anyone even hint that Jefferson as
president could initiate a suspension, Taney noted.
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Regarding the whole question "as too plain and too
well settled to be open to debate," the chief justice said
that he would not have bothered to argue the obvious if
General Cadwalader had acted on his own.

However, the

whole case became pivotal because the orders for the
suspension came from the president.

Professing respect for

that high office, Taney felt obliged "to state plainly and
fully" the grounds of his opinion so that it would be clear
that he had "not ventured to question the legality of his
[the president's] acts without a careful and deliberate
examination of the whole subject."
Taney's examination began in the first article of the
Constitution, the legislative article.

After prescribing

the method and manner of choosing Congress this article
enumerated each of its specific powers including a broad
grant of license for Congress to make all laws "necessary
and proper" for carrying out these prerogatives.

But this

being "unavoidably somewhat indefinite," the cautious
Founders deemed it necessary to guard "certain great
cardinal principles," said Taney.

In express terms they

denied Congress power to legislate in particular areas.

The

first of these prohibitions (and demonstrating by this
position the importance attached to it he suggested) involved
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus which Congress
was not to suspend except in cases of invasion or rebellion
and then only when the public safety required it.

1

If it has been intended that the president should
have this "high power over the liberty of the citizens," as
Lincoln was claiming, the Constitution would have granted
it "in plain words," the chief justice insisted.

However,

in providing for the executive department the second article
enumerated the powers and duties of the president without
mentioning anything that would "furnish the slightest ground"
to justify his suspending habeas corpus.
Taney viewed the executive's relationship to the
judiciary much as he did its relationship with the
legislature.

Being charged with taking care that the laws

were faithfully executed made the president the executor
of the judicial will.

Whatever the judiciary "expounded and

adjudged" to be the law, was what the residents had to
enforce.

Consequently, he had to come to the aid of the

judiciary whenever it was "resisted by a force too strong
to be overcome without . • • assistance."

In this capacity

the executive acted "in subordination" to the judiciary
"assisting it to execute its process and enforce its
judgments."
Taney's interpretation of the habeas corpus clause
made no allowance for any exceptions.

The Constitution was

a document of "delegated and limited powers."

No power not

specifically granted to one of the three coordinate branches
could be exercised by the federal government.

Never "in

any emergency or state of things" could the president
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authorize suspension of habeas corpus or arrest a person
"except in aid of the judicial powers."

Doing so would

constitute a breech of his charge to faithfully execute
on two counts.

First, he would be usurping the legislative

power by suspending the writ and, second, the judicial also
"by arresting and imprisoning a person without due process
of law."

This remained immutable even "in times of

tumult and danger" and no argument based on "sovereignty"
or "self-defense" could circumvent this.
After a lengthy digression into Blackstone and
English constitutional history in which he re-hashed the
roots, abuses, and triumphs of habeas corpus in England,
Taney returned his attention to America.
great question "did not solely lie

Settlement of this

in analogies between the

English Government and our own, or the commentaries of
English jurists, or the decisions of English courts,"
Taney proclaimed, although such things obviously enthralled
him.

After all, he had "one of the most eminent jurists of

the age •

(and)

.

highest ornament of the Supreme

Court" supporting his position.

In his Commentaries Justice

Joseph Story was certain that the power to suspend habeas
corpus in cases of rebellion or invasion had been given to
Congress making it "seem" to Story that "the right to
judge whether it had arisen must exclusively belong to that
body."
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Taney found more sustenance for his position in
the words of his predecessor in a case that grew out of the
Burr conspiracy.

He quoted Chief Justice Marshall as having

said of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (in which Congress provided
for the issuance of writs of habeas corpus) that 'if at
anytime the public safety should require the suspension of
the power vested by this Act, it is for the Legislature to
say so.'

To these "clear and emphatic words" Taney said

he could "add nothing," although of course he did.
In his mind the military had gone farther and done
worse than first appearances might indicate.

"By force

of arms" they had "thrust aside the judical authorities .
and substituted a military government," Taney charged.
Prior to the Merryman proceedings there had been no
"resistance or obstruction" to the processes of any court
in Maryland "except by the military."

The judicial system

was open and operating in that state.

If the Army wanted

any case to be made against John Merryman it should have
gone to the proper civil authorities with its charges and
its proof.
Winding down his opinion Taney again protested the
Army's multiple violations of John Merryman's constitutional
rights.

So crass and casual a disregard for the fundamental

law of the land under such questionable pretexts worried
Taney.

He warned that while allowed to continue "the

people of the United States are no longer living under a
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government of laws, but every citizen holds life, liberty
and property at the will and pleasure of the army officer
in whose district he may happen to be found."
The Merryman case made Taney feel his duty was "too
plain to be mistaken."

He had no choice but to appeal to

the executive for assistance in enforcing his will, the
judicial will, which the president could not refuse to do
because, as Taney saw it, the construction of the Constitution mandated it.

Suggesting that General Cadwalader had

possibly "misunderstood his instructions" and "exceeded
his authority," the chief justice offered Lincoln a
convenient excuse to reverse the Army and correct the
situation.

To this end the opinion would be filed with the

circuit court and a copy would be sent to the president as
an appeal for "that high officer . . . to fulfill his
constitutional obligation to 'take care that the laws be
faithfully executed'
of the United States

1

(and)

. . . the civil process

. be respected and enforced."

1

Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Case No. 9,487 (1861)
at 147-153.

CHAPTER XIX
4 JULY 1861: THE PRESIDENT'S RESPONSE
For more than a month Taney's appeal to the president
went unacknowledged. Finally on Independence Day, 1861,
Lincoln addressed the matter of his suspending habeas corpus
in his "Message to Congress in Special Session."
The president admitted that authority to suspend
habeas corpus had been granted, but insisted that it had
been "exercised vary sparingly."

Nevertheless, "the legality

and propriety of what had been done under it has been
questioned," he noted.

The attention of the country had

been "called to the proposition that one who is sworn 'to
take care that the laws be faithfully executed,' should not
himself violate them."

But "the whole of the laws" were

not being executed in "nearly one-third" of the states,
Lincoln pointed out.

Was not it worth violating one law

in order to enforce execution of others?, he asked.
But "it was not believed that any law was broken,"
Lincoln insisted and he quoted the Constitution's habeas
corpus provision verbatim to illustrate his point.

He

explained how the clause provided for the suspension of
habeas corpus privileges when during rebellion the safety
181
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of the public might require it.

Lincoln assessed this

to be the precise situation in the country at the time.
As to who or what (the executive or the legislative) should
exercise this power, Lincoln alleged the Constitution was
"silent."

This being the case, he insisted that it was more

expedient for such a momentous emergency decision to be
made by the executive.

Lincoln argued that the Framers

of the Constitution certainly did not intend for a danger
to run its course until Congress could be assembled to
address the problem.

In addition Lincoln found in his

official oath a unique obligation on himself as president
to preserve the Union at any cost.
a president had the ability

It was Lincoln's view that

and also an obligation during

an emergency to exercise the discretionary powers of the
habeas corpus clause in the best interests of the country.
Lincoln closed this portion of his "Message" with a
promise that "an opinion, at some length, will probably be
prepared by the Attorney General."

As for legislation on the

suspension, Lincoln neither suggested nor asked for any but
left the matter "entirely to the better judgment of
Congress."

l

l

.
l
.
.
A. Linco
n, Message to Congress in
Special
Session,
4 July 1861, Lincoln, Collected Works, 4:429-431.

CHAPTER XX
THE MIND OF TANEY
Any understanding of Roger B. Taney's involvement
in the Merryman case, the decision he rendered in it, and
the opinion he prepared supporting that decision must first
be based on an understanding of the greater context in which
Taney approached and ajudicated the matter.

Although the

facts of the case were unprecedented in the legal history
of the nation under the Constitution, Ex parte Merryman,
as the case has come to be known, was not a spontaneous
phenomenon.

Quite the contrary, the whole matter resulted

from longexistingcircumstances and forces that had been
working their effect on the United States, its institutions,
its people, and Roger B. Taney in particular for years.
To properly appreciate, although not necessarily
endorse, Taney's conduct in the Merryman affair requires an
intimate acquaintanceship with Taney as he was at the time-a man who had been raised in the South and had spent a
lifetime in a career in the law, in politics, and on the
bench.

This involves examining the attitudes and opinions

Taney developed toward a number of political, legal, and
social circumstances and issues.

These ranged from the

mundane and immediate to the esoteric and seemingly less
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184
pertinent, but each had its special relevance to how Taney
acted in handling the Merryman affair.

Taney had acquired

definite concerns and opinions about the nature and future
of the South as a society, slavery as an institution, the
Negro race in the United States, the states as semisovereignties in the federal system, the federal system in
general, the judiciary as one of the three co-equal
branches of the Federal government under the Constitution,
and the Constitution itself.

These made Taney what he was;

and he, in turn, made the Merryman case what it became.

* * * *
Two things especially dear to the heart of Roger B.
Taney and inextricably bound up one in the other were the
Constitution and the South.

The scion of a tidewater tobacco

planting family and a lifelong resident of Maryland whose
people considered their state to be essentially "southern,"
Taney considered the Constitution as the special guardian
of the South.

That document contained certain compromise

agreements between different classes of states.

For

instance, between those with larger and lesser populations
there was the ''Great Compromise" regarding the configuration
of the national legislature.

More germane to this

discussion were agreements and arrangements between slave
states and free without which the South might never have
acceded to the federal compact.

In more general terms,
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Taney believed the Constitution provided that within certain
bounds the people of the states could pursue their lives
and destinies as they as a polity so chose, without any
meddling by outsiders.

To Taney this meant that the states

of the South could live the lifestyle of their choosing
even if that included something as odious and unpopular
elsewhere as slavery.

1

Taney had no particular fondness for slavery.
Although raised "with pickaninnies as playmates,"

2

Taney

came as an adult to regard it as "a blot on our national
character."

3

He looked towards the end of slavery and
4

and manumitted his own slaves, but was no abolitionist. Taney feared that "a sudden and general emancipation would
be absolute ruin to the Negroes,
white population. 115

. . • as well as to the

Although expressed in 1857 this

1 R. M. Spector, "Lincoln and Taney: A Study in
Constitutional Polarization," American Journal of Legal
History 15 (1971) :210.
2

· h er, R. B. Taney, p. 93 .
Swis

3

John D. Lawson, ed. American State Trials, 14 vols.
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sentiment had long been his conviction.

Thirty years

earlier he had concluded that "America had to endure the
evil of slavery for a time" but that it would be "gradually
wiped away."

6

Taney's attitude toward blacks was admirably
benevolent, but decidely paternalistic and definitely racist.
True,on the personal level Taney habitually treated
individual blacks decently.

On occasion this extended

beyond common courtesy to truly magnanimous gestures.

He

once loaned one free black the money to buy his enslaved
wife's freedom.

Consistent as it was, such behavior might

tempt one to view Taney as a man ahead of his times in
matters of racial tolerance, but he was not.

Nothing about

Taney suggests that he did not wholeheartedly subscribe to
the almost universal opinion of "informed" people both North
and South that blacks were an inherently inferior race.

Like

many prominent Americans from Jefferson to Lincoln, Taney
could not bring himself to conceive of a biracial society
in America.

The solution he preferred was to remove the

irritant by deporting the entire black population.

For a

short time he worked actively toward this end by serving
as an officer in a chapter of a recolonization society.

6

Lawson, State Trials, 1:88.

7 swisher, R. B. Taney, pp. 93-94, 100; Lewis,
Without Fear or Favor, pp. 355-360.
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The warmth and decency with which Taney generally
treated blacks on a day to day basis might have derived from
his religious beliefs or another personal aspect of his
character, but it had nothing to do with the law.

8

American

law traditionally treated blacks in a degraded manner, even
to the point of allowing their enslavement.

As one who

spent his life earning a living and serving society as a
functionary of the legal system, Taney worked within the
law doing whatever it required.

For example, when he

practiced law, Taney could be found one day advising a group
of citizens on how to rescue free blacks who had been
kidnapped for selling into salvery, and the next day
representing a slave owner in an action seeking to recover
a runaway.

9

Later, after ascending the bench, Taney's

perspective changed but not his basic conviction.
were to be dealt with according to the law.

Blacks

As for being

a judge, his function was to apply the law whatever it
might be, not to teach morality or preach religion. 10
As a jurist, it was Taney's professional opinion
that American law had always treated blacks in a special,
separate, and degraded manner.

8
9

The classic exposition upon

swisher, R. B. Taney, p. 423.
Lewis, Without Fear or Favor, p. 355.

10 Swis
. h er, R. B. Taney, p. 24.
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this is central to his infamous Dred Scott opinion of 1857.
But Taney's position on this long antedated that famous case.
For example, an 1840 murder case brought into his federal
circuit court under admiralty law, required Taney to rule on
the admissability of the testimony of several blacks.

Under

Maryland law no black, either free or slave, could bear
witness against "Christian white people."
accused was a Christian educated Malay.

In this case the
Deftly sidestepping

the religious question to concentrate on the race issue,
Taney ruled from historical and "scientific'' sources that
the Malay was not white and therefore subject to the
damning testimony of the blacks.

Most people took such

racist conventions for granted, but something in Taney
compelled him to investigate and explain what in the law
required him to rule as he had.

Digressing into obiter

dictum, Taney examined the reasons for the discrimination
in the rules regarding testimony.

Taney did not maintain that

it was either just or proper, but only that the laws
providing for it were made for practical purposes and were
long established.

11

When it came to the "crunch" between black and white
there is neither doubt nor surprise where Taney's sentiments
lay and where his concern for blacks terminated.

Though not as

vitrolic as some people's, Taney's prejudices were as real

11
(1840).

U.S. vs. Lorenzo Dow, 25 Fed. Case No. 14,990
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as anybody's.

On occasion he could be as cold blooded as the

most unregenerate slaver.

Once on circuit duty in Virginia

he heard the case of a white man charged with engaging in the
slave trade.

Predictably, the jury refused to convict.

Taney believed the man to be guilty, but was relieved by
the verdict nevertheless.

In a letter to his wife, Taney

admitted being 'not sorry' about the results of the trial
because he had no desire to impose the prescribed penalty-death.

12

Obviously, when it came down to a white man's

offense against a black Taney's prejudice could overcome
both his sense of justice and his respect for the law.

13

The incontrovertible fact was that the Constitution,
the nation's highest law, dealt with the blacks in the
traditional degraded manner, even to the point of recognizing
and protecting their enslavement.

Although the Founding

Fathers could not bring themselves to use the words "slave"
or "slavery" in the Constitution, with euphemisms and veiled
references they nevertheless managed to sanction the
peculiar institution three different times.

14

''Slavery,"

12

R. B. Taney to Anne Taney, 7 May 1845, quoted in
Lewis, Without Fear or Favor, p. 317.
13
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In f airness,
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Taney ruled that blacks who had been kidnapped in Africa
and later mutinied and took possession of the ship and crew
that was carrying them into salvery were free men. U.S. vs.
the Amistad, 15 Peters 518 (1841).
14
sec. 2.

U.S. Const. art. 1, sec. 2 and sec. 9, and art. 4,
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Samuel Tyler, Taney's authorized biographer and sometimes
alter ego, observed, "was one of the fundamental institutions
in our system. 1115
Although Taney had little attachment to slavery, he
did not let the Constitution's sanctioning of it affect his
respect for the document as a whole, as some others did.
Because it made slavery possible some radical abolitionists
villified the Constitution as "a convenant with death and
an agreement with hell."

To one of Taney's mind this

colorful allusion defied all the facts.

The contract

entered into with the creation of the Constitution was not
between anyone and hell, but between thirteen independent
states in particular, and the North and South in general.
Other verbal attacks against the Constitution were made
on this point, but so far as Taney was concerned the most
contemptible came from the lips of William Henry Seward.
In opposing the Compromise of 1850, freshman Senator Seward
declared 'there is a higher law than the Constitution.'
Taken out of context, as they were, these words made a fine
. .
. t s. 16
s 1 ogan f or the a b o 1 1t1on1s
To one of Taney's mind it was incredible that
anyone would attack slavery, an institution on which many

15
16

Tyler, Memoir, p. 339.

Glyndon G. Van Deusen, William Henry Seward
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 123, 127-128.
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people believed the ''present prosperity and safety" of the
South depended,

"upon a principle whose obligation was

assumed to be above the Constitution."

17

Whether made

in regard to slavery or any other question, no appeal to
higher law or natural law ever set well with Taney.

Never

in his legal career did he resort to any argument based on
any law but the written law of man; not even in cases
involving such classically transcendant issues of personal
freedom as the right to speak one's mind.

18

To Taney

every right, liberty, and privilege had some firm, demonstrable basis in man's law.

To Taney it was incomprehensible

that anyone, for any reason, would deem any "law'' to be a
"higher law'' than the "supreme law of the land."
If the attacks on slavery had threatened that
institution alone and no other, it is unlikely that feeling
as he did about slavery Taney would have become especially
concerned.

But because the attacks directly assaulted the

constitutional order and because Taney conceived of the
Constitution as being the special protector of the South,
it was a serious situation to him.

Remember, Taney's

heritage was that of a Southern gentleman.

He believed that

traditional Southern culture was worth saving, even though

17
18

Tyler, Memoir, p. 402.

charles W. Smith Jr., Roger B. Taney: Jacksonian
Jurist (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina
Press, 1936), pp. 27-28.
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that involved slavery.

The idealized virtues of the South,

with which he had been inculcated as a youth, were what he
valued as an adult.

Southerners' emphasis on courtesy,

regard for the dignity of the individual, and tolerance,
these Taney believed were in danger of being smothered by
.
19
extremists.
The temptation to label Taney a "states rights" man
should be resisted, if only because the term is pejorative
.
.
given
t h e extreme racist
connota t.ion

1· t

h as acquire
'
d . 20

It

is better to say that Taney believed that states had rights.
This was consistent with his belief in the bifurcate
distribution of sovereignty in the United States.

As Taney

saw it, Americans had acquired their sovereignty from the
King of England consequent to their victory in the Revolution.
This they vested in thirteen new and distinct political
associations, the individual states.

Eventually, after

some experimentation, the people of those sovereign states
gave

over

some

parts

of their sovereignty to another

new and distinct political association, the United States
of American, by ratifying the Constitution.

In doing this

the sovereign people of the states divided the powers of
government and sovereignty into two great parcels and then
delegated them to their two institutions of government in

19
20

Lewis, Without Fear or Favor, p. 441.
spector, "Polarization," p. 209.
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a prescribed manner.

In brief certain powers associated

with sovereignty were given to the Federal government and
all others were reserved for the states.

21

Both governments

exercised powers traditionally associated with sovereignty,
but neither was subject to the other.

Dispute, which was

inevitable, hopefully would be settled by arbitration,
the only alternative being a resort to arms.
As did many others, Taney believed the most fitting
arbiter to be the Supreme Court.

In practice as presiding

officer of that body for almost three decades, Taney, when
arbitrating federal-state disputes, would seem to have
favored the states, especially by comparison to his
predecessor, John Marshall.

Certainly, Taney participated

in many rulings that apparently strengthened state sovereignty,
but on other occasions he also enlarged the powers of the
Federal government, especially in cases where there was no
state-federal conflict and mutual benefit would accrue.

In

sum and with succinctness, it has been said of Taney as
chief justice that "considered as a grant of power to the
national government he construed the Constitution liberally,
considered as a limitation on the powers of the states he
construed it strictly. 1122

In general Taney was a practical

man and pragmatic jurist who strove for 'a workable

21
22

smith, Jacksonian Jurist, p. 90.
Ibid., p. 105.
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distribution of authority between two governments for a
23
single people. '
Unfortunately, Taney's fondness for the South and
his reverence for the integrity of the Constitution and its
institutions as he perceived them combined to place him
in an unbecomingly inflexible position regarding the slavery
controversy.

Remember, Taney believed the people of each

state had the right to determine, within prescribed bounds,
their institutions and their course.

Whether their

actions were wise or unwise, just or unjust, they were, for
.

the most part, so 1 e 1 y t h eir concern.

24

Taney wanted this

autonomy for all, but most dearly for the South.

He strongly

believed that outsiders had no right to meddle in the affairs
of Southerners, especially through the offices of the
national government and especially regarding slavery which
Taney believed the Constitution sanctioned.

To do so would

violate both the letter and spirit of the Constitution.

Pure

political power, even majority rule, could not be allowed
to change this.

Taney believed that the Constitution

included a doctrine explicity expressed in no one clause
or section but coursing throughout implying that the majority
should always have concern for the minority.

With regard to

23

Felix Frank further in lecture at Harvard Law
quoted in Lewis, Without Fear or Favor, p. 301.
24

smith, Jacksonian Jurist, p. 103-104.
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the slavery issue it was a matter of principle that this
If the Southern states could be dictated

be respected.

to regarding slavery, they could be dictated to on any phase
.

.

o f h uman activity.

25

Unlike most people, Taney was in a position to do
something about the situation.

As chief justice of the

Supreme Court for more than two decades, he was accustomed
to resolving disputes and thereby dictating the present that
shaped the future.

But for the most part neither Taney nor

the rest of the Court was anxious to address the heart
issue of the slavery controversy.

An effort in Congress to

force the matter on the Court failed in 1848.

26

For years

thereafter the Court managed to avoid the crucial question
despite continual pressure urging them to take it up.

27

This burning question was the territorial issue:
whether slavery would be allowed in the lands the Federal
government acquired by purchase or conquest.

Specifically,

it involved whether or not Congress had any constitutional
right to regulate (read prohibit) slavery on such lands
when it was organized into territories and before it became
states.

If Congress prohibited slavery in an area during

25

26
27
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the territorial stage, obviously it would be unlikley to be
allowed when statehood was achieved.
The territorial issue finally came before the Supreme
Court in the case of Dred Scott vs. Sanford.

The facts

of this landmark case are so well known as to hardly bear
repeating.

The actual determination of the Court was not

earth shaking.

By a 5-2 vote the Supreme Court concluded,

as they had intimated in many previous decisions, that
blacks, either free or slave, could be denied citizenship.
This was purely a matter of race, an expression of the
degraded manner in which American law traditionally treated
the blacks.

Therefore, Dred Scott, who was black, could

not use the federal courts to sue for his freedom or anything
else.

Obviously, this did not touch on the territorial

question and Taney for one would have been glad to have
left it at that.

However, the two dissenting justices

made it known that they would present a minority opinion
delving into the more sensitive areas of the case including
the territorial question.

Powerless to stop this, Taney

felt that he had no choice but to respond in kind, believing
that to ignore the two would only make matters worse.

Thus,

Taney came reluctantly to author on behalf of a majority
of the Supreme Court the infamous Dred Scott opinion which
contained a lengthy obiter dictum addressing the territorial
question.

Due to illness and fatigue he delivered it in a

halting voice that sometimes dropped to a whisper on
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6 March 1857.

The gist of it was that Congress possessed no

constitutional right or power to regulate slavery in the
.
.
28
territories.
The majority finding was unabashedly pro-Southern.
The decision promised protection for the South from
meddling by the North.

Blacks would not be able to seek

protection in federal courts that might be presided over by
judges appointed by a president with abolitionist sympathies.
No Northern dominated Congress could pass any law excluding
slavery from the territories and thus prevent its expansion.
But even more than this, Dred Scott meant that the old
concern of majority for minority would again reign, even if
it required the Supreme Court to be its regent.
Response to the Dred Scott opinion was immediate
and predictable.

The abolitionists were due their day

and they dragged it out for weeks.

In the press and from

the pulpit they reviled the Court and Taney in particular.
As author of the opinion the attacks on him were especially
scurri·1 ous. 29

Taney weathered the abuse philosophically,

as was his style.

30

But the negative response had

28
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Lewis, Without Fear or Favor, pp. 377-419; Swisher,
R. B. Taney, p. 485-523.
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affected him.

Under most circumstances the normally

taciturn Taney would have confined expressing his feelings
to a small circle of intimate friends and correspondents.
However, when a New England Congregationalist minister sent
Taney a copy of a well received, favorable review of the
institution of slavery in general and Taney's Dred Scott
opinion in particular that he had

authored,

Taney responded

with a frank letter that went beyond a mere note of thanks.

31

Although atypical of Taney, time would prove this letter to
have been only slightly out of the ordinary development in
what was yet to become an unprecedentedly extraordinary
response to a Supreme Court decision.

But for the time

being, a few months after it was first promulgated, Dred
Scott slipped from the headlines and the nation's political
consciousness

32

--at least temporarily.

The gravest threat Taney could imagine to the
already strained constitutional order of the republic was
the Ascension of a sectional political party to national
power.

He believed that such an eventuality would cause

the final fatal loss of political balance so long maintained

31

R. B. Taney to S. Nott, 19 August 1857, Mass.
Hist. Soc., Proceedings, p. 136.
32

The decision actually stirred up very little
interest among Americans as a whole. Refer to Claude G.
Bowers, Bereridge and the Progressive Era (New York:
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between the two contending sections.

The people of the

section of the dominating party would be able to impose
their will on those of the other with the help of unprincipled
politicians in the minority states (who would collaborate in
order to continue in power) and the might of the federal
military.

Once ascendancy was established, the majority

would no longer have reason to be respectful of the minority.
With this essential doctrine of the Constitution disregarded,
the entire compact would be rendered void.

The agreement

between the states thus broken, to avoid political subjugation the offended states would be justified in withdrawing
and establishing a separate, new order on their own terms.
Taney came to view the emerging Republican party
as the most likely protagonist of this hypothetical
destructive scenario.

When it ran John C. Fremont against

James Buchanan in the 1856 presidential election, the
prospect made Taney shudder.

It seemed to Taney that

Fremont's candidacy threatened those two things most dear to
him.

Reflecting on this situation in a personal letter to

one of his sons-in-law just before the election, Taney
privately concluded that a Republican victory would bode
ill for the South and the Constitution:

'The Constitution

will undoubtedly be trampled under foot,' he predicted,
the South doomed to sink to a state of inferiority.'

'and

Con-

trolling the country through the Republican party, the North
would be able 'to gratify their evil passions, without the
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slightest regard to the principles of the Constitution.'
With the Constitution corrupted and the balance between
North and South no longer existing, the Union would quickly
degenerate into a bilateral but politically unequal
combination,

'one of power and weakness' like the unions

of England and Ireland or Russia and Polana.

33

The utter

despair of Taney's casting the lot of his Southern brethren
with the Poles and the Irish should not be underestimated.
Of course, on election day Buchanan and the Democrats
prevailed, presumedly to Taney's delight and relief.
fears should have been allayed.

His

The prospect was that for

at least a quadrennium the Republicans could not harm him or
his.

But this was not to be.

One day short of a year into

Buchanan's term the Republicans began to attack Taney and
the Supreme Court over Dred Scott.

This was a fresh attack

from a different quarter, quite distinct from the immediate
hue and cry with which the radical abolitionists first
greeted Dred Scott.

That cacophony rose and fell without

appreciable effect.

But the new protestation would have

great and telling effects.

It would lead the Republicans to

the presidency and Taney to despair and near total disaffection with the legitimate government of his country.
The Republican diatribe against the Dred Scott
decision was begun by William H. Seward, the man whose

33

R. B. Taney to J.M. Campbell, 2 October 1856,
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"higher law'' remarks had brought him to Taney's attention
some years before.

The decision was eminently assailable

on any of a number of points of law, but rather than argue
substance Seward chose to attack the Court and Taney
personally.

Before the Senate, Seward premeditatedly

accused Taney of taking part in a clumsy conspiracy with
regard to the Dred Scott decision that blatantly impugned
the honor of Taney and the Court as a whole.
attack was politically motivated.

Seward's

He ached to be president

and desperately wanted the Republican's nomination in
1860.

34

Taney was so incensed that he swore he would refuse

to participate in Seward's inauguration if he were ever
elected to that high office.

35

The Republican party made plenty of political hay
with the Dred Scott decision, but no individual brought in
a bigger crop than a relatively unknown lawyer and politician
operating out of Sangamon County, Illinois.

Abraham Lincoln,

unlike Seward, had been among the early critics of the
decision,

36

but it profited him nothing until the 1858

Congressional election.

Early in his Senate race against

Stephen Douglas, Lincoln seized upon Dred Scott as a

34
35
36

Van Deusen, Seward, pp. 188-189.
Tyler, Memoir, pp. 158-159.

A. Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, 26 June 1857,
Lincoln, Collected Works, 2:400-405.
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primary issue and relentlessly pushed it into the spotlight.37

Lincoln lost the election, but succeeded in

raising both himself and the Dred Scott decision to
national prominence.
Meanwhile, Taney suffered in silence.

Much as he

wanted to take them to task, it would have been unbecoming
a chief justice to publicly answer his critics.

Yet,

Taney was greatly affected and in need of relief.
Repairing to his study in the fall of 1858 he poured out
his heart and mind onto paper.

The result was a thirty

page "Supplement to the Dred Scott Opinion."

Writing was

a catharsis for Taney, and producing the "Supplement''
contributed much to his maintaining peace of mind, if not
the debate of the day.
38
his death.

It was not published until after

When Abraham Linclon captured the 1860 Republican
presidential nomination, it was inevitable that
Dred Scott would become an important issue of the
campaign.

Although the role it played can easily be

exaggerated, it was a main issue if not the chief

37

Beginning with his "A House Divided" speech on
16 June 1858 and through his seventh debate with Douglas
on 15 October 1858, Lincoln seldom missed a chance to
talk about Dred Scott. Lincoln, Collected Works, 2:462-3:318
passim.
38
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issue of the election.

Each of the major candidates had a

distinct position on Dred Scott.

Breckenridge supported

it, Lincoln opposed it, Douglas straddled it, and Bell
sought to sweep it under the rug.
other issues.

Of course, there were

But an individual voter could, if he chose,

express his opinion on Dred Scott by casting his ballot
for the candidate whose position most closely reflected
his own.

Many undoubtedly did.

In that sense the election

of 1860 may be said to have been a referendum on Dred Scott.
Southerners understandably resented their ''victory" in the
Dred Scott decision being subjected to this test.

On

behalf of himself, the South, and his subject, Taney
biographer Samuel Tyler complained "it is a fearful thing
to submit to a popular vote a question which had been decided
after the most mature deliberation, by a judicial authority
which had been made a co-ordinate department of the
Government by the Constitution."

39

4
.
. .
At
1 h oug h rna1nta1n1ng
pu bl.1c si· 1 ence, 0 Taney was

not without strong opinions about the corning election.

Not

surprisingly his greatest worry was Lincoln and the
Republicans.
distress.

39
40

It was a concern that eventually approached

As the campaign drew to a close and it became

Ibid., pp. 411-412.

R. B. Taney to G. Hodges, 22 August 1860, Ibid.,
pp. 405-408.
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increasingly apparent that the Republicans might prevail,
Taney lost all objectivity and predicted disastrous
repercussions if that should come to pass.

Just as

before the 1856 election, Taney's pent up fears and
frustrations again found release in a letter to his son-inlaw.

Fearing what might "be visited upon . . . our

southern countrymen," Taney's agony and hopelessness led
him to predict that a Republican victory in November would
mean the destruction of the Union and slave insurrection
41
in the South.
When Abraham Lincoln became the first successful
national candidate of the Republican party, Taney's fears were
almost immediately half realized.

A general slave rebellion

did not break out, but the Union was destroyed.

Parts of the

Deep South took Lincoln's victory as a signal for secession.
South Carolina blazed the path out of the Union on
20 December 1860.

Others followed:

Mississippi on

9 January 1861, Florida the next day, Alabama the day after
that, Georgia left on January nineteenth, and Louisiana
one week later.

In total by the day of Lincoln's inaugura-

tion six states had formally withdrawn from the Union.

41
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A huge crowd watched over by unprecedented security
precautions witnessed Abraham Lincoln's inauguration as the
sixteenth president of the United States on 4 March 1861.

43

Those assembled listened attentively, but none more so than
Taney, as Lincoln delivered his inaugural address "with a
. t'1nct voice.
.
,,44
c 1 ear, 1 ou d an d d is

As expected, he spoke

sharply against secession, but over all his speech was
surprisingly moderate in tone.

One passage in particular

could not help but catch Taney's attention because in it
Lincoln discussed the Supreme Court and the Dred Scott
decision.

Lincoln said that he did not "forget the position

assumed by some that constitutional questions are to be
decided by the Supreme Court."

But it was possible, he

mused, that a decision of theirs could be "erroneous."

If

in such an eventuality the policy of the government upon
so vital a question was to be "irrevocably fixed by the
Supreme Court," Lincoln concluded, then the people would
have ceased to be their own rulers."

45

A disclaimer he

tossed in notwithstanding, it was clear that Lincoln
intended to "resist and menace" the Taney Court, although
1146
"he did not pledge a direct assault upon it.
43National Intelligencer, 4 March 1861, p. 2;
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Sitting a few feet away Chief Justice Taney
listened attentively.

According to one acute observer,

while outgoing President Buchanan stared at the toe of his
right boot, never during the entire delivery did Taney's
eyes leave Lincoln.

47

There is no way of knowing what went

through Taney's mind during this, but when Lincoln spoke of
the Court one suspects that Taney must have thought something
akin to what biographer Tyler later wrote:

This was ''the

most pernicious political heresy ever uttered in the politics
of our country.

It saps the foundation of the Constitution,

and substitutes the fluctuating and alternating will of
the party majority of the people in its stead. 1148
When Lincoln finished, Taney rose from his seat and
all present removed their hats.

Speaking in low tones,

Taney began reciting the presidential oath while gesturing
for Lincoln to repeat the words.
ceremony was over.

49

In a few moments the

As he had for presidents from Van Buren

to Buchanan, Taney again, and for the last time, fulfilled
the traditional duty of the chief justice to swear in the
government's chief executive officer.

Relations between he

and the previous six had been at least cordial.

Surely he

must have suspected that this time it would be different.

47 New Yor k

T'1mes,

5 March 1861, p. 1

48 Tyler, Memoir, p. 418.
49 New York Times, 5 March 1861, p. 8.
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All things considered, it is hardly surprising that during
this swearing-in Taney "seemed very much agitated, and his
hands shook very perceptibly with emotion. 1150
Taney did not approve of Lincoln's prosecuting a war
in order to maintain the Union.

After Sumter, Lincoln

surveyed the situation, concluded the choice was between
"immediate dissolution and blood," and opted for the latter.
Taney preferred the former.

Unlike Lincoln, he had no

reservations about the constitutionality of secession.

He

saw nothing in the Constitution that denied a people of a
state the right to leave the Union.

Putting it in twentieth

century terms, Taney found arguments against secession on
constitutional grounds as absurd in his day as American's
of today would find that in joining the United Nations the
. d . 51
United States lost its right to withdraw if it so d esire
Of itself, disunion held no particular terror for Taney.
Over the years he had become increasingly comfortable with
the idea.

In 1856 he nearly endorsed secession, in 1860

he predicted it, and in 1861 Taney concluded that the nation
would be better off with "a peaceful separation. 1152
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rbid., p. 8.

51 Spector, "Polarization," p. 209.
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R. B. Taney to J.M. Campbell, 2 October 1856,
Swisher, R. B. Taney, pp. 492-493; R. B. Taney to J.M.
Campbell, 19 October 1860, Howard Papers Box 10 Ms 469,
Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore; R. B. Taney to
F. Pierce, 12 June 1861, Pierce, "Papers," p. 368.
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Taney did not shrink back from the blood that
Lincoln preferred to dissolution.

True, in 1856 he

hesitated to endorse a resort to arms by the men of the
South, but only because at the time he saw no real chance
for military success.

Taney did not take the senseless

loss of life lightly.

Still, five years later when

hostilities had actually commenced Taney all but pushed the
men of the South into war.

Taney did nothing to discourage

anyone from joining the Confederate Army.

When the grandson

of one friend called him on his way south, Taney spoke
what the young man took as a few comforting, almost
encouraging words.

He told him:

'the circumstances under

which you are going are not unlike those which your grandfather went into the Revolutionary War.• 53

But it was not

only the sons of friends that Taney saw off to Confederate
service.
Army.

One of his own sons-in-law joined the Confederate

Taney had considerable trouble with sons-in-laws,

but far from repudiating this "rebel," Taney held him in
esteem and never forgot him during the long separation that
54
the war enforced.
It was clear for whom and what Taney was rooting.
According to one quote attributed to him, on learning of

53
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Lewis, Without Fear or Favor, p. 465.

· h er, R. B. Taney, p. 455 ; R. B. Taney to
Swis
J.M. Campbell, 15 March 1862, partially quoted in Lewis,
Without Fear or Favor, p. 464.
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a skirmish near Arlington on 25 May 1861, Taney declared he
hoped 'the Virginians would wade to their waists in Northern
blood.

155

Frankly, it is inconceivable that Taney would have

been so foolish as to have said something so incendiary
in the presence of a New York Times reporter or anyone
who might pass his words onto the Times.

However, it is

not inconceivable that Taney might have said something like
that

in an intemperate moment in private.

In any case,

what he did say for certain was that he hoped the war would
be "too violent to last long," that it would be so bloody
people would quickly grow disgusted with it and conclude
after "calmer and more sober thoughts" that it would be
better to allow the South to depart in peace.

56

To Taney the Civil War was the culmination of all
his fears, the inevitable result of the history he had
lived through and tried in vain to change.

But the war was

not an "irresistible conflict" in the sense that it could
not have been avoided. In Taney's thinking more careful
adherence to the spirit of the Constitution would have
prevented secession and made the war unnecessary.

Disregard

of the Constitution's implied principle of concern by
majority brought on the war.

55
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Political conflicts over

New York Times, 29 March 1861, p. 1.

R. B. Taney to F. Pierce, 12 June 1861, Pierce,
"Papers," p. 368.
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slavery or public lands or the tariff or any other issue
were only symptomatic of the greater disease.

Taney

believed that under Republican rule the people of the
individual states would not be allowed to determine their
own way of life if a majority of outsiders disapproved.

In

the South with regard to slavery this was already happening.
To Taney this signalled the beginning of the end of the
established constitutional order.

A federal government

which acted only upon the states and within constitutional
bounds seemed doomed to be supplanted by national government
that would dictate to states and individuals alike as
to just how they must conduct themselves.

Consequently,

Taney could never conceive of the war as a glorious struggle
to preserve the Union and uphold the Constitution.

To him

it seemed that the North was intent on bludgeoning the
Constitution and subjugating the South.

Lincoln and the

Republicans were waging war against the two things most dear
to Taney--the South and the Constitution.

* * * *
When Merryman's lawyer laid his client's petition
for a writ of habeas corpus before Taney, he presented the
chief justice with much more than a mere piece of paper--he
brought him a golden opportunity.

Relative to the executivE

and legislative branches of government, the judiciary is
limited as to when it can act on a question otherwise

211
within its competence.
initiative.

The judiciary possesses no

No judge can go forth and involve himself

in a question on his own discretion.

He must be invited.

It is the nature of the case system that actual controversies
embodying justicable issues must be brought to the attention
of a court by one of the parties involved in a dispute
before the judiciary can act.

57

Without the Merryman

petition, Taney could not have acted much as he may have
wanted to do something.
Taney welcomed the Merryman's plea and was anxious
to answer it.

This was his first opportunity to quit biting

his tongue and openly broadcast his views on what had been
happening to the country.

Obviously, Taney entered into

the Merryman matter intending not merely to free a man held
prisoner (although that would be indicative of his success)
but also with the purpose of exposing and censuring the
despotism he believed Lincoln was perpetrating.

Taney

intended to use the courts as the 'impenetrable bulwark
against every assumption of power on the . . . Executive'
that James Madison once told Congress that the Founders
meant them to be.

58

Plainly the confrontation between the
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victor G. Rosenblum and A. Didrick Castberg, eds.,
Cases on Constitutional Law: Political Roles of the Supreme
Court (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press), p. 83.
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Quoted in Hyman, Perfect Union, p. 240.
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chief justice and the president that grew out of Ex parte
Merryman did not occur by chance, but neither, however, was
it arranged, rather it was more a case of opportunity
seized.
Upon receiving the Merryman petition, Taney
immediately set about doing some "shrewd arranging.

1159

He undoubtedly recognized that his opponent (the Lincoln
administration and its agent the United States Army)
possessed many advantages in the contest at hand.
included a previous victory.

This

In the recent Mullen case

Judge Giles had attempted to implement the habeas corpus
process in order to wrest an individual from the custody
of the Army.

Giles and the civil process failed.

60

Taney

knew that if he were not clever enough to recognize and
exploit the few advantages that were his, he too would be
doomed.
Apparently Giles failed because as a judge of
the United States Circuit Court for the District of
Maryland he lacked the necessary prestige to command
obedience to his paper.

Taney had every intention of

avoiding that ignominious fate if at all possible.

So, in

order to summon every available iota of authority to his
cause, Taney arranged to hear the case in his capacity as
chief justice of the United States Supreme Court.
59

The phrase is Professor Hyman's.

60 see Chap. XIII, pp. 136-143 above.

Ibid.
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This required an assertive and somewhat irregular
act on Taney's part.

Merryman's petition addressed itself

to "Roger B. Taney, Chief Justice of the United States and
Presiding Judge of the Circuit Court for Maryland."
was a valid citation.

This

As did all justices of the Supreme

Court, Taney served on a federal circuit court near his
home between sessions of the high court.

This is why he

could be properly addressed in two capacities.

But in this

instance Taney took the liberty of tampering a bit with a
legal document.

Upon accepting the Merryman petition he

struck out half the double designation, the half that
referred to him in his lesser capacity.

As amended by

Taney, the petition addressed itself to "Roger B. Taney,
Chief Justice of the United States," the nation's highest
. d.1c1a
. 1 o ff.1cer.
JU

61

To secure this coup Taney had every court paper
subsequently issued in the case refer to him exclusively
in his

loftier capacity.

reaction.

This maneuver produced the intended

Everyone concerned with the Merryman case

61 h ·
.
d in
. a 1 etter f rom A. S.
Tis act was mentione
Ridgely to S. P. Chase on 28 December 1866. Ridgely was
federal district attorney in Baltimore and Chase was chief
justice of the Supreme Court at the time. A. s. Ridgely to
S. P. Chase, 28 December 1866. Chase Papers, ser. 1, box 98,
no. 1472 D, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. A
photocopy of the original petition is marked as Ridgely
asserted in a pen stroke that seems very similar to that
in the "Order for a Writ of Habeas Corpus" that Taney wrote
out at this time. Ex parte Merryman, original case file.
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obliged Taney by recognizing that the matter was not before
some inferior judge, but the highest judicial officer in
the land.

The newspapers made the distinction.

General Cadwalader.

So did

Even President Lincoln got the point.

62

This matter of titles was no egotistical whim on
Taney I s part.

•
He was not a vain
man. 63

. was a
Rat h er, it

a calculated and concerted effort by Taney to manipulate
public opinion.

It succeeded in that it helped focus

national attention on the matter.

Ex parte Merryman

received much more national publicity than did the Mullen
case or similar cases.

However, at the same time this

strategy failed in the final reckoning to bring the desired
results.
behalf.

It produced no great public outcry in Merryman's
Actually it backfired.

The publicity generated

was predominately reactionary.
According to one man who spoke with Taney just
after he took up the case, it was the chief justice's

62

For the reaction of the national press refer to
pp. 286-290 below. Cadwalader addressed his first letter
to "Roger B. Taney, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States." G. Cadwalader to R. B. Taney, 26 May 1861,
Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Case No. 9,487 (1861) at 146.
In his first draft of "Message to Congress in Special
Session" Lincoln wrote that he had been "reminded from a
high quarter," clearly an allusion to the chief justice.
Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, 4:176-177.
631

He [Taney] was absolutely free from the slightest
trace of vanity and self concern of any man I ever knew.'
Justice Curtis quoted by Chief Justice C. E. Hughes in
Hughes, " R. B. Taney, " p. 7 8 5 .
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avowed intention to escalate the Merryman matter to the
highest levei.
succeeded.

65

64

The concensus among scholars is that he

That this failed to win Merryman his release

or Taney his victory over the president should not reflect
absolutely negatively on the strategy.

Actually Taney

had little choice but to stand as tall as he could and
give forth his mightiest call.

Under other conditions

Lincoln might have sympathized with Taney's views.

66

There

were those who thought, if only for a moment, that the
president might indeed have no choice but to obey the
chief justice's decree.

67

Normally, almost without

exception, presidents obeyed the rulings of chief justices.

68

None of the six presidents preceding Lincoln with whom
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A. S. Ridgely to S. P. Chase, 12 December 1866,
Chase Papers, ser. 1, box 98, no. 1472 D, Library of
Congress.
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Hyman, Perfect Union, p. 83.
Lewis, Without Fear or Favor, p. 453.
New York Herald, 2 June 1861, p. 5.

under Chief Justice Marshall the Supreme Court
once handed down a decision in a dispute between the
Cherokee tribe and the state of Georgia. President Jackson
did not like the ruling--which favored the Indians--and
refused to enforce it. He is supposed to have said 'Well:
John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it.'
Horace Greeley, American Conflict, 2 vols. (Hartford:
Case & Co., 1864), 1:106.
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Taney dealt ever attempted to obstruct him in his official
duty.

69
But in this case Taney had again misjudged respect

for the Supreme Court and more particularly himself.

As he

had done in Dred Scott, Taney acted decisively with the
intention of settling a constitutional dispute with one
bold stroke.

In Merryman, as in Dred Scott, Taney thought

that he was rendering a national service.

And in Merryman,

as in Dred Scott, he erred in supposing that the particular
question, much less the underlying issues, could be put to
rest by a judicial pronouncement regardless of from whom it
came.

70

Granted, in the first years under Taney's leadership

the Supreme Court had maintained its power base and
nurtured the creed of judicial sovereignty that first developed
under Marshall and gave the Court its role as final arbiter
of constitutional questions.

71

But that had changed in the

years immediately preceding the Civil War.

As chief

justice, Taney could not successfully censure and reverse
the president's action in the Merryman matter any more than

69

with the exception of Polk, Taney had the good
fortune of dealing only "with relatively mild presidents
not generally disposed to stretch their powers too far."
Spector, "Polarization," p. 2 06.
70
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Hughes, "R. B. Taney," p. 787.

Henry J. Abraham, Justices and Presidents: A
Political History of Appointments to the Supreme Court
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 87.
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a majority of the Supreme Court could establish national
policy regarding the expansion of slavery in Dred Scott
simply because the respect that might have otherwise
mandated compliance was absent.

On these occasions Taney

seemed completely oblivious to the undermining of public
confidence in the Supreme Court that had been going on
72
for more than a decade.
Why he did not take this more
seriously challenges all understanding, but it is indicative
of Taney's often impolitic nature and consistent lack of
political finesse.

73

Taney probably knew in his heart and

his head what he simply refused to recognize in his
actions--that the reputations of the Court and himself were
bankrupt in the North.
Unfortunately for Taney's cause, in the final
analysis his first bit of arranging proved an inauspicious
beginning.

It gained neither the South, the Constitution,

or even John Merryman anything; while it cost Taney and
the Supreme Court heavily.
to take.

It was a gamble that Taney had

Unfortunately, Taney lost and he paid the

consequences.

72
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Lewis, Without Fear or Favor, pp. 741-742.

Especially as compared to his predecessor, John
Marshall. Smith, Jacksonian Jurist, p. 3: Charles Grove
Haines and Foster H. Sherwood, The Role of the Supreme
Court in American Government and Politics 1835-1864, 2 vols.
(Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1957),
p. 523.
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Taney's second bit of arranging involved selecting
a site for holding the Merryman habeas corpus hearing
and it proved more successful.

Originally when the lawyer

brought Merryman's petition to Taney in Washington the
defense team figured that the chief justice would order
the transfer of their client there for the hearing.

74

Moving Merryman to Washington would at least have released
him from the clutches of his immediate tormentor, General
Cadwalader.

But the chief justice quickly formulated a

plan of his own.

He decreed that the hearing would be

held "in the Circuit Court room, in the Masonic hall,
in the city of Baltimore. 1175
In the Merryman opinion Taney offered a brief and
ingenuous explanation for this change of venue.

He claimed

that he ordered it solely for the benefit of General
Cadwalader.

Holding the hearing in Baltimore rather than

Washington would allow the general to appear in court
without having to leave the geographic limits of his
military command which did not extend to the capitai.

74
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But

Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Case No. 9,487 (1861)

at 147.
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R. B. Taney, Order for a Writ of Habeas Corpus,
26 May 1861, Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Case No. 9,487
(1861) at 146.
76
at 147.

Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Case No. 9,487 (1861)
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the truth is that Taney made the change more for his own
benefit than Cadwalader's convenience.
Taney did sacrifice something in not hearing out
the Merryman matter in Washington.

That winter the Supreme

Court had moved from its dank and dismal basement quarters
('a potato hole of a place') 77 to the remodelled former
chamber of the Senate.

With luxuriously carpeted floors,

marble walls, comfortable furnishings, and artistic
embellishments that included a large gilded eagle with
wings outspread suspended over the dais, the semicircular room capped by a vast ornamental dome made a
magi' f 'icent courtroom. 78

All in all it would have been a much

more fitting site for the great constitutional conflict
that Taney was arranging than the humble accommodations
in Baltimore's 'Old Masonic Hall' where the circuit court
had been housed for more than nearly four decades.

79

Then there was the matter of travel which was
becoming increasingly more trying for the old and somewhat
infirm Taney.

The time was fast approaching when ill health

would prevent him from travelling his circuit; at least it
could provide an excuse for him not to travel to participate
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New York Tribune, 16 March 1859, quoted in Lews,
Without Fear or Favor, p. 269.
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i ver, Lincoln's Court, p. 1.
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Chestnut, "Federal Court in Mayland," p. 363.
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in a case he did not want to hear.

But for the time being

the trip to Baltimore was not too much, especially since in
this instance it promised an invigorating case.

Certainly a

trip to Baltimore by train was much more appealing than the
strenuous stagecoach ride of several hundred miles required
to reach his other circuit court sites in Dover and New
Castle.

By comparison, the brief train ride to Baltimore

on the B&O was not difficult, except that sometimes in
winter Taney sometimes found the crowded conditions on the
cars a bit oppressive.

Apparently, the chief justice

suffered from a mild case of claustrophobia.

80

If by changing the Merryman hearing from Washington
to Baltimore Taney surrendered any advantage, which is
doubtful, the loss proved worthwhile.
in Baltimore did two things for Taney.

Holding the hearings
First, there was

paranoia in Washington and being in Baltimore kept some
distance between Taney and Republican officials who might
threaten him.

Second, being in Baltimore allowed Taney

the luxury of hearing the Merryman matter in a genuinely
friendly atmosphere.

Taney undoubtedly knew that a friend-

lier populace or more sympathetic press could hardly have
been found in any part of the secession diminished Union
than that which existed in Baltimore.

80S WlS
. h er, R. B. Taney, p. 449.

The local reporting
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of these events and the behavior of the crowds that
attended the hearings bore this out.
Taney's "shrewd arranging" in the Merryman affair
left him susceptible to charges of playing politics with
the case, which, undeniably, is exactly what he did.
to Taney the charge lacked any real sting.

But

However, he

was conscious of it and actually anticipated it to the
extent that he offered his disingenuous explanation for
arranging to hear the case in Baltimore.

But at the same

time he apparently felt no compunction to explain why he
made so much ado about hearing the case in his capacity
as chief justice.

There is no evidence that Taney felt the

least self-conscious about either of these arrangements
or any other aspect of the Merryman affair.
81
.
h e reve 11 e d in
.
.
opposite,
it.

Quite the

To criticize Taney for mixing politics and the law
ignores the essential nature of the Merryman case as it came
to him.

The president and the Army had instigated the whole

affair by taking it upon themselves to suspend habeas corpus
and hold a man without charge or legal recourse.
was a political prisoner.

Merryman

No one in the Lincoln administra-

tion, much less the Army could legitimatize his arrest.
Politics, not the law, made Merryman's arrest possible; and

81

R. B. Taney to F. Pierce, 12 June 1861, Pierce,
"Papers," p. 368.

222
politics, not the law, held him in confinement.
was political before Taney became involved.

The case

None of this is

meant to deny that Taney had ulterior political reasons
for involving himself, because he clearly did.

But he also

had a firm legal basis for doing so, not to mention a
moral commitment to investigate the plight of a citizen
begging for help.
There was an often discussed "custom" more established
in theory than practice that the judiciary did not involve
itself in purely political questions.

The exercise of

political power belonged to the other branches of government, so on purely political questions the judiciary
customarily withheld its judgment.

However, as Toqueville

observed, in America 'scarcely any political question
arises . . . that is not resolved, sooner or later, into
a judicial question.~

2

suspended habeas corpus.

This is what happened when Lincoln
Much sooner than later, Ex parte

Merryman resolved Lincoln's suspension into a judicial
question.

This resolution was hardly earth shaking.

Jurists

before Taney recognized that in some instances the distinction between political and justicable questions could be
difficult to discern, but that in cases 'where the rights of

82

Alexander de Tocqueville as quoted by Raoul Berger,
Executive Privilege (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1974), p. 304.
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persons . . . are involved and when such rights can be
presented under some judicial form of proceedings . . .
courts o f

.
.
. t erpose re 1 i· ef . •83
Justice
can in

If ever there

was a case involving the 'rights of a person,' Ex parte
Merryman was it.
Taney broke the taboo of the custom for the only
acceptable reason and that should exonerate him from most
charges of involving the judiciary in political matters, but
that custom begs further examination.

On balance only the

historically naive will blindly accept any notion that
automatically condemns the Supreme Court or any of its
justices for becoming politically involved.

Beginning with

the appointment of justices the Court is inherently a
political body, usually constituted with the express hope
of advancing a particular political ideology.
appointment was political and justly so.

Taney's

His predecessor,

John Marshall, had used the position to work the principles
of the Federalist party into constitutional law.

President

Jackson fully expected Taney to do no less for his party.
Consequently, a great portion of Taney's judicial career,
especially inthe early days, was devoted to undoing
Federalism and redirecting the course of the nation along

83

Justice Thompson quoted in Randall, Constitutional
Problems, p. 10.
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lines more ammenable to the Democratic party.

84

As chief

justice, Taney even maintained some involvement in the less
glamorous grind of day to day politics.

He continued to

advise President Jackson much as he had previously and later
offered political advice to President Van Buren and, on
occasion, even to local politicos regarding state matters.
In sum, he continued the pattern begun under Washington and
Adams and carried on by the Supreme Court under Marshall
of active participation by the judiciary in political
.
85
a ff airs.

In view of this any assertion to the contrary,

even Taney's own insistence that he never engaged in or
commented on political affairs after becoming chief justice
rings hollow.

In reality the barrier of custom against the

judiciary' s involvement in political issues was no firm wall.
Rather, it was a screen behind which the judiciary could
hide at its pleasure when it wished to avoid a touchy
political question and a podium from which critics could
harrangue the judiciary when they chose to involve themselves
in a touchy political question.

* * * *
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Abraham, Justices and Presidents, p. 87; Swisher,
R. B. Taney, p. 585.
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Taney's behavior during the course of the Merryman
affair was revealing and deserves examination.

Welcoming

the opportunity and fired by the energy pent up in his
frustrations, Taney began expansively.

Jumping into the

breech eagerly and aggressively, he arranged things to his
advantage or what he thought was his advantage.

Undoubtedly

Taney initially conceived of himself as a man with a
a hero out to strike a blow against a villian--

mission:

the Lincoln administration--on behalf of the innocently
offended--the Constitution, the South, and, of course, John
Merryman.

But the anticipated glory of battle was not

forthcoming in the hard reality of combat.
mired in a struggle in the trenches.

Taney became

Rapidly his initial

hopes gave way to dispair as it became increasingly
evident that the sword of justice was incapable of giving
him the clear-cut victory he wanted.

As it became apparent

that the Army meant to obstruct his will and the judicial
process, Taney changed.

At times he behaved downright

injudiciously in the truest, most literal sense of the word.
In general, as his fortunes in the Merryman matter deteriorated, so did Taney's behavior.
Taney had a "fierce and explosive temper. 1186

It

was about the only characteristic he had in common with his
father.

Fortunately for the younger Taney, due to his

86

.
Lewis, Fear or Favor, p . .
6
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mother's influence he grew up to be much more successful
in controlling it.

As an adult, even his political foes

came to acknowledge Taney as a 'graceful and polished old87
fashioned gentlemen.'
However those intimately acquainted
with him for any length of time eventually experienced
Taney's temper.

'He had a temper,' remarked one man whose

association with Taney spanned forty years, 'not merely
88
quick, but naturally fierce.•
On occasion in both private
and professional situations anger got the best of Taney and
his temper would burst forth out in memorable display.

But

for the most part Taney managed to control his passions,
keeping them at least, if only barely, under wraps.

However

it was a struggle.
As far as Taney was concerned, the Merryman case
began going badly even before the first court session got
underway.

At the stroke of the appointed hour Taney was on

the bench ready to hold court.

Merryman's lawyers were

present, but General Cadwalader had not arrived.

No one

arrived until Colonel Lee presented himself as the general's
representative somewhat later--perhaps as much as twenty
minutes later.

89

Taney could not have been anything but

87

Edward Bates, The Diary of Edward Bates, ed. Howard
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displeased.

He abhorred tardiness.

90

How displeased he was

would have been geometrically proportional to how late
the colonel actually arrived.

In any case, Taney was

probably already aroused to some degree when Colonel Lee
belatedly first appeared before him.

Taney would have

liked it if General Cadwalader had presented himself, the
prisoner in question, and an explanation for holding him;
and then submitted himself to Taney's judgment in the matter.
This would have constituted full compliance with the writ
that he had issued the general.

Instead, Cadwalader sent

an aide with a letter explaining his position, but without
the prisoner.

The letter informed the chief justice in

courteous words that the prisoner in question would be
released only if the president ordered it and asked the
chief justice to hold himself in abeyance until word
.
. d . 91
regar d 1ng
tha t was receive
This return hardly satisfied Taney.
had hedged on not producing the prisoner.

The general
However, in

strictly legal terms not producing the prisoner was

90

one of Taney's maxims as a judge specified:
'a judge should be punctual to the minute to the times
appointed for the meeting of the court, . . . and should
exact the same punctuality from all others. 1 Lewis,
Without Fear or Favor, p. 276.
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G. Cadwalader to R. B. Taney, 26 May 1861,
Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Case No. 9,487 (1861) at 146.
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permissable as long as an acceptable excuse for failing to
do so was offered.

The catch was that Taney was to be the

judge of what was acceptable.

92

Of course, he had no

disposition to give the general anything--not the benefit
of the doubt or the benefit of time to confer with his
superiors.

In addition, Cadwalader's cavalier behavior,

especially his not appearing in person probably offended
Taney.

As presented by the colonel, the general's excuse,

suggesting as it did that he had more important things to do
than appear before the chief justice of the United States
Supreme Court when called, was an insult to Taney.

Hence,

having no legal obstacle to impede him, Taney required only
a moment to decide his course.

In no mood for unwelcomed

excuses, he ruled that the general was "in disobedience
to the writ" and immediately cited him for contempt.
Taney had every legal right to do this.

93

Legally a person

making a return judged to be equivocal or evasive was as
liable to immediate attachment for contempt as the person
failing to make any return.

94

Technically, Taney had

acted in accordance with the law, but the haste and
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Hurd, A Treatise, bk. 2:246.
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impatience in this action suggests that his temper was
beginning to assert itself.
Although one man who attended the Merryman hearings
later insisted that Taney never varied from a manner of
"calm dignity, 1195 this simply was not the case.

During the

second hearing, held on Tuesday,May twenty-ninth, Taney's
temper nearly overcame his carefully cultivated courtoom
demeanor.

It could almost have been predicted.

came into the session expecting the worst.

Taney

In his mind he

was sensible of his "grave responsibility. 1196

In his hand

was his prepared statement explaining the attachment of the
general and ruling that "it . . . is very clear that John
Merryman . . . is entitled to be set at liberty and
11 97
. h arge d imme
.
d.iate 1 y f rom imprisonment.
·
·
d isc
edge and for good reason.

Taney was on

He knew of the rumors that his

arrest had been considered.

For a time it seemed likely

that a United States marshal or an Army patrol might be
upon him at any minute.

Taney would have been foolish not

to have been a bit scared at some point.

But by now he felt

95

McHenry Howard, Memo, 5 May 1919, Steiner, Life
of R. B. T., p. 494.
96

R. B. Taney to F. Pierce, 12 June 1861, Pierce,
" Papers , " p . 3 6 8 .
97

R. B. Taney, Statement, 28 May 1861, Ex parte
Merryman, 17 Fed. Case No. 9,487 (1861) at 147.
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that the danger to him had passed.

98

Still it must have

angered him, and this anger undoubtedly contributed to the
precipitateness of his actions that day.
The marshal's return on the writ of attachment should
have hardly surprised Taney, but apparently it aggravated
him nevertheless.

Surely, he did not seriously expect

Cadwalader to accept service of that writ.
profited him nothing.

It would have

Still, this refusal, like the

general's earlier failure to appear personally in court,
could easily be construed as an insult by the chief justice.
Obviously exasperated with the obdurate general, Taney
took out his frustrations on those who had the misfortune
of bringing him the bad news.

Becoming excessively finicky

in his pique, Taney made much unnecessary ado about the
marshal and his deputy amending their perfectly clear
return just to satisfy him.
Reading his prepared statement did not calm Taney,
although it would have been well for his reputation for
judicial calmness had it done so.

Instead, in the excite-

ment of the moment Taney ignored his own good advice about
foregoing oral remarks and began speaking extemporaneously.
It was at this point, one fairly objective observer reported,
that the chief justice was obviously "greatly affected and

98

Brown, Baltimore, p. 90.
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displeased. 1199

Indeed, Taney assailed the marshal, his

deputy, and even the president, but he focused in on General
Cadwalader.

Toward him Taney's wrath was unbounded.

He

vowed that if he ever got the chance, he would punish
Cadwalader to the limits of the law.

The relevant federal

statutes in force at the time were vague as to specific
procedures pertaining to the habeas corpus process, but one
clearly provided that Taney could find Cadwalader guilty
of a misdemeanor and punish him with a fine of up to $1,000
100
and six months in jail.
Considering all that had
transpired, it must be believed that Taney would have done
so if he had ever gotten the chance.
The depth of Taney's ill feelings toward the general
should not be underestimated.

However, no less an authority

than J. G. Randall claims "it was not seriously proposed
that Taney should have ordered his marshal to call out the
citizenry in opposition to the President and army of the
United States.

11101

But a fairly objective witness insists

that from the tone of his voice, Taney was very sincere

99 Baltimore correspondent of Philadelphia Enquirer
in New York Evening Post, 29 May 1861, p. 3.
100

u.s.,

Statutes at Large, 4:634.

lOlJ. G. Randall, Lincoln the President, 3 vols.
(New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1945), 3:162.
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about wanting to arrest the general.

102

Randall seems to

leave the impression that in light of previous censure of
the practice of assembling extraordinarily large citizens'
posses, Taney could not have been serious.

But as even

Randall seems to understand, past objections to large
posses was based on their purpose (to serve as standing
armies to fight desperadoes) not their size per se.

103

There had been no objection to using a posse, regardless
of its size, for its proper purpose that being to assist
a marshal in the execution of specific judicial orders and
writs.

This was precisely what Taney considered doing.

He

wanted a posse of sufficient size and strength to serve a
writ of attachment and, perhaps, an arrest warrant on
General Cadwalader.

Taney dropped the idea not because of

any doubt about its propriety, but because of its impracticality.

Quite simply Taney knew that no posse that the

marshal might muster could force service on General Cadwalader
if he chose to resist it, ensconsed as he was in Fort McHenry.

* * * *
In both content and mood Taney's Merryman opinion
aptly reflects the chief justice's reaction to President

102

Baltimore correspondent of Philadelphia Enquirer
in New York Evening Post, 29 May 1861, p. 3.
103

Randall, Constitutional Problems, p. 160.
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Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus.

Colored by his

political and emotional involvement in the matter, it fully
presents his particular view of what the Constitution
intended regarding habeas corpus.

Its argumentation is

forceful and logical--after a fashion.

Being well

grounded in Taney's strict interpretation of the Constitution
and buttressed by citations to various British and American
legal and historical precedents, it has the ring of
authority.

But like the rest of the case with which it

deals, the Merryman opinion is controversial and has been
both praised and condemned.

Yet even those who dismiss

Ex parte Merryman as the antics of an elderly, pompous,
and benighted partisan can admire the opinion for the
boldness of its attack, an attack made against great odds
and not without some risk.

At the same time those who

venerate and admire Taney must admit that his Merryman
opinion "is rich in curious features."

There is no wonder

why it has become a "landmark in constitutional law and
.
par t isan
po 1·t·
1 ics. "104

The most pervasive "curious feature" of the Merryman
opinion was its precipitateness.

It was abrupt, rash at

times, and seemed on the whole to lack forethought.
Perhaps to have been expected under the circumstances but
never to be excused, this was an almost inevitable outgrowth
of Taney's peculiar behavior during the hearings preceding
104

Hyman, Perfect Union, p. 85.
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the composing of the opinion.

That had resulted from his

emotional involvement in the issues surrounding the case
interacting with his personal emotional constitution which
ignited a chain reaction in him.

Entering the affair

with great hopes, Taney soon became frustrated, which led
to anger that found expression in his impatient and
impulsive behavior during the hearings and which carried
over affecting his opinion.
The opinion has the tone of something written
"under the gun."

However, no pun is intended or applicable

because before he wrote the opening sentence of his opinion
Taney knew he was no longer in danger from the Lincoln
· ·
t.ion. l0 5
a d ministra

St.i 11 , h e was un d er a pressure.

Taney

had only four days to prepare and submit his opinion and
he felt "pressed for time."

106

imposed by any outside force.
himself.

This requirement was not
Taney set the deadline

Only he can be blamed for the consequences.

The

only imperative involved was Taney's burning desire to
speak his mind which impetuously led him to promise in court
that he would provide an opinion in writing "in the course
of this week." 107
105

The predictable

results, especially when

Brown, Baltimore, p. 90.

106

R. B. Taney to C. Robinson, 10 April 1863, Tyler,
Memoir, p. 460-461. Taney allowed himself only four days to
prepare his Merryman opinion; by comparison he spent four
weeks on his Dred Scott decision. Freund/Swisher, The Taney
Period, p. 850.
l0 7 R. B. Taney, Statement, 28 May 1861, Ex parte
Merryman, 17 Fed. Case No. 9,487 (1861) at 147.
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other official duties intervened, was a less than perfect
. .
opinion.

.
.
By T aney I sown a d mission

1· t

.
1 ete. 108
was incomp

It also seems hasty in its rush to use dubiously applicable
supporting arguments and occasionally rash in its logic.
It would stretch the definition of causality to attribute
all this solely to Taney's emotional state and the haste
with which it caused him to act, but whatever its cause
it

undoubtedly contributed to some of the opinion's

other "curious features."
When writing a judicial opinion it is standard
practice for a judge to quote from the previous rulings made
by other judges in similar cases that support his position.
These are called precedents.

109

But because no president had

ever taken it upon himself to suspend habeas corpus, no
case asking any judge to rule on his right to do so had
ever been brought into court.

This presented a problem for

Taney who needed something to fill a few pages and, hopefully, buttress his argument.

Always a diligent researcher,

this time Taney managed to find in his law books two
quotations that could be construed to support his position.
Both came from eminent jurists, but neither was a true

108

R. B. Taney to C. Robinson, 10 April 1863, Tyler,
Memoir, pp. 460-461.
109
110

Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1340.
Hughes, "R. B. Taney," p. 785.
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precedent in any strict legal sense, and the inclusion
of each provided the opinion with another "curious
feature."
One was a quotation from Joseph Story's Commentaries
on the Constitution.

Story was an exceptional jurist,

brilliant scholar, and an extraordinary educator.

The

youngest man ever appointed to the Supreme Court, he served
with distinction for thirty-four years.

As a teacher at Har-

vard, his writings on American law and the Constitution earned
him an international reputation.
immensely.

Taney respected Story

However, it was not just because Taney felt that

Story's writings supported him in the Merryman matter that
Taney referred to him as "one of the most eminent jurists of
the age."

The particular passage postulated that Congress

was the sole judge of the exigency warranting a suspension
declaring that 'as the power is given to Congress to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus . . . it would seem . . . that
the right to judge whether the exigency had arisen must
exclusively belong to that body.'
was incomplete.

But Story's consideration

He made no attempt to define a suspension

or what role a president might play in one.

For this and

because his writings lacked the force of adjudication, being
only the animadversions of a teacher albeit a respected and
knowledgeable scholar, the citation from Story's Commentaries
was strictly inapplicable.

Although not totally without
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relevance, it was only questionably appropriate and
certainly not any kind of precedent.

111

More questionable was Taney's use of a quotation
from his predecessor, Chief Justice Marshall.

In a case

growing out of the Burr conspiracy, Marshall said of the
habeas corpus process:

"If the . . . public safety should

require the suspension
say so."

112

. it is for the legislature to

Taney quoted Marshall's remarks more fully

and absolutely faithfully,
a misapprehension.

113

yet still managed to promulgate

When the whole context is considered, it

is clear that Taney was not addressing the same question
in Ex parte Merryman that Marshall had in Ex parte Bollman.
The truth was "that neither the facts of the

. case

nor the oft-quoted passage of Marshall's opinion have any
bearing upon the controversy as to whether Congress or the
president has the suspending powe~"

114

What was more, the

passage was obiter dictum and therefore lacked the force of

111

Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Case No. 9,487 (1861)
at 151-152; Joseph Story, Commentary on the Constitution
of the United States (Boston: Charles C. Little & James
Brown), p. 197; Hatcher, Martial Law, p. 189.
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. d'ication.
.
115
a d JU

Whether cited in error due to haste or by

intention due perhaps to deviousness, it is another "curious
feature."
Much more comprehensible and typical of Taney was
his lengthy digression into British legal, constitutional,
. ' 1 h.istory, 116 a1t h oug h it
. too was not wit
. h out
an d po 1 itica
curiosities.

Certainly it was very characteristic of Taney.

His long established practice had been to search for the
meaning of current law by examining its demonstrable roots
in the laws and events of the past.

Well grounded in

common law, Taney conceived of the United States as being
connected through it to Great Britain in the evolution of its
117
legal system.
In the opinion Taney deduced from the
various sources that only Parliament could suspend habeas
corpus in Britain, then analogized that only Congress could
. i. n t h e Unite
. d States. 118
d o it
this.

.
Th ere were two pro bl ems with

One, that any analogy between English and American

constitutionalism is unwarranted.

Admittedly the English

system had effect on the design of the American system

115 1 k'
.
.
B ac s Law Dictionary,
p. 1222 .
116

Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Case No. 9,487 (1861)

at 150-151.
117
118
at 150.

smith, Jacksonian Jurist, p. 38.
Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Case No. 9,487 (1861)
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simply because the Americans were most familiar with it when
they designed theirs.
stand on its own.

But the Constitution was intended to

The delegates to the Philadelphia

convention were adamant that the British constitution was
not a ''model" for theirs.
to Taney's analogy.

119

The second problem was specific

Investigations into Taney's use of

British history have found it lacking in objectivity by
reason of being highly selective.

According to one critic,

Taney ignored 'an unbroken sequence' of English judicial
decisions upholding the right of the Crown to wield every
sort of arbitrary power in time of war including sequestering
noncombatants andexecutinghostile subjects under exigent
.
120
circumstances.
Unto themselves Taney's historiographical shortcomings are relatively unimportant.

No one would read the

Merryman opinion for its insights into British history.
As was so much of the argumentation in the opinion, Taney's
citations of British history were intentionally selected
to support his conclusion and highly edited to remove
anything that remotely conflicted.
With American history Taney did not have as many
problems.

For one thing it was not necessary to attempt

analogies between distinct, sovereign nations.

119
120

However,

Hatcher, Martial Law, p. 192, note 15.
rbid.
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Taney was as selective as before.

For instance, in his

addendum to the opinion Taney quoted a remark that
President of Congress Thomas Miflin supposedly made when
accepting General Washington's military resignation at
the end of the Revolutionary War.

According to Miflin,

Washington had conducted the great military contest with wisdom and

fortitude,

invariably regarding the rights of the

civil power through all disasters and changes.

121

Miflin

may have been sincere, but his assertion was not true.
Certainly, compared to other revolutionary generals in
history Washington was remarkably restrained, but he did not
'invariably' regard the rights of the civil power at 'all'
times as Miflin and Taney claimed.

For instance, in 1780

at Tarrytown Washington asserted the authority to hang a
civilian who had allegedly been involved in Benedict Arnold's
treason.

Fortunately for both Washington and the man,

the general reconsidered and had a military tribunal try the
civilian.

They rightly voted an acquittal, thus preserving

the man from death and General Washington from a grave
mistake.

Only then was the man turned over to the civilian
. .
122
aut h orities.

121

R. B. Taney to C. Robinson, 10 April 1863, Tyler,
Memoir, p. 460-461.
122

G. Washington to G. Clinton, 29 October 1780,
George Washington, The Writings of Washington, ed. John C.
Fitzpatrick, 26 vols. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
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There were other similar instances in Revolutionary
history that Taney conveniently ignored.

One of Taney's

critics maintained that during the war civilian America
"acquiesced in violations of the writ."
officers repeatedly ignored writs.

Continental

This inspired a series

of protests to Congress by those involved, but Congress
took "no . . • action against the practice.''

To the

contrary, on at least one occasion they specifically
approved a general's refusal to honor a writ issued by the

. f
c h ie

123
.
.
Justice
o f De 1 aware.
The problem with Taney's attempt to relate these

events to the Merryman case was that they predated the
Constitution and comparing pre-Constitution America with
the United States under the Constitutionwasalmost as
fallacious as drawing analogies between American and
British constitutionalism.

In both cases Taney was

making sophistic comparisons.

Prior to the Constitution

there were only the Articles of Confederation, which did
not mention habeas corpus.

Before that there was no

national constitution at all and no national habeas corpus
law.

Because of this no true precedent to the Merryman

case could have occurred.

Therefore, whether Taney cited

events from this period accurately or not is of less
importance than the fact that he cited them at all, because

123 Hate h er, Martia
. l Law, p. 190.
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in doing so he was again stretching history to fit his
needs.
However, there was one episode in American history
with circumstances almost identical to those that brought
about the Merryman affair.

This Taney gladly and relatively

completely cited because it totally supported his position.
It happened in the wake of the Burr conspiracy.

In January

of 1807 the Supreme Court granted writs of habeas corpus
to several of Burr's alleged accomplices.

But desiring to

hold these men in jail nevertheless, President Jefferson
moved to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.

However, unlike

Lincoln he did not declare a suspension on his own authority.
Instead Jefferson sent a request that the action be taken
and supporting evidence to Congress.

In a single day a

compliant Senate appointed a committee to inquire into the
need for a suspension that reported back a bill providing
for a three month suspension which was read three times,
amended, and passed.

Sent to the House 'in confidence' it

was taken up three days later with quite different results.
They made the proposal public and after a brief but spirited
debate rejected it by a huge margin.

124

Some of these

details were not crucial to Taney's position so as before
he omitted them.

What was important to him, as important

as anything else in his opinion, was the fact that when a

124

For a brief but thorough account of this see
Schwartz, Commentary on the Constitution, pp. 134-135.
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previous president wanted a suspension of habeas corpus he
did not take it upon himself to act, but referred the
matter to Congress.
erred.

This was where TaneybelievedLincoln

To Taney, President Jefferson's behavior was

exemplary.

125

It was more akin to what Taney believed

Lincoln should have done.
Preeminently Roger Taney was a logical man in every
phase of life.

There was an order about his thinking and

actions, including that which brought him to the Merryman
case in the first place.

Because of this it is difficult

to understand how one of the most "curious features" of the
Merryman opinion came to be.

But the fact is that Taney

began his argument in the Merryman opinion by assuming
that which he needed to prove.

The major point of departure

between Lincoln and Taney was whether only Congress could
suspend habeas corpus.

Taney maintained that the privilege

to suspend belonged exclusively to Congress.

But in his

opinion he made no effort to prove this assertion.
he offered only an assumption.

Instead

He "supposed it to be one

of those points of constitutional law upon which there was
no difference of opinion, and that was admitted on all hands
that the privilege of the writ could not be suspended,
126
except by act of Congress."
125

Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Case No. 9,487 (1861)

at 148.
126

Ibid.
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With regard to every canon of logic, this failure
is inexcusable, but considered with respect to Taney's
purpose in the Merryman opinion it is readily explainable.
Taney drafted his opinion in a challenge of the president's
actions.

His purpose was to censure Lincoln.

So all

consuming was this desire that Taney devoted practically no
effort to arguing Congress' exclusive right to suspend
habeas corpus simply because he had no particular interest
in defending Congress or its prerogatives.

If Taney was

defending anything, it was the Constitution, the South, and,
to the extent that their fates were intertwined, John
Merryman.

However, his Merryman opinion was not defensive

in nature; quite the opposite, it took the offense.

Rather

than defend the usurped (Congress), Taney attacked the
usurper (President Lincoln).
The main thrust of Taney's attack was an attempt to
diminish the office Lincoln held (the presidency) and
thereby discredit the officeholder.

Toward this end Taney

referred to the Constitution's second article, which defined
and delineated the executive branch.

He reviewed it

strictly, and, not surprisingly, somewhat incompletely.
Noting the president's relatively brief four year term and
liability to impeachment, Taney portrayed the chief
executiveship of the United States as an especially weak
office, particularly by comparison to its English counterpart.

According to Taney, those who formulated the
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Constitution intentionally withheld from the president every
power "dangerous to the liberty of the subject."

As he saw

it, other than being commander-in-chief "from necessity,"
the president had no substantive powers he could wield on
his own.

In one fashion or another the exercise of every

executive power was somehow contingent on Congress.

The

president could not appoint civil officers, make treaties,
or do most anything without some kind of approval from
the legislative branch.

By the same token, although

commander-in-chief, he could use his troops only for
purposes Congress agreed to fund.

To Taney it was plain

that the will of Congress, not that of the president, was
meant to determine the course of the government. 127

To him

the presidency was a limited institution and its limitedness
was clearly intended to mean weakness.
In this recitation on the executive article Taney
was again selective.

He conveniently ignored those

admittedly few, but undeniably constitutional, powers that
the president could exercise on his own.

These included the

not inconsequential power of pardon and the powers to
128
convene and adjourn Congress.
These omissions are noteworthy not only for the misapprehension they create, but
also because they are in keeping with the many other
similar "oversights" that riddled the Merryman opinion.
127 Ibid., p. 149.
128

u.s. c ons t . ar t . 2 , sec. 2 .
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As for matters of "life, liberty, or property,"
Taney conceded the president no involvement other than his
specific constitutional charge "that he take care that the
laws be faithfully executed."

Moreover, the president

had no choice in this because the Constitution granted
him no discretion in this.

He had to execute the law as

passed by Congress and "expounded and ajudged" by the
proper "coordinate branch of the government."

In brief,

according to Taney, the president had to do what Congress
and the judiciary wanted done.

It followed that all

judicial decisions were to receive the full respect and
support of the executive.

This meant that any time

the judicial authority was "resisted by a force too
strong to be overcome without assistance of the Executive
arm," the president had to render the aid necessary to
enforce the judiciary's decision.

Taney's clincher was that

while undertaking this task the president was to be "in
11129
.
.
t o JU
. d"1c1a
. 1 aut h ority.
.
su b or d 1nat1on

Curiously, the

chief justice apparently recognized no contradiction in
one "coordinate" branch of the government being "subordinate"
to another.
Few matters concerned life, liberty, and property
more directly than suspending habeas corpus.

129

Who could do

Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Case No. 9,487 (1861)
at 149; Haines and Sherwood, The Role, 2:454-455.
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it was "too plain and too well settled to be open to
dispute" as far as Taney was concerned.

He believed that in

taking it upon himself Lincoln "exercised a power which he
did not possess under the Constitution."

By placing the

habeas corpus clause in the first article, the authors of
the Constitution made it seem clear to Taney that Congress
was to initiate suspensions.

He reasoned that if the

prerogative had been intended for the president, the next
article, the executive article, would have said so "in
plain words"--but it did not.

130

Superficially considered the weak executive inherent
in Taney's interpretation of the Constitution may seem to
more befit a jurist with a Whiggish background than one who
came into office under Jacksonian Democracy.

But stereotypes

aside and despite its faults, this interpretation was
consistent with how Taney had always viewed grants of power
to the national government:

If there was no conflict and

no infringement on the rights of the states, he tended to
construe them liberally.

However, in the case of the

executive, Taney recognized few powers to be construed in
any manner; certainly none over the life and liberty of
the individual like denying habeas corpus.
To Taney the crucial issue was sphere of power, not
sheer power.
130
at 149.

The exercise of effective force involved in

Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Case No. 9,487 (1861)

248

any governmental act did not of itself concern Taney as long
as the act itself fell within the realm of proper constitutional powers.

Presidents, for instance, could take strong

actions as long as they did not exceed their constitutional
powers.

Therefore, without being inconsistent Taney could

support Jackson's veto of the new charter for the Bank of the
United States (which was a strong measure) because the
Constitution clearly provided a president the power to
veto legislation and later censure Lincoln for suspending
habeas corpus (another strong measure) because he believed
the Constitution gave the president no power in that sphere.
Taney felt his position was unassailable, that
regarding habeas corpus the matter was "too plain
be open to dispute."

. to

But at the same time he anticipated

the most likley excuse for the president's actions and
disputed it before it was ever raised.

No argument could

"be drawn from the nature of sovereignty, or the necessity
of government, for self-defense in times of tumult and
danger," Taney admonished.

Emergencies did not change

Taney's position on implied powers.

The government, he

insisted, was still "one of delegated and limited powers''
and none of its branches "can exercise any of the powers
of government beyond those specified and granted. 11131

131

rbid.
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The leitmotif underlying Taney's involvement and
actions in the Merryman affair was his belief in and appeal
for faith in the rule of law "which breathes through the
opinion. 11132

That one man had lost his faith in the rule

of law and subsequently taken it upon himself to suspend
a portion of the law greatly troubled Taney.

He regretted

that President Lincoln no longer believed in the ability
of the courts in Maryland to handle cases like Merryman's
and so had allowed the Army "by force of arms . . . to
thrust aside the judicial authorities • . . and substitute
a military government."

the reign of force majeure in one

state was enough to make Taney fearfully and perhaps
hastily conclude that "the people of the United States are
no longer living under a government of laws, but every
citizen holds life, liberty, and property at the will and
pleasure of the army officer in whose district he may be
.. 133
f oun.
d
Obviously Taney was a man of great faith in the
rule of the law who sincerely believed that his position
deserved to be upheld.

A man of less zeal for the law

would never have enunciated such unpopular views at such a

132

W. Marbury, Remarks, 26 May 1861, H. Walker
Lewis and William Marbury, "Ex parte Merryman," Maryland
Historical Magazine (December 1961) :394.
133
at 152.
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crucial time.

Unfortunately, this reflected a grievous

misapprehension of political reality.

Although Taney

probably quickly developed some inkling that his actions
in the Merryman matter would prove immediately futile, that
the president would not immediately order Merryman's release,
he certainly never perceived them as a farce or a mistake.
He did not understand that neither he nor the Court would be
allowed to participate in the war or that the Court would
.
. its
.
"h
require
years to repair
s attere d pres t·ige. "134

The

truly pathetic thing was that adherence to a high ideal
caused Taney to injure his office.

Yet, for him to have

behaved otherwise might have wrought a worse effect.
Feeling as he did, Taney had a moral obligation to act as
he did.

Discretion may be the better part of valor, but

for the chief justice of the Supreme Court to back down from
a position simply because it was impolitic would have been
as pernicious a precedent as the president's suspending
habeas corpus.

The politics of Ex parte Merryman aside

and with some allowance for hyperbole it has fairly been
said 'there is no sublimer picture in our history than this
of the Chief Justice--the fires of the Civil War kindling
about him . . . serene and unafraid, interposing the shield
of the law in the defense of the liberty of the citizen. • 135
134
135

Lewis, Without Fear or Favor, p. 423.

wm. E. Mikell in William Lewis Draper, ed.,
Great American Lawyers, 8 vols (Philadelphia: John C.
Winston Co., 1908), 4:188-189.

CHAPTER XXI
THE MIND OF LINCOLN
President Abraham Lincoln's 27 April 1861 executive
authorization for the suspension of habeas corpus
genesis for the entire Merryman affair.

1 was the

The suspension

encouraged the arrest of John Merryman, which inspired his
struggle to regain his freedom, which became formed into
Ex parte Merryman, which provided a forum for Chief Justice
Taney to attack President Lincoln.

Alone the suspension

was a bold and assertive act beyond the realm of anything
ever attempted by any previous president.

But, by the same

token, the political circumstances of the spring of 1861
were also without precedent.

These circumstances and the

particular context in which Lincoln authorized the suspension
of habeas corpus must be understood if one is to understand
how a president came to wield such extraordinary power over
the lives and well-being of individuals.

* * * *

1

A. Lincoln to W. Scott, 27 April 1861, Lincoln,
Collected Works, 4:347.
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For Abraham Lincoln it began when he won the
sixteenth contested election for the presidency of the United
States.

His election was very unusual.

Garnering less than

forty percent of the popular vote, Lincoln was clearly a
minority president; but balloting in the electoral college
did make his victory overwhelming.

Other presidential

candidates have lost in the popular vote then in a reverse of
fortune prevailed in the electoral balloting, but none quite
as spectacularly as did Lincoln.

The explanation for his

turnabout lies in the geographical distribution of the vote.
The strength of each of the race's four candidates was
sectional, but Lincoln's was the most sectional of all.
faired poorly in the

He

border states, worse in the South

(ten Southern states failed to credit him with a single vote),
but carried every Northern state handily.

Their 169

electoral votes alone sufficed to make him the nation's
next president.

The other eleven he received from

California, Oregon, and New Jersey were superfluous to his
. t ory. 2

VlC

Because of the terms of his election, Lincoln's
presidency began inauspiciously.

He did not have the free

hand with which he later suspended habeas corpus.

When he

assumed office, Lincoln did so with about as little prestige

2

&

John Garrity, The American Nation (New York: Harper
Row, 1966), pp. 890-893.
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and, hence, as little political latitude as any man who ever
entered it.

He was not recognized as a leader even in the

counsels of his own party, despite the victory he won for
l' t • 3

To many of his countrymen over whose government he

was to preside the ''tall, shambling, plain" man
homely enigma.

4

Lincoln was an unknown quantity.

quarters he was openly mistrusted.

was a
In some

Many Easterners doubted

his ability to cope with the crisis at hand.

5

Some Southern-

ers considered his election sufficient grounds for dissolving
the Union.

He could not claim the popular mandate of the

people that successful presidential candidates are wont to
declare theirs.
Under the circumstances, there was seemingly little
that Lincoln could do.

However, as president-elect he did

possess a little political clout and he used what he had
to his advantage.

Operating behind the scenes, Lincoln

resorted to obstructionist tactics (the most effective kind

3

Wm. Seward and Thurlow Weed, for example, had more
personal clout in the ranks of the Republican party.
Randall and Donald, Civil War and Reconstruction, p. 150.
4

orville Hickman Browning, The Diary of Orville
Hickman Browning, eds. Theodore C. Pease and James G.
Randall, 2 vols. (Springfield, Ill.: Illinois State
Historical Library, 1925), 2:64.
5

p. 163.

Randall and Donald, Civil War and Reconstruction,
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when one's power is limited) to exert some influence, if
only in a negative vein.

In Congress and elsewhere men were

attempting to effect a reconciliation between the North and
the South through compromise.

Their efforts focused on

slavery's territorial question, much as the Supreme Court
had in Dred Scott.

Each side blamed the other for their

joint failure, but the regrettable fact was that "in the
fateful hour responsible Republican leaders refused to
accept any compromise."

6

For his part Lincoln wrote

"private and confidential" letters to key people counseling
against compromise.

"Entertain no proposition for a

compromise in regard to the extension of slavery," he
admonished Congressman William Kellogg.

To Lyman Trumbull

the president-elect determinedly announced, "if any of our
friends . . . fix up a compromise on the territorial question
I am for fighting again--that is all."

And to his future

Secretary of State, Republican kingpin William Seward, he
declared, "I am inflexible.

I am for no compromise. 117

Meanwhile in public President-elect Lincoln
maintained a sphinx-like silence.

Between the election

in November and his inauguration in March Lincoln did not

6

rbid., p. 149.

7
A. Lincoln to W. Kellog, 11 December 1860;
A. Lincoln to L. Trumbull, 17 December 1860; and
A. Lincoln to W. Seward, 1 February 1861, Lincoln,
Collected Works, 4:150, 153, 183.
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foreshadow the kind of strong chief executive he would
become.

He steadfastly refused to comment on any matter of

much more substance than the weather and even joked about
his reticence.

8

To some it seemed that he was doing nothing

but "perambulating the country, kissing little girls and
growing whiskers. 119

Actually his actions were similar to

those of the man he was about to succeed--James Buchanan.
For this historians have deemed Buchanan a failure, a man
"of weakness, vacillation, and timidity. 111

°

Curiously,

Lincoln, who followed much the same course at precisely the
same time, has miraculously escaped the censure of most
historians, being excused as "powerless to prevent
disaster. 1111
The "rub," as Lincoln himself might have said, was
that in truth Buchanan was not so completely inactive nor
was Lincoln so totally powerless as either has been
repeatedly portrayed.

"Timid" Buchanan called the first

8 Refer to the speeches Lincoln made while in transit
to Washington for his inauguration.
Lincoln, Collected
Works, 4:190-247, passim.
9charles Francis Adams, Charles Francis Adams 18351915: An Autobiography (New York: Russell & Russell,
reissue 1968), p. 82.
lO A11 an Nevins,
.
h Emergence o f L1nco
.
1 n ( New Yor:
k
T!e
Scribner & Son, 1950), p. 342.
11
p. 142.

Randall and Donald, Civil War and Reconstruction,
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troops to the defense of Washington and made the original
.
.
·
•12
to d e f en d Fort S umter ' t o the 1 as t extremity.
d eterm1nat1on
Meanwhile behind the scenes, "powerless" Lincoln played at
politics using what clout he had to effectively influence
people and through them events.
After the inauguration the Lincoln presidency did not
immediately assert itself in an aggressive manner.

Beginning

with his inaugural speech Lincoln was neither as hard on the
South as some of his hard-line supporters hoped, or some
Southerners expected.

The long awaited speech, delivered

in "an atmosphere of apprehension and military display,
struck the note of gentle firmness and breathed the spirit
of conciliation and friendliness to the South."

Lincoln

"made it clear that his government could not consent to its
own destruction by recognizing secession, and that it must
maintain its authority against the challenge of disunion. 1113
The first few weeks of the Lincoln administration were akin
to the closing weeks of Buchanan's in that the government
maintained a wait and see attitude.
people.

This disgruntled some

One "totally disappointed" New York Republican

wrote Lincoln in early April and charged him with being "as
destitute of policy, as weak, and [as] vassalating [sic] as
was your predecessor,"

12
13

rbid., p. 146.
rbid., p. 164.

"Give up Sumpter, Sir," Lincoln was
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warned, "& you are as dead politically as John Brown is
physically."
of policy

&

The way this man saw it, Lincoln's "want
action has demoralized the country more than

all three months of Buchanan's imbecility did altogether."
He advised Lincoln to "either act, immediately

&

decisively

or resign and go home. 1114
Despite such reaction Lincoln held fast to his
initial course as promoted by a more moderate faction of
the Republican party.

Taking the reigns of power quietly

but determinedly, Lincoln studiously avoided anything that
might needlessly offend the upper tier of slave states.

He

hoped to hold these states, including Virginia especially,
loyal until a tide of anti-secession reaction would sweep
the South and drive the fire-eaters back from their
. .
. h out vio
. 1 ence. 15
untena bl e position
wit

The success of this

policy was necessarily predicated on careful avoidance of
collision and bloodshed until the time when more sober
second thought could occur in the South.

As Lincoln later

said, at this juncture he was relying on "time, discussion
and the ballot-box 1116 to settle the matter.

Events

1411 Republican" to Mr. Lincoln, 3 April 1861, Mearns,
Lincoln Papers, 2:516-517.
15

one explanation of this strategy, which was very
similar to Buchanan's "conciliation and Union" policy, appears
in Adams, Charles Francis Adams, pp. 73-74.
16

A. Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session,
4 July 1861, Lincoln, Collected Works, 4:423.
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subsequently proved this course incapable of preventing
disaster, but the chance that it might have succeeded made
pursuing it a worthwhile endeavor.

After all, it cost only

some time and caused no harm.

* * * *
The bombardment of Fort Sumter by South Carolinian
artillery on 12 April 1861

17

changed the entire situation.

For months the attention of the government (first under
Buchannan, later under Lincoln) had been focused there, as
had that of the nation as a whole.

While the stars and

stripes still waved over Sumter's parapets, all was
relatively well, as far as the nation's Unionists were
concerned.

But to many Americans any Federal presence in the

South at this time was unwelcomed.
relatively moderate Virginia.

This included many in

In that crucial state a

special convention to determine its future course, which
included considering secession, had been sitting for some
time without any action being taken.

On April eighth this

group had dispatched a special three man commission to ask
President Lincoln for a clear expression of his policy
regarding Federal forts in the South.

18

They should hardly

17

For a brief account of the bombardment refer to
Randall and Donald, Civil War and Reconstruction, pp. 173175.
18

wooster, Secession Conventions, pp. 140, 147-148.
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have bothered.

In March in his inaugural speech Lincoln

had made it clear that he intended to use his power "to hold,
occupy and possess the . . . places belonging to the
government."

He repeated this almost verbatim for the

Virginian's edification in April.

19

But by the time the

disappointed commissioners returned to Richmond on April
fourteenth the matter was almost moot.

News of the

firing on Fort Sumter had already reached Virginia.

Just

after the Palmetto flag replaced stars and stripes on
Sumter's flagpole and even before the brave Federal defenders
of the fort after honorably surrendering could make their way
north, the Virginia convention adopted an ordinance of
secession on 17 April 1861.

20

The loss of Virginia, the South's most populous and
wealthy state, constituted the final blow to the Union that
that state had been so instrumental in creating and,
incidentally, all hopes for a peaceable North-South reconciliation.

Once it became evident that Virginia would become

the eighth state to secede (it was clear that this would
happen as early as April thirteenth)
favor in the Upper South was lost.

21

all hope of currying

Hostilities had

19

A. Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, 4 March 1861,
Lincoln, Collected Works, 4:266.
20

Randall and Donald, Civil War and Reconstruction,
pp. 148-149.
21

Ibid., p. 148.
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commenced at Fort Sumter and whether Lincoln had sinisterly
maneuvered the South into firing the first shot or not,

22

mattered little at the time compared to the fact that the
North and the South had begun internecine war.
News of the bombardment of Fort Sumter aroused the
North and a wave of martial spirit swept across the free
states.

There were war sermons from pulpits and war speeches

wherever people assembled.
was offered.

Troops were tendered and money

Cities were made radiant with bunting,

village greens became mustering grounds and fields everywhere became camps.

The newspaper were full of military

reports, orders, and proclamations; the streets full of
parades, drums, flags, and bayonets.

The people of the

North quickly turned "from the industries of peace to the
activities of war."

23

The change in political circumstances was complete.
With the deep South seceded and much of the rest of it
irrevocably on the way out of the Union, Lincoln had only
the North to which to be politically accountable.

Suddenly,

more than five months after his election and more than a
month into his administration, Lincoln for the first time

22

·
. bl e an d emotiona
.
1 --views
.
For con t rast1ng--sens1
refer to Newman, Maryland and the Confederacy, pp. 19-21;
and Randall and Donald, Civil War and Reconstruction,
pp. 174-175.

23

Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, 4:85.
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had the mandate a new president can normally claim.

He had

every reason to believe that the people of the North, who
had supported him in the previous fall's election, would
support him in this spring's crisis.

The way was cleared

for Lincoln the president to be what Lincoln the citizen
had always been back home in Springfield--a man of action,
the man to see when something needed doing.
Assuming the mantle of active leadership, the question facing Lincoln no longer was what dare be done, but,
matter of factly, what would be done "now," as Attorney
General Bates so plainly stated it, "that we are in open
war."

24

Clearly, Lincoln felt no longer bound by his

inaugural promise that he would perpetrate "no bloodshed
or violence. 1125

As he saw it, the new circumstances demanded

new policies and new promises.

In his estimation the

choices were "immediate dissoluton or blood. 1126

Lincoln

opted for blood and immediately began marshaling his
government for war.
According to the Constitution and statutory law, as
president Lincoln's powers to respond to a war situation were

24

E. Bates, Memo in Cabinet, 15 April 1861, Mearns,
Lincoln Papers, 2:555.
25

A. Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, 4 March 1861,
Lincoln, Collected Works, 4:266.
26

A. Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session,
4 July 1861, Lincoln, Collected Works, 4:423.
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few, but not non-existent.

However, Lincoln managed to

respond to the fall of Fort Sumter with what became a
series of energetic and spectacular measures in which he
almost single-handedly moved the national government into a
. .
. · 1 war. 27
position
to prosecute a civi

Some of these were

unquestionably within his power as president and commanderin-chief.

But others, especially the latter, tended to be

"less traditional outreachings of national executive
authority," as one Lincoln apologist has glossed over them;
or as Lincoln himself admitted, they were acts that might be
considered "strictly legal or not."

28

Almost immediately after Sumter's garrison honorably
surrendered, Lincoln issued a public executive proclamation.
It declared that "whereas the laws of the United States .
are opposed, and . . • obstructed,

. by combinations too

powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course," he, as
president, was calling into federal service "the militia of

2711 Every other war president has submitted to Congress
the question of war and peace, but President Lincoln, taking
upon his own shoulders the decision as to how the situation
should be met, launched a whole series of war measures and
irrevocably committed the country to a definite war policy
months before Congress was even called into session."
James Garfield Randall, "Lincoln in the Role of Dictator,"
South Atlantic Quarterly 28 (July 1929) :237.
28 Hyman, P erect
f
.
Union,
p. 61; A. Lincoln, Message
to Congress in Special Session, 4 July 1861, Lincoln,
Collected Works, 4:429.
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the several states of the Union, . . . in order to suppress
.
"29
sa1"d comb"1nat1ons.

The legality of this measure

was beyond question, if one accepted the premise that the
secessionists were fomenting rebellion.

The Constitution

empowered Congress "to provide for calling forth the militia
to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections
and repel invasions."

After some fumbling with this

responsibility, Congress responded with the Militia Act
of 1795 which delegated this power to the president in a
prescribed manner.

The second section of this law

empowered the president to call the militia into service
"whenever the laws . . . shall be opposed by combinations
too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course."

The

only stipulation of the law was that the president give the
insurgents fair warning by commanding them to disperse within
"a limited time."
twenty days.

30

Lincoln allowed the secessionists

31

Response to his call must have heartened Lincoln.
Seven state governors replied affirmatively the very day of

29 A. Linco
.
1 n, p roe 1 amation
.
Calling Militia and
Convening Congress, 15 April 1861, Lincoln, Collected Works,
4:331-332.
30

u.s. Const. art. 1, sec. 8; U.S. Congress, Annals
of Congress, 3rd Cong. (Washington, D.C.: Gales & Seaton,
1855), pp. 1508-1509.
31

A. Lincoln, Proclamation Calling and Convening
Congress, 15 April 1861, Lincoln, Collected Works, 4:331-332.
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the proclamation, three more the next.

Within a week

seventeen of the twenty-four states requisitioned had
fallen into line.

The seven seceded were not asked for

obvious reasons, but four that would soon join them were.
The governors of all--North Carolina's Ellis, Virginia's
Letcher, Tennessee's Harris, and Arkansas' Rector--declined.

Two other governors also flatly refused--Magofin of
.

. 32

Kentuc k y an d Jae k son o f Missouri.

Maryland's beleaguered

Governor Hicks hesitated, then declined after the rioting
33
in Baltimore on April nineteenth "for the present."
Actually on the face of it the numbers alone were
not that encouraging, only seventeen out of twenty-four.

But

the enthusiasm with which some of the governors replied
undoubtedly helped offset the abruptness and downright
nastiness with which six of the seven declined.

In any case,

Lincoln need not have been especially concerned with the
governors of the states or their responses.

The men of the

states were flocking to enlist in the requested militia units.
Letters came telling Lincoln how the men of the states were

32

Gleaned from letters sent to S. Cameron by various
governors written between 15 and 23 April 1861, ORR, ser. 3,
1:70-103 passim.
33

T. Hicks to S. Cameron, 22 April, 1861, Mearns,
Lincoln Papers, 2:573.
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uniting "under one flag--the flag of our glorious Union."
Party differences were being set aside, the minority
president was told, Democrats and Republicans alike were
ready to give themselves over to the task at hand.

Lincoln

was assured that "God and country are with you in the
34
mightiest effort you can make."
Lincoln continued his mighty efforts, but none
received a public response approaching that of calling the
militia.

For instance, in the same proclamation that

called out the militia Lincoln also convened Congress.
Yet, that inspired no parades, no rejoicing.

35

Gathering a

bunch of stodgy politicians could not compete for the
public's imagination with gathering an army.

The marshaling

of troops entranced the popular mind and focused public
energies.

The trappings and mere spectacle of it all

thrilled the North.

A good friend back home in Illinois

wrote Lincoln telling him how six or seven thousand gathered
to see a local unit off to war.

Banners were waved,

speeches made, hymns sung, and prayers prayed.

"The scene,"

opined the correspondent, "altogether, was the most
sowlemn [sic] and impressive I have ever witnessed and

34

H.P. Tappan to A. Lincoln, 22 April 1861, Mearns,
Lincoln Papers, 2:572-573.
35 A. Linco
.
l n, Proclamation Calling Militia and
Convening Congress, 15 April 1861, Lincoln, Collected
Works, 4:331-332.
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showed unmistakeably how intensely the fires of patriotism
are burning in the hearts of our people. 1136
With public opinion supporting him and the public
mind not paying much attention to details, Lincoln
continued his assertive ways.

Four days after calling the

militia, he publicly declared a naval blockade of the seven
seceded states.

A week later, he announced its expansion

to include Virginia (which had seceded by then) and North
Carolina (which would not officially secede for almost
another month).

A week after that in another public

proclamation Lincoln called for an additional 42,034 volunteers, directed the regular Army to be increased by the
creation of new regiments, and the Navy augmented by
37
. .
recruiting
a dd't•
i iona 1 seamen.
The constitutionality of this last measure was
highly debatable.

According to the Constitution, Congress,

not the president, had the power "to raise . . . armies''

36

0. H. Browning to A. Lincoln, 22 April 1861,
Mearns, Lincoln Papers, 2:581-582.
37

A. Lincoln, Proclamation of a Blockade, 19 April
1861; A. Lincoln, Proclamation of a Blockade, 27 April 1861;
and A. Lincoln, Proclamation Calling for 42,034 Volunteers,
3 May 1861, Lincoln, Collected Works, 4:338-339, 346-347,
353-354.
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and "provide .

.

. a navy."

38

There were similar problems

with other of the actions that Lincoln took.

His authority

to impose a blockade on executive authority before Congress
declared an insurrection to exist was actually challenged
in the Supreme Court where Lincoln was upheld by the
.

narrowes t o f margins.

39

Thus it was against a background

of dubiously constitutional actions and in an atmosphere
charged with patriotic fervor that Lincoln undertook what
ranked among the most constitutionally debatable acts
of his entire presidency and certainly became the most
controversial of his early war measures--he authorized the
suspension of habeas corpus.
On 27 April 1861 Lincoln signed an executive
directive authorizing General Winfield Scott, the supreme
commander of the rapidly increasing Federal forces and his
top military advisor, to suspend habeas corpus.

It was a

terse, two sentence injunction.
To the Commanding General of the Army of the United
States:

38

U.S. Const. art. 2, sec. 8. General Scott pointed
out to Lincoln that expansion of the Army or Navy was not
to be done without Congressional approval. W. Scott to
A. Lincoln, 4 April 1861, Mearns, Lincoln Papers, 2:526.
General Sherman later said:
'I have never met any one who
claimed that the President could, by proclamation, increase
the regular army,' as quoted in Randall, "Lincoln as
Dictator," p. 238.
39

The Prize Cases, 2 Black 635 (1863).
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You are engaged in repressing an insurrection
against the laws of the United States. If at any
point on or in the vicinity of the [any] military
line, which is now [or which shall be] used between
the City of Philadelphia and the City of Washington
via Perryville, Annapolis City, and Annapolis Junction,
you find resistance which renders it necessary to
suspend the writ of Habeas Corpus for the public
safety, you, personally or through the officer in
command at the point where the [at which] resistance
occurs, are authorized to suspend that writ.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 4 0
Obviously, Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus was
not an isolated action.

Rather it was but one of a series

of measures that together constituted a forceful response
to an unprecedented crisis.

The ultimate responsibility

for each of these actions lies with Lincoln.

With regard

to each measure, Lincoln discussed it with or received input
from some member of his cabinet or other advisor:

General

Scott offered advice regarding calling out the militia and
enlarging the regular Army.

Lincoln apparently discussed

the convening of Congress with Secretary of State Seward.
Attorney General Bates promoted a blockade.

41

Lincoln

listened attentively to his advisors, especially at this
early point in his presidency, but he often ignored their
counsel and always reserved the final decisions for himself.
It is difficult to judge the extent to which others
might have influenced Lincoln's decision to suspend habeas
40

A. Lincoln to W. Scott, 27 April 1861, Lincoln,
Collected Works, 4:137.
41

W. Scott to A. Lincoln, 4 April 1861, Mearns,
Lincoln Papers, 2:526.
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corpus.

One Lincoln biographer leaves the impression that

the president acted only after consulting with and
42
receiving an opinion from his attorney general.
this is a misapprehension.

However

Lincoln did not ask for an

official attorney general's opinion regarding habeas corpus
43
until some time after the fact of the suspension.
A
thorough search of the available primary documents reveals
not the slightest hint that at any time prior to the
suspension did Lincoln actively solicit anyone's opinion
about the wisdom of suspending habeas corpus or his right
as president to do so.

44

However, Lincoln did receive a letter that might
possibly have influenced him with regard to suspending
habeas corpus.

It was one of many that came from private

42

Benjamin P. Thomas, Abraham Lincoln (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), p. 377. Thomas' error is probably
due to taking Lincoln's secretaries' account of this period
to heart. Nicolay and Hay attempted to link a memo by
Attorney General Bates on April twenty-third directly to
the suspension on April twenty-seventh.
In the memo Bates
pled for action, and suggested several things that Lincoln
might do, but he did not mention or allude to the suspension
of habeas corpus. Refer to Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, 4:167;
Bates, Diary, pp. 185-186.
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A. Lincoln to E. Bates, 30 May 1861, Lincoln,
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citizens warning him of plots and plans against him and his
capital, and urging him to take action.

This particular

letter was one of two that Lincoln received from one man.
In the first a blockade of Southern ports was suggested.
The second warned of Confederate plots to seize the national
capital and suggested that the president declare martial
law in the District of Columbia.

45

Although it does not

appear that Lincoln ever answered either of these letters,
the latter could conceivably had had some effect.

It could

well have planted a seed in Lincoln's mind or nurtured one
already sprouting there.
However, it must be pointed out that declaring
martial law and suspending habeas corpus are not the same.
Declaring martial law implies the suspension of habeas
corpus, but suspending habeas corpus is not declaring martial
law.

Martial law is a general suspension of all civil law

and substitution of arbitrary military rule, while the
suspension of habeas corpus is a specific suspension of
only a part of the civil law while civil rule is otherwise
maintained.

On paper the distinction may seem academic, but

.
.
.
.
46
in
practice
i' t is
immense.

45

J. Henderson to A. Lincoln, 13 and 16 April 1861,
Mearns, Lincoln Papers, 2:548-550; 563-564.
46

Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1726. For a discussion
of martial law more contemporaneous to Lincoln refer to
Caleb Cushing in Official Opinions of the Attorneys General
of the United States, vol. 8 (Washington, D.C.: R. Farnham,
1858), pp. 365-374.
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If any letter significantly influenced Lincoln with
regard to habeas corpus it was the one composed by
Secretary of the Treasury Chase.

Originally, Chase had been

more conciliatory toward the South than Lincoln, but after
Sumter he clamored for action.

Addressing Lincoln on April

twenty-fifth, he seemed to forget his own past hesitancy
to act and blamed the country's problems on the president's
inaction.

Chase's concern was the intentions of the State

of Maryland.

If Maryland should leave the Union and join the

Confederacy the national capital would be completely
surrounded by hostile territory.

Observing that the

Maryland legislature was about to convene and figuring it
would pass an ordinance of secession, he asked Lincoln to
"save us from this new humiliation."

Chase suggested "that

a word to the brave old commanding general will do the work
of prevention."
on Lincoln.

He placed the responsibility squarely

"You alone," Chase told the president, "can

give the word."

47

The extent to which this letter motivated Lincoln
can only be guessed.

But if ever there was a time when

Lincoln was likely to be influenced by the counsel of a
member of his cabinet, this was it.

47

In any case, either

s. P. Chase to A. Lincoln, 25 April 1861, J. W.
Schuckers, The Life and Public Services of Salmon Portland
Chase (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1874), pp. 424-425.
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Lincoln either took Chase's suggestion to heart or their
minds were running on much the same track because on the
same day Lincoln indeed sent "a word to the brave old
commanding general."
The "brave old . . . general" was General Winfield
Scott and the "word" was a brief memo in which Lincoln for
the first time discussed with one of his subordinates the
possibility of suspending habeas corpus.

Like Chase's

letter this memo noted the coming assembly of the Maryland
legislature in special session.

Like Chase, Lincoln

expected trouble, that the legislature would "not.
improbably . . . take action to arm the people of that
state against the United States."

But unlike Chase,

Lincoln could not endorse "work of prevention."

Lincoln gave

some consideration to dispersing the legislators or arresting
them, but dismissed both alternatives out of hand feeling
neither would be "justifiable or efficient."
Not knowing for certain how they would act, Lincoln
could not bring himself to move against the legislators.
Besides, Lincoln reasoned, dispersing or arresting them
would resolve nothing:

They would soon be free to assemble

again at another time in another place.
hold them as prisoners," he concluded.

"We cannot long
Obviously, on April

twenty-fifth Lincoln had not quite yet come to the point
where he could imagine arbitrarily seizing and holding
anyone for an indefinite period of time.

To Lincoln on the
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twenty-fifth the key was ''their action."

It was in his

willingness to wait for this that he differed fundamentally
from Chase.

Should Maryland legislature do the worst,

Lincoln was as ready as Chase to react strongly.

If that

should happen, Lincoln instructed Scott, "adopt the most
prompt and efficient means to counteract even, if necessary,
to the bombardment of their cities, and, in the extremest
necessity, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus."

48

On the twenty-fifth the focus of Lincoln's concern
was the Maryland legislature and what it might do.
was good reason to be concerned.

There

During its last meeting

the legislature had passed a resolution vowing 'that should
the hour ever arrive when the Union must be dissolved,'
which was happening at this point,

'Maryland will cast her

lot with her sister states of the South and abide their
fortune to the fullest extent.'

49

The legislature had

become an immediate problem three days earlier when
Governor Hicks, after successfully struggling all winter to
avoid calling them into special session, succumbed to
public pressure.

In the wake of the rioting in Baltimore

over the weekend of April nineteenth, Hicks spent a day
in seclusion trying to decide what he should do next and

48
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Collected Works, 4:344.
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determined at length that he might as well call the legislature before the people of the state took it upon themselves
. 1 conven t.ion. 50
to convene a spec1a

Both Chase and Lincoln

were pessimistic about where this might lead, but Lincoln,
unlike Chase, was at least willing to wait and see what
would happen before acting.

On April twenty-fifth Lincoln's

criteria for a suspension was plain--there would have to
be a hostile act on the part of the Maryland legislature
before he would allow any suspension of habeas corpus.
The Maryland legislature convened in extraordinary
session in Frederick on Friday April twenty-sixth, one week
after the worst rioting in Baltimore.

That afternoon the

House of Delegates met in the courthouse, talked some, but
did nothing of import.

The Senate met early the next day

and before receiving the message customarily sent by the
governor, unanimously passed resolutions styled an "Address
to the People of Maryland."

These stated that the legisla-

ture had no right to consider an ordinance of secession,
but held out a promise to call a special convention if the
people expressed a desire for one.

51

When the governor's much anticipated message
arrived, the legislators gave it an attentive reading.

50
51

Radcliffe, Hicks, pp. 62-63.

National Intelligencer, 29 April 1861, p. 3;
New York Times, 28 April 1861, p. l; Radcliffe, Hicks, p. 74.
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Governor Hicks had been notably quiet since his last public
pronouncements, which had been made before the mob in
Baltimore's Monument Square after the rioting of the
nineteenth.

By his remarks then Hicks had shown himself

. sympat h y f or Linco
.
1 n I s po 1.icies.
.
52
k.
in
1 acing

That he had

subsequently called the legislature into session after
resisting pressure to do so all winter and spring, piqued
imaginations.

If he should denounce the Lincoln administra-

53
.
.
. cou ld sweep th estate into
·
·
t ion
again,
it
secession.
Hicks did not address secession.

But

Instead he hewed out a

middle ground, placing blame for the Baltimore riot on the
"irresponsible mob" on one hand and criticizing the federal
military authorities on the other.

Hicks concluded by urging

in specific terms what he had been pushing Maryland toward
.
54
a 11 a 1 ong--neutra 1 ity.

. message h as
For goo d reason this

been termed "singularly non-commital. 1155

After calling the

legislature into special session, the governor neither
requested nor recommended any specific legislation.

Even

his critics, in this case no less than President Lincoln's

52

Hicks' remarks on this occasion are recounted on
pp. 70-71 above.
53

Radcliffe, Hicks, p. 71.

54

Governor Hicks' message as reported in National
Intelligencer, 30 April 1861, p. 3.
55

Radcliffe, Hicks, p. 72.
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personal secretaries, had to concede the message's
"underlying spirit of loyalty."

56

Although considered the legislature's more radical
chamber, the House of Delegates joined in the spirit of
moderation two days later by adopting the Senate's "Address
to the People" with an overwhelming majority.

Interpreting

this as a "direct vote" on secession, it required no great
brilliance or analytical powers for one Northern reporter
to conclude that in Maryland "secession is killed
'd ea.
d '"57

This should have been Lincoln's conclusion also,
but it is difficult to say with any certainty what he was
thinking.

In any case, in the midst of all this he went

ahead and suspended habeas corpus on the twenty-seventh
of April.

Had Lincoln changed his mind about suspending

habeas corpus or had the criteria he set for General Scott
on the twenty-fifth been met?

On the twenty-seventh the

Maryland legislature did do several things that could possibly
have been construed to be as warlike.

They began to

approve a half-million dollar loan for the defense of
Baltimore, called for an accounting of state militia arms,
and validated the militia commissions of several known

56
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Southern sympathizers.

These actions, which were not

particularly serious, were the most bellicose steps that
the legislature took up to and including the day that
Lincoln suspended habeas corpus.
Did Lincoln consider any of this tantamount of
58
Perhaps
"arming the people . . . against the Government?"
he did, but it would hardly seem so.

Difficult as it is to

say with any certainty, Lincoln probably did not suspend
habeas corpus in reaction to the legislature.

Actually there

is a good chance that he had not even heard about their
most "warlike" measures before he acted.

In any case, when

he did act his central concern seemed to be the Army's
problem moving men to Washington from the North.

The

Maryland legislature, which had been the focus of Lincoln's
first habeas corpus memo, was not mentioned at all.

Instead

Lincoln's concern was the "resistance" to the reinforcement
of Washington,
Baltimore.
full circle:

59

which, of course, had been strongest in

There everything leading to the suspension came
It was the rioting of Baltimore's mob

resisting the passage of Federal troops through their city
that finally forced Governor Hicks to call the state

58
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legislature into special session and concern over what they
might do that moved Lincoln to first seriously consider
suspending habeas corpus.
The resistance in Baltimore had been sufficiently
stiff to completely halt the reinforcement of the capital
via the most direct route.
desperate.

The situation there was

Washington would know many despondent times

in the coming war, but none quite like the days of late
April 1861.

Morale had been deteriorating for some time.

Everyone who could leave Washington had done so.

By the

eighteenth normally bustling Willard's Hotel was nearly
empty.

Soldiers patrolled the streets and the Union flag

waved from buildings, but there was little optimism and
much concern.

Those who had to stay behind were apprehensive.

Many, including some close to the president, expected the
city to be attacked at any moment.
reports were hardly encouraging.

60

General Scott's daily

He never said that

Washington could not meet any foreseeable attack, but at
the same time he was obsessed with adding more men to the
.
th e capi't a 1 as f ast as possi'bl e. 61
f orce d e f en d ing
For a while each day brought news of another disaster.
On April seventeenth Virginia seceded.
60
61

The next day Federal

Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, 4:105-108, 124-125.

General Scott's Daily Reports began 1 April, 1861
and ended 3 May 1861.
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troops had to burn and abandon the arsenal at Harpers
Ferry.

62

The nineteenth brought word of the rioting in

Baltimore 63 and subsequent developments there resulted in
even more bad news during the next few days.

While talks

continued with Baltimore authorities, reports came of the
burning and abandonment of the strategic naval yards at
Gosport near Norfolk, Virginia on the twentieth.

64

Finally

on the twenty-first Lincoln had to order the troops at
Cockeysville to retreat back to Pennsylvania.

65

Blessedly for Lincoln, the twenty-first also marked
the bottoming out of bad news for a while, although not
people's hopes.

On that day the capital received word that

a troop ship full of Massachusetts militia commanded by
General Benjamin Butler had anchored in the harbor of
Annapolis.

66

This was the first encouraging news in a week.

Nevertheless, two days later when they had yet to arrive in

62 R. Jones to W. Scott, 19 April 1861, ORR, ser. 1,
2:4.
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Telegram, 19 April 1861, Mearns, Lincoln Papers, 2:571.
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yards are in the Official Records of the Union and
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(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1896),
vol. 4.
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Washington morale dropped even more.

Had the problems

General Scott predicted would be encountered in Annapolis
stopped the Massachusetts troops?

67

On the night of the

twenty-second Washington again expected to be attacked,
but again it did not happen.

By the twenty-third even

Lincoln was becoming distraught, exclaiming at one point
quite out of the blue and to no one in particular:
don't they come?"

68

But they were on their way.

"Why
On the

twenty-fifth the relief column of Massachusetts militia
arrived in Washington amid bands, banners, and a cheering
citizenry.

The way to Washington had been blazed.

Baltimore, the most direct route, was not the only route.
Resistance had been minimal; Northern troops could reinforce
. t on as f as t ass h'1ps cou ld carry th em to Annapo 1·is. 69
Was h 1ng
Suddenly the circumstances that had seemed so
precarious no longer existed.

The arrival of a single

regiment had changed everything.

Militarily the city capital

was undoubtedly more secure from the attack, which, as it
happened, never came.
was great.

The attendant psychological impact

Even General Scott's daily reports, which had
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been at best cautiously optimistic, suddenly became upbeat.
Reinforcements had arrived and more were in transit, he
could report.

Moreover, Scott, who had previously warned

the president of sinister machinations against him in
Baltimore and Virginia, now believed there was "good
evidence of a return of good feelings in Baltimore" and
informed him that Virginia authorities were opposing any
Confederate attack on Washington.

70

The buoying of spirits in Washington after the
twenty-fifth was reflected in Lincoln's suspension of habeas
corpus on the twenty-seventh.
imperative.

Defense was no longer the

Encouraged by developments, and anxious to

seize the moment, the powers that be began thinking
offensively.

Concerns about defending Washington quickly

gave way to considerations of moving against Baltimore.
General Scott set about formulating a plan of attack as
thorough as any he had employed in Mexico years before.

He

foresaw advancing against Baltimore on four fronts--along
the rail lines from Philadelphia, York, and Washington, and
coordinated with a simultaneous naval supported attack from
Annapolis.

71

According to the president's secretaries, it

was in anticipation of such an offensive that Lincoln

70 w. Scott to A. Lincoln, 26 April 1861, Mearns,
Lincoln Papers, 2:586-587.
71
w. Scott to Maj. Gen. Patterson, 28 April 1861,
ORR, ser. 1, 2:607.
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issued the order of the twenty-seventh authorizing Scott
to suspend habeas corpus.

He did it "to give the military

•
f or every contingency.
•
II 72
amp 1 e aut h ority

In view of the circumstances surrounding it, from
the moment it was done the suspension of habeas corpus was
plainly an aggressive, assertive act by the president.
Lincoln was not acting in the reflexive manner that Chase
suggested, nor was he awaiting some terrible disaster to
which he would react as had been his own first inclination.
Instead Lincoln was moving muscularly from a position of
strength to use the suspension of habeas corpus in the same
manner as he used calling the militia, or instituting the
blockade--asa weapon against those engaged in what he saw
as rebellion.

* * * *
Once Lincoln established his precedent, further
presidential action regarding habeas corpus inevitably
followed.

On April thirtieth Lincoln indorsed a remarkable

letter to Captain Nathaniel Lyon commanding in St. Louis.
Theletter authorized the captain to enroll up to ten
thousand locals directly into the service of the United
States Army.

Furthermore, it advised Lyon to declare

martial law in St. Louis ''if deemed necessary," contingent

72
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only on the concurrence of six prominent citizens named
in the letter.

As has been pointed out, declaring martial

law implied suspending all civil law, including habeas
corpus, and substituting arbitrary military rule.
old General Scott was taken aback at this.

Even

Noting the

"irregularity" of these actions--enrolling men into Federal
service without Congressional approval and setting up a
mechanism for instituting habeas corpus--Scott endorsed
the letter with reservation citing "revolutionary times"
as justification.

73

Indeed, the situation in Missouri at

this time was critical from Lincoln's point of view.

The

state's secessionist governor had refused to provide troops
for the Union and wanted to send men to help the Confederacy.
His efforts to move Missouri into secession were only
narrowly thwarted by a small group of resourceful pro-Union
politicians.

Anything could have happened, but strong

support from Washington, such as the letter, enabled Lyon
and others to nurture Union sentiment and keep Missouri out
of the Confederacy, although the state suffered internal
turmoil throughout the war.

74

Ten days later Lincoln authorized the suspension of
habeas corpus in parts of Florida--the only seceded state

73
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in which the Federal government still retained a presence.
In addition to Fort Pickens on Santa Rosa Island commanding
Pensacola harbor, Federal authorities remained in control
of various other islands off the coast including Key West
and the Tortugas.

Lincoln ordered the commander of Union

military forces along the Florida coast to "permit no
person to exercise any office or authority" upon these
islands.

To assist him in dealing with "dangerous or

suspected persons," Lincoln authorized the commander, "if
he shall find it necessary, to suspend there the writ of
Habeas Corpus."

75

This proclamation was the first public

notice that Lincoln had taken it upon himself to suspend
habeas corpus.

The press duly reported it, but no great

discussion of constitutional issues ensued.

76

Meanwhile the authority to suspend habeas corpus in
Pennsylvania and Maryland, along "the military line . . .
between the City of Philadelphia and the City of Washington"
remained

relatively secret.

announced.

At least it was not publicly

Eventually this enabled Taney to chide Lincoln

for not giving any notice "by proclamation or otherwise" to
the courts or the public.

77

Even in official circles the
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suspension of the twenty-seventh was not widely known.
For instance, Major Morris conducted his entire dispute
with Judge Giles while ignorant of the fact that his
superiors had oresidential authority to suspend habeas
corpus that could theoretically have been extended to him.
Word of Morris' situation went all the way to the office
of the attorney general and back to the major without any
mention being made of the president's suspension--at least
not to Morris.

This silence may indicate that Bates and

other members of the cabinet knew nothing about the suspension at

this

time.

Lincoln's first communication with

General Scott regarding it was private and the second memo
to Scott, the one authorizing the suspension on the
twenty-seventh, was signed by Lincoln alone.

By comparison,

the letter to Captain Lyon in St. Louis bore the signatures
of President Lincoln, Secretary of War Cameron, Secretary
of State Seward, and General Scott.

Eventually Lincoln's

actions regarding habeas corpus became well known.

However,

no public proclamation concerning the suspension of habeas
corpus was made until 24 September 1862, when Lincoln
announced a suspension applying to the entire country with
regard to persons arrested for discouraging enlistments or
resisting the draft. 78
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* * * *
Chief Justice Taney's taking up of the Merryman
petition in late May had the effect of making President
Lincoln's April suspension of habeas corpus in Maryland
public knowledge.

The local press in Baltimore immediately

reported Merryman's arrest and Taney's involvement.

The

story was picked up and published in newspapers across the
country.

The events of the court session that followed were

also widely reported.

79

Word from Baltimore had it that

this would be 'a memorable case in the jurisprudence of the
country, •

80

and the nation's newspapers wanted to inform

their readers of it.

Those papers that did not have

correspondents there, reprinted items from the Baltimore
press.

One way or another the story was spread.

As a

result of the attention, the fact that Lincoln had taken
it upon himself to suspend habeas corpus became readily
available to any who cared to note it.
However the press did not choose to emphasize the
suspension or the constitutionally questionable role
Lincoln played in authorizing it.

Initially Lincoln's

79
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part, which Taney for one hoped would be the focus of
attention, slipped by almost without comment.

Immediate

press reaction primarily reflected political biases.
81
Critical analysis would not come until later.
Most of the political bias in what remained of the
Union did not favor Taney.

Throughout the week following

Merryman's arrest and during the hearings culminating in the
issuing

of Taney's opinion in Ex parte Merryman, the

press took Taney to task.

There had been nothing to compare

to it since the Dred Scott decision four years earlier.
As in 1857, papers like the New York Tribune lead the way
in excoriating the chief justice.

Tribune editor Horace

Greeley railed against Taney's issuance of a writ styling it
''a gross perversion."

He characterized the venerable chief

justice as "decrepit," and openly questioned his loyalty.
The New York Times declared that Taney was ''too feeble" and
used "the power of his office to serve the cause of rebellion."

The Chicago Times ran a front page editorial

81

The most prominent defense of Lincoln was:
Horace Binney, The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
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entitled "Old Taney" that said the chief justice had
already entered his dotage when he delivered the Dred Scott
opinion and concluded the Tintervening years had not
brightened his faculties.

1

The New York Evening Post

claimed Taney had given aid and comfort to the enemies of
the United States and should be required to take an oath
.
82
o f a 11 egiance.
No major newspaper openly censured Lincoln for
exceeding the authority of his office or unreservedly
supported Taney.

The Washington Star pointed out that

Taney's decision was correct in "the strict letter of the
law," but chided Taney for unrealistically ignoring "the
existing state of affairs."

The New York World started as

if to support Taney by saying that a suspension not authorized by Congress was

'illegal,'

then concluded that 'public

exigency' could 'justify it' nevertheless.

Even the major

Baltimore papers supported Taney only with lukewarm phrases
and showed little disposition for taking on the president.
The severest criticism of Lincoln stopped far short of
censure.

Boston's Daily Advertiser professed no sorrow in

seeing the judiciary declare its opinion, applauded Taney's
fortitude, and encouraged the courts to always act whenever
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'the bounds of the Constitution are overstepped.'

Excesses

were not to be overlooked; they were to be noted so that
they would stand in the record as a warning.

If ignored,

such episodes might come in time to be regarded as
precedents that would promote imitiation instead of
83
exceptions that were not to be emulated.
It was obvious to anyone capable of reading a
newspaper that the national press, with hardly any reservations, supported Lincoln.
apparently mattered little.

Constitutional considerations
Across the North "the existing

state of affairs" and the "public exigency" were of
paramount concern, not the Constitution or the law.

As

the Boston Daily Advertiser succinctly said, "necessity
. . • was the justification" for what had been done.

84

Lincoln could hardly have missed what was so obvious, in
fact it seems that he took it to heart.

He had to have

been encouraged by the initial press response to Taney,
the Merryman affair, and his suspension of habeas corpus.
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Certainly, there was nothing about it to discourage or
dissuade him.
During the week that Taney held his hearings,
rendered his decision, and prepared his opinion for
Ex parte Merryman, rumors spread concerning Lincoln's
response.

One that circulated in Baltimore had it that the

president would give in, obey the chief justice, and
release Merryman forthwith.

Supposedly, late in the week

Lincoln sent Taney a letter regarding the Merryman case
85
indicating that he would comply with his decision.
In
truth there is no record of Lincoln writing a letter to
Taney at thi .s t '1me. 86

He certainly never acceded to the

chief justice's point of view.

In reality this rumor seems

to have been nothing more than wishful thinking on the part
of Southern sympathizers in Baltimore.
Another rumor portrayed the president as being
anything but contrite.

According to it, rather than obey

Taney, Lincoln considered obstructing him in a most
decisive manner--by arresting him and putting him in jail.
As has been pointed out, the press spread this rumor and
Taney took it to heart to some extent.

The only thing

approaching hard evidence indicating that this rumor had
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any basis in fact comes from an unpublished memo written
some time after the fact by Francis Lieber--a German-born
intellectual and professor of history and political science
at Columbia University whose area of special interest
was legal-military questions and the laws of war.

Some

considered Lieber the authority on the political implications of suspending habeas corpus.

Lincoln's most prominent

legal champion, Philadelphia lawyer Horace Binney, consulted
with Lieber when preparing his pamphlet defending the
president's right to suspend habeas corpus.

At the outbreak

of the Civil War, Lieber was much consulted by the Union
government and hence was not without some knowledge of the
innermost workings of the Lincoln administration.

In

view of his position and reputation, some serious consideration must be given to Lieber when he matter-of-factly
related how "after due consideration the administration
determined upon the arrest of the Chief Justice."

According

to Lieber, a warrant was issued and given to Ward Hill Lamon-the president's former law partner and erstwhile bodyguard
who had recently been made U.S. marshal for the District
of Columbia.

Supposedly, Lincoln personally placed the

warrant in Lamon's possession "with instructions to him to
use his own discretion about making the arrest unless he
should receive further orders."

Of course no one arrested

the chief justice, but Lieber's dispassionate account of

292
the consideration that was given it, replete with details,
is difficult to ignore.

87

What is certain is that late in this week and even
before Taney released his opinion in Ex parte Merryman,
the president was moving through more regular channels to
meet the chief justice's challenge.

On Thursday, May

thirtieth, he drafted a memo telling his attorney general
to "be preparing to present the argument for the suspension
of Habeas Corpus. 1188
Edward Bates was Lincoln's attorney general.
Lincoln had beat Bates in the contest for the Republican
nomination although only a few months before the convention
Lincoln conceded that Bates might be the "strongest and
best" candidate the party could run.

89

Early on in

Lincoln's administration, Bates and the president had an
amiable relationship.

But at no time was Bates a lackey

or ideological twin to Lincoln.

Beginning with his first

87 Francis Lieber, Memo on Habeas Corpus, n.d., LN2422,
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official opinion and ending only with his last, Attorney
General Bates told President Lincoln "no" more often than
not. 90

However in this instance it was of paramount

importance that Bates support the president, that the
Lincoln administration present a unified front regarding
the executive suspension of habeas corpus.

Judging from

the language of the memo, it seems clear that Lincoln fully
expected this from Bates.
Hence it fell to Bates to discover, devise, or
conjure up some reasonable and legally passable justification
for Lincoln's presidential suspension of the habeas corpus
privilege.

Fortunately for Lincoln, he and Bates shared

a belief in the existence of expansive heretofore unexercised presidential powers that belied their Whiggish
political roots.

91

But Lincoln knew that Bates, like

himself, had little previous experience in such matters of
constitutional law and sensed that Bates had little stomach
for taking on the redoubtable chief justice.

Consequently

he had suggested that Bates seek some outside help and
recommended Reverdy Johnson.

92

Lincoln received the support

90 John P. Frank, "Edward Bates, Lincoln's Attorney
General," American Journal of Legal History 10 (1966):42-43.
9lrbid., p. 42.
92 Johnson, a former Whig, was a lawyer from Maryland
who specialized in constitutional law. He had participated
in much of the most important litigation of his day. There
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p. 1.
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that he wanted and needed from Bates in the form of an
93 b t .
. . 1 a t torney genera l' s opinion,
. .
o ff icia
u its con t en t is
of no more importance to this discussion than that of
works churned out by any of the other legalistic pamphleteers
who sprang to Lincoln's defense, or, for that matter, those
who took him to task.

What was significant about the

Bates' opinion was that Lincoln took a personal interest in
its preparation.

In doing so Lincoln demonstrated that he

realized that he could not forever ignore Taney, but that he
would have to answer for himself in some manner.
The last thing Taney did in court after rendering
his decision in Ex parte Merryman and promising a full
opinion, was to vow that a copy of it and the pertinent
papers would be sent directly to the president.

Immediately

after Taney filed his opinion on June 1, 1861, the clerk of
the court in Baltimore complied with Taney's order and sent
the promised documents to the White House where Lincoln's
secretaries duly noted receiving them.

They later claimed

"no attention was of course paid to the transmitted papers."
If true, this means it is possible that Lincoln saved
himself the aggravation of actually reading Taney's tedious
essay and the unwelcomed opinions and conclusions it
contained by simply ignoring it.

But as satisfying as it

93

official Opinions of the Attorneys General of
the United States, vol. 10 (Washington, D.C.: w. H. &
0 H. Morrison, 1868), pp. 74-92.
94 · 1
.
1 n, 4 : 176 .
Nico ay an d Hay, Linco

94

295
might have been for him to so slight the chief justice,
Lincoln realized that he would have to personally account
for his actions and not act through the attorney general
or any other surrogate.

The prerogative of choosing a forum

was Lincoln's, and he chose carefully.
On the Fourth of July 1861 Congress convened in
special session.

Eighty days had passed since the president

had issued the proclamation calling for this gathering,

95

but nevertheless the lawmakers behaved almost as though time
was a critical factor and organized themselves with
uncharacteristic speed.

Of course the absence of representa-

tives from the Southern states facilitated this; for the
first time in many years there were not two factions capable
of contending for positions of leadership.

The House, for

its part, elected a slate of officers on the first ballot.
By afternoon of the first day a joint committee of the House
. on t h e presi'd ent. 96
an d S enate h a db een se 1 ecte d to go an d wait
Lincoln responded with his "Message to Congress in Special
.

Session.

,,97

95 Bruce Catton commented that "they were called in
haste to convene at leisure." Bruce Catton, The Coming
Fury (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1961), p. 414.
96
97

New York Times, 6 July 1861, p. 1.

A. Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special
Session, 4 July 1861, Lincoln, Collected Works, 4:421-441.
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This Independence Day message discussed much more
than the suspension of habeas corpus.

Even insofar as

Lincoln's purpose was to explain his actions, the suspension
was but one act and Lincoln undertook to explain in general
terms almost everything he had done since his first day
in office.

However, he did give special attention to

what he referred to as the ''war power"

98

that he called

out after the fall of Fort Sumter and he recounted each
of his major strong executive responses to the secession
crisis.

None received as much attention as the suspension.

Clearly, it was of special concern to the president that
it be understood.
Lincoln did not recount these actions in chronological order.

Instead, he addressed them in an ascending

hierarchical order according to how controversial was the
constitutionality of his undertaking each.

He began with

his calling out of the militia and the declaration of a
blockade of the rebel states.

Referring to these actions,

which he undertook on April fifteenth and nineteenth
respectively, Lincoln opined "so far all was believed to
be strictly legal. 1199

As has been noted, he was unquestion-

ably in the right with regard to the militia and the courts
did eventually uphold him on the blockade.

98
99

Ibid., p. 426.
Ibid., p. 428.

297
Lincoln then skipped to his proclamation of May
third in which he called for volunteers to serve for three
years and additions to the regular Army and Navy.

Even

Lincoln realized that these actions placed him on dubious
constitutional ground.
to defend them.

However, Lincoln did not attempt

"Whether strictly legal or not," he did

not offer an opinion.

But he did insist that they "were

ventured upon, under what appeared to be a popular demand,
and a public necessity."

"Trusting

. that Congress

would readily ratify them," Lincoln as much as confessed
having violated the Constitution by trespassing on
Congress' prerogatives saying he "believed nothing has
been done beyond the constitutional competency of Congress.

100

At this point in his "Message" Lincoln went back
to the suspension of habeas corpus which he authorized
on April twenty-seventh.

This proved to be the most

controversial of his actions, certainly it was the most
constitutionally questionable.

Lincoln began by publicly

acknowledging for the first time that he had granted authority
to suspend habeas corpus, then immediately insisted that it
. d very sparing
. 1 y, "101 be f ore
h a d ac t ua 11 y b een " exercise
finally moving to defend it as best he could.

lOOibid., p. 429.
lOlibid.
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Lincoln could not directly answer his critics'
assertion that one sworn to "take care the laws be faithfully executed" should not himself violate them.

Instead,

cornered as he was, Lincoln responded as best he could with
a counter observation and a couple of rhetorical questions.
"The whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully
executed, were being resisted, and failing of execution, in
nearly one-third of the states," Lincoln noted.

This being

the case, he asked were "all the laws, but one [meaning
the Constitution's habeas corpus clause provision], to
go unexecuted, the government itself go to pieces, lest that
one be violated?

Even in such a case would not the official

oath [that of the president] be broken, if the government
should be overthrown, when it is believed that disregarding
the single law, would tend to preserve it?"

102

Although hardly apt responses to the questions before
him, these were incisive questions that Lincoln asked.

It

is regrettable that Lincoln did not undertake to answer them.
Instead, immediately after posing them, Lincoln dismissed
them as being inappropriate to the prevailing situation,
saying they were "not . . . presented."

Lincoln declared,

"it was not believed that any law was violated."lOJ

l0 2 Ibid., p. 430.
lOJibid.
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Lincoln then referred to the Constitution's habeas
corpus clause, quoting it verbatim.

To him this provision

represented authority to suspend habeas corpus in time of
rebellion.

Deciding "this was the case" and the public

safety required it, he had authorized a suspension.

"Which,

or who," Congress or the president, he believed the
Constitution intended to exercise this power Lincoln would
not say in so many words.

But by his recent actions he

obviously thought the president could.

However, on this

occasion Lincoln backed off from making any attempt to
assert the power positively for himself as president.
Instead, he insisted that the Constitution was "silent,"
as indeed strictly speaking it is.

Noting that the habeas

corpus "provision was plainly made for a dangerous emergency,"
he expressed a disbelief that the "framers . . . intended,
that in every case, the danger should run its course,
until Congress could be called together.

11104

The logical

conclusion he need not and did not bother making explicit.
Lincoln knew enough to say nothing when there was nothing
to say, or rather, to not say that which was better left
unsaid:

If Congress was indisposed and hence unable to make

a suspension when necessary, the duty had to devolve to
someone else and by default that someone might logically be
assumed to be the president.

l0 4 Ibid., pp. 430-431.
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As a lawyer on the judicial circuits of Illinois,
Lincoln came to early recognize the wisdom of never pleading
what you neednot, lest you oblige yourself to prove what you
cannot. 105

The lesson served him well on this occasion.

This was exactly what he did with regard to habeas corpus
in his Fourth of July "Message."

Unable to prove his power

to suspend by citing any specific positive authority for a
president to suspend habeas corpus, he did not claim any.
Still, while Lincoln would not concede that he had violated
the Constitution neither could he legitimatize his actions.
On the Fourth of July 1861 the best Lincoln could do was to
rationalize the suspension, because he could not defend its
constitutionality.
Within Lincoln's relatively brief remarks on habeas
corpus there exists a "curious feature" or two as remarkable
as any of those that dot Taney's Merryman opinion.

In

view of the attention those have been given, Lincoln's
deserve some examination.

Together they shed some light

on some rarely exhibited aspects of Lincoln's character.
After acknowledging the suspension, Lincoln
attempted to sugar-coat the bitter pill by assuring all
that it had been "exercised but very sparingly. 11106

Exact

105Albert A. Woldman, Lawyer Lincoln (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1936), p. 291.
106

A. Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session,
4 July 1861, Lincoln, Collected Works, 4:421-441.
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figures are difficult to assemble
case.

107

and meaningless in any

What is "spare" to one man's sensibilities can be

excessive to another's.

But regardless of the actual

number of people arbitrarily incarcerated up to this point,
and even granting that the number was small, Lincoln's statement represents a little white lie, to put it charitably.
Of course on July Fourth 1861, Lincoln had no way of knowing
that tens of thousands of Americans would be arbitrarily
arrested during the war any more than he or anyone else
could have known then that the war would drag on for years,
cost millions of dollars, and claim hundreds of thousands
of lives.

But Lincoln did know that the military was

already abusing the authority he vested in them.

At least

that seems to have been his own opinion on May seventeenth,
when he circulated a memo to his key people saying he would
"prefer" that further arrests "should cease," "unless the
necessity. . . is manifest, and urgent."

108

Plainly, this

memo and his assurances to Congress in July do not square.
Another, perhaps darker, side of Lincoln, especially
to those of a civil libertarian bent was more boldly
displayed.

Speaking of the role of the habeas corpus process

in the law and society, Lincoln seemed to forget that it was

107

For a discussion of the number of people actually
incarcerated and how that has been determined refer to:
Randall, Constitutional Problems, pp. 152-153, note 25.
l0 8A. Linco
·
1 n, Memoran d um on Mi·1·itary Arrests, 17 May
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intended as protection for the innocent and frankly declared
that "it relieves more of the guilty, than of the innocent.'~og
To him this was good reason to do away with it--if only
temporarily.

This attitude was classically conservative:

civil liberties being viewed as protection for the guilty,
limiting them does not threaten the innocent who have
nothing to fear, only the guilty who have much to hide.
Obviously Lincoln believed that unencumbered by the
restraints habeas corpus could impose, the Federal government
could root out its enemies with greater facility.

Thus,

dispensing with the execution of one law in order to promote
the execution of all the rest of the law seemed a fair
trade to him.

In this case Lincoln, a man normally respect-

ful of civil liberties was willing to risk gambling with
them.

But then he was dealing the cards.

One wonders if

Lincoln would have been so accepting of this if he, like
the rest of the people, could only play the cards he was
given.
What Lincoln in any other capacity than president
would have thought of what President Lincoln did makes for
some interesting speculation.

It probably would have

depended on what that other-than-presidential capacity was.
As a politician, Lincoln enjoyed and made frequent use of

109 A. Linco
.
l n, Message to Congress in
. Special
.
Session, 4 July 1861, Lincoln, Collected Works, 4:430.
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the prerogative of all people, but especially of women and
politicians, to change one's mind.

More than a decade

before becoming president, when he was a Congressman from
Illinois, Lincoln stood steadfastly against assumption by the
executive of powers widely considered to be essentially
legislative--the very kind of thing he admitted doing
himself in the spring of 1861.
Back in 1848 Congressman Lincoln disputed President
Polk's using the Army to involve the country in a war with
Mexico.

Polk's backers argued that a president could

authorize the invasion of an enemy nation and thereby involve
the United States in a foreign war without the consent of
Congress by styling the attack as an act of self defense.
Answering a letter from a political associate who defended
Polk, Lincoln sought to explain to the correspondent the
error of his ways:
The provision of the Constitution giving the warmaking power to Congress, was dictated, as I understand it, by the following reasons. Kings had
always been involving and impoverishing their
people in wars, pretending generally, if not always,
that the good of the people was the object. This,
our [Constitutional] Convention understood to be the
most oppressive of all Kingly oppressions; and they
resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one
man should hold the power of bringing this oppression
upon us. But your view destroys the whole matter,
and plfIOs our President where kings have always
stood.

llO A. L1nco
·
1 n to W. Hern d on, 18 Fe b ruary 18 4 8,
Lincoln, Collected Works, 1:451-452.
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Admittedly the circumstances differed between 1848
and 1861, if only in that Lincoln had now become president
himself.

But the central issue--whether the Constitution

makers had intended that one man, the president, could under
any circumstances in times of emergency exercise the war
powers

ostensibly belonging to Congress--was the same.

The particulars were not identical, but they were passably
analogous.

Polk used the Army as a weapon against Mexico

without a declaration of war from Congress because he
imagined an emergency to exist; Lincoln used arbitrary
arrests as a weapon against secessionist sympathizers without
a suspension of habeas corpus by Congress because he
imagined an emergency to exist.

In both instances both

presidents were incontrovertibly exercising war powers
normally associated with Congress.

Lincoln himself said

of suspending habeas corpus and the other measures undertaken that he had "called out the war power of the
Government."

In 1861 Lincoln as much as admitted that he

had taken it upon himself to stand, as he said in 1848,
"where kings have always stood."
Lincoln excused his presidential poaching on
Congressional prerogatives by pleading "popular demand,
.
.
,,111
an d . . . pu bl 1c necessity.

Indeed, the overwhelming

popularity of his strong response to the secession crisis

111A. Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session,
Lincoln, Collected Works, 4:372.
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after the fall of Sumter is beyond question, even if it
cannot be objectively quantified.

However, the public

necessity of some of the measures Lincoln undertook,
including especially suspending habeas corpus, is
subjective and highly debatable.
probably debatable to no end.
the point.

Unfortunately it is

That, however, is not

The point is when he suspended habeas corpus

Lincoln assumed the position "where kings have always
stood."

Lincoln had behaved no differently than Louis

Napoleon, except that instead of drawing his authority from
the might of the military, Lincoln's came from the consent
of the people.

But tyranny, in the form of arbitrary

arrests or otherwise, is no less odious when popular
than when not and in any case is antithetic to law in
general and the Constitution in particular.
Abraham Lincoln was hardly a tyrant,
not in the classic sense.

112

certainly

There was, for example, no

brutality about his oppression of John Merryman.

It ill

serves justice or history to portray Lincoln in terms of
evilness or malevolence.

By mid-nineteenth century

standards (and much more those of the twentieth century),
Lincoln conducted his government's internal security
operations in a humane, civilized manner.

He established

no mechanism to permanently silence those who he conceived

112

Randall, "Lincoln as Dictator."
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to be his enemies.

John Merryman and others of his ilk

were not systematically advanced from their cells to
the gallows, guillotine, or gas chamber.
Although no one's life was taken, personal liberty
was denied without proper legal process.

Lincoln paid

as much lip service to individual rights and personal
liberties as the next politician, but he, like all
politicians, should be judged by his actions in particular
instances not his words on isolated occasions.

The fact

is in this instance Lincoln authorized the suspension of
habeas corpus that led to the arbitrary arrest and confinement of various individuals (most especially John Merryman)
in direct contravention and denial of their constitutional
rights.

Lincoln himself never attempted to deny his

personal role--that would have been untenable.

Quite the

opposite, in the rough draft of his "Message to Congress
in Special Session" when discussing

the

suspension of

habeas corpus Lincoln used the personal pronoun "I"
.
.
113
t h irteen times.

Recast in language more befitting a

state document these "I"s were eliminated thus diluting the
sense of personal responsibility that Lincoln actually felt.
In any case, Lincoln had an excuse for his actions.
He believed that the exigent circumstances of war to
suppress a rebellion enlarged his powers as president and

113 A
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commander-in-chief.

Control over the war was his and it

extended not just over his army and the enemy (to the extent
that his army would enforce it) but also over the civilian
population.

Unavoidable innocent incidental casualties

of his war--be they the loss of people's property, lives,
or liberties--were regretted by Lincoln, but that was the
extent of it.

In sum, Lincoln acted as though it was more

important to preserve the union of the states than uphold
the constitution that created it.

CONCLUSION
The conflict between the two central figures of
the Merryman affair--Chief Justice Roger B. Taney and
President Abraham Lincoln--has been compared to that typical
of classic Greek tragic theatre.

Taney's struggles, like

those of any stock Greek tragic hero, "were completely
unavailing to avert the fate to which the protaganists
were predestined, .
ineffective."

they . . . were foredoomed to be

Lincoln, "like the gods on Olympus," could

afford to simply respond with "indifference."

Meanwhile,

the "sympathy of the community" lay with Taney in much the
same way as "the pity and sympathy of the chorus" lay with
the tragic hero, although as always it had no effect on the
foreordained outcome.

1

Although appealingly literate, the analogy to Greek
tragic theater in this form has obvious flaws.

For one, at

the time of the Merryman affair the sympathy of the
community was not necessarily with Taney, at least insofar
as contemporary nationwide

press

response would indicate.

But much worse was the disparity in the choice of analogous

1

W. Marbury, Remarks, 28 May 1961, in Lewis and
Marbury, "Ex parte Merryman," pp. 392-393.
308

309
characters:

Taney cast as a mere mortal, while Lincoln was

elevated to Olympian godhood.

Although originally intended

to be sympathetic toward Taney, this specific analogy was
nevertheless in this latter aspect unintentionally demeaning
of him.

To accord Lincoln god-like status while consigning

Taney to mortality is pejorative, slights Taney, and lacks
any semblance of historiographical objectivity.
Unfortunately this unfair comparison of Taney to
Lincoln is sadly typical of the overwhelming reverence with
which Lincoln has been traditionally treated.

If ever

Americans have moved in the direction of deification they
have done so with Abraham Lincoln.

2

More has been written

about him than any other character in the history of the
United States,perhaps even the world, with the exception of
Jesus of Nazareth.

3

'One can only sample the enormous

literature on Lincoln. 14

Biographies are numerous, other

books and articles innumerable, and virtually all of his
known writings have been collected.

5

Carl Sandburg's

multivolume work is a poet's paean to America's political
man-god; his marble icon sits in the national capital;
Ford's theatre in Washington, D.C. and Lincoln's house
in Springfield, Illinois are maintained as national shrines.
2 spector, "Polarization," pp. 199-200.
3woldman, Lawyer Lincoln, p. 1.
4 John Garrity quoted by Spector, "Polarization,"
p. 200, note 2.
5 Lincoln, Collected Works.
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Even his death, perhaps especially this, his martyr's
death--violent as it was at the hands of his enemies, at
the peak of his power after winning his great victory-contributed to Lincoln's being elevated above his
presidential contemporaries, predecessors, and successsors.
If deification is too strong a term it can at least be
said that he has been moved toward canonization and is well
on his way toward achieving something akin to political
sainthood.
Unfortunately, Lincoln's superhuman image can be
a great hindrance to understanding him (in that it sometimes
transcends reality and occasionally intimidates) and an
even greater impediment to appreciating those who surrounded
him, including Taney.
not peculiar to Taney.

The problem of Lincoln's image is
Much of the literature pertaining

to any of the plethora of historical figures contemporary
to Lincoln--Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan, William H.
Seward, Benjamin Wade, and Stephen Douglas to name but a
few--has centered around how and to what extent they agreed
with him in word or deed.

6

In the extreme, some of these

men have all but lost their individual identity by virtue
of their association with Lincoln.
example.

Edward Bates is a good

His biographer almost reduces a multi-faceted

(if admittedly hardly scintillating) life to a single

6

Spector, "Polarization," pp. 200.
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aspect--his association with Lincoln--beginning with the
title:

Lincoln's Attorney General: Edward Bates of

Missouri. 7

But whereas Bates has become a mere adjunct

to Lincoln, Taney has been perceived as an obstacle to
Lincoln and a patently hostile figure.
Small wonder that compared to Lincoln's, Taney's
memory has not fared well.
apologetic (except Tyler's) ,

Biographies have been largely
8

his writings have not been

collected, and his house in Frederick, Maryland which was
once maintained by a local historical society has been
closed "for lack of funds and probably interest. 119

In the

end Taney died a forlorn and largely unmourned man only
months before Lincoln was assassinated.

He was probably

the only chief justice to die in office whose funeral was
not attended by the president who would appoint his
successor.

10

Ironically, Taney--the conscientious jurist who was
ever respectful of individual rights and liberties--has
come to be tagged in the popular mind with an image befitting
the unflattering appelation the "Unjust Judge," while
7cain, Lincoln's Attorney General, Edward Bates of
Missouri.
8Tyler, Memoir; Swisher, R. B. Taney; Smith,
Jacksonian Jurist, Lewis, Without Fear or Favor; Steiner,
Life of R. B. T ..
9 spector, "Polarization," p. 200.
10

Bates, Diary, p. 419.

312
Lincoln--the imprisoner of thousands of individuals without
benefit of legal recourse--has come down as the "Great
.
..11
Emancipator.
Popular images and erroneous, prejudiced interpretations aside, Taney and Lincoln were in fact similar in many
respects, yet also dissimilar.

Both were born in the

Southern border states but while Taney lived out his life
in and around Maryland, Lincoln spent most of his out West
in Illinois.

Both came from English ancestry but Taney's

forefathers prospered and became aristocrats among the
tidewater tobacco growers, while Lincoln's father was
a pioneering dirt farmer.

Both men were tall and gaunt but

while Lincoln was physically strong, Taney was inordinately
weak throughout his long life.

Both possessed first rate

minds but Taney had the benefit of a formal education,
while Lincoln was largely self educated.

Both became

successful lawyers but while Lincoln had a general practice
Taney devoted himself to the specialized field of constitutional law.

As for dissimilarities, Lincoln was an

agnostic Protestant and Taney a devout Catholic; and Taney
once owned slaves, while Lincoln never did.

At the same

time both were superb writers, neither was an especially
gifted orator, and while both were politicians neither was
particularly successful in elections.

Yet despite this

11 Spector, "Polarization," p. 201-202.
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last common trait, Lincoln did win election as president
and Taney was confirmed as chief justice of the Supreme
Court.

12

Thus at the time that they came into conflict

over the suspension of habeas corpus Lincoln as president
and Taney as chief justice were similar in that they each
held one of the two highest offices the Constitution
allowed an individual.
Returning to the comparison of the Lincoln-Taney
struggle to the conflict in classic Greek tragedy tragic
theatre, there is a more apt analogy that can be made if it
is done with care and specificity.

A particular Greek

tragedy comes to mind, one by the master dramatist Aeschelus
entitled Prometheus Bound in which two Olympian figures,
Zeus and Prometheus, conflict over the latter's giving
of the gift of fire to mankind.
Prometheus

For this generous bestowal

was punished by an angered Zeus who bound him

in fetters to a rock so that his ever regenerating liver
could be daily gnawed on by a ravenous eagle. 13

Many

are the analogous points between the conflict in this
classic play and the conflict played out between Lincoln and
Taney, but none is more germane to this discussion than the
relative equality of status between the two mythic

12

spector, "Polarization," pp. 202-203; Thomas,
Abraham Lincoln; Lewis, Without Fear or Favor."
13

Aeschelus, Prometheus Bound, opening scene.
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Zeus and Prometheus were both gods of the

protagonists.
Greek pantheon.

Lincoln and Taney each headedoneof the

three co-equal branches of the federal government.

To

compare Lincoln to Zeus is natural and valid, but to place
Taney on the mortal level is fallacious.

His analogous

character should be someone nearer whatever level Lincoln
is assigned.

If Lincoln is to be Zeus, then Taney should

be Prometheus because Taney and Lincoln were on a
constitutional par comparable to the pantheonic par of
Prometheus and Zeus.
Once the premise for this analogy has been laid out
and accepted other parallelisms between the situations
of Lincoln and Taney and Zeus and Prometheus become
apparent.

Like Lincoln, Zeus was young, new at his job,

and willing to flex his cosmic muscles.

Both Lincoln and

Zeus were attempting to assert themselves in an effort to
maintain control over difficult situations and both were
willing to use force to get their way or punish those who
they conceived to be aligned against them.

Along the way

these two came to accept that being chief god of the
Greek pantheon or president of the United States could
involve

some

ruthlessness.

Taney's position, like

Prometheus' stand on the side of mortal folk, resulted in
involvement in a contest pitting reason and law against
overwhelming force.

As Prometheus stood for reasonableness

and orderliness, Taney stood for the rule of the law.
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Both of them believed that intelligent reason, not brute
force, would, or at least should, govern their respective
.
14
universes.
In any case Taney's point of view regarding the
Merryman matter and the suspension of habeas corpus was not
the result of stupidity or inability to see what Lincoln
saw--an immediate threat to the Union.

Lincoln and Taney

differed in that Taney took a longer view, one that has
become increasingly significant and insightful in the latter
decades of the twentieth century.

15

Ex parte Merryman,

per se, was a civil liberties case replete with as many
implications for the future of individual liberties in the
United States as any, but in a greater sense the struggle
between Lincoln and Taney was essentially constitutional and
involved the defining or redefining of the basic structure
of the governmental system--the relationship between the
three ostensibly coordinate and coequal branches.

Lincoln

wanted to plow new constitutional ground by expanding the
powers of the president in times of emergency to include
assuming from Congress the power to suspend habeas corpus
during rebellion as he saw fit.

Meanwhile, Taney sought to

14

The interpretation of Prometheus is based on that
in an essay by Rex Williams in R. L. Lind, ed., Ten Greek
Plays (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), pp. 3-5; Spector,
"Polarization," p. 201.
15

Spector, "Polarization," p. 201.
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hold inviolate his ground that only Congress could authorize
a suspension of habeas corpus, that the president had no
special powers in times of emergency, and that all presidential acts were liable to judicial review and censure if
found to be unconstitutional.

Essentially, Lincoln

attempted to expand the power of the president in what he
judged to be an emergency at the expense of Congress and
without regard for the Constitution or the judiciary, while
Taney protested that expansion.

Today, more than a century

later, the seemingly ever expanding role and powers of the
presidency can, and have on occasion, threatened the
liberty and freedom of individuals as definitely, if not
as dramatically, as Lincoln's arrest and incarceration of
John Merryman.

The great danger implicit in Lincoln's

action is that from the moment he took it future presidents
were more likely to interpret it as a precedent to be
imitated than an exceptional circumstance not to be emulated.
This danger has been made evident by the actions
of some of Lincoln's successors.

Richard Nixon recalled

quite clearly Abraham Lincoln's words on one occasion when
Lincoln was attempting to justify his resort to extraconstitutional acts, such as his suspension of habeas corpus.
In an interview with David Frost, ex-President Nixon
defended the various and sundry questionably legal acts of
his administration in combating opposition to the war in
Vietnam and an earlier statement to a Senate committee in
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which he wrote:

'It is quite obvious that there are certain

inherently government activities, which, if undertaken by
the sovereign in protection of the interests of the nation's
security are lawful, but which if undertaken by private
persons, are not.'

Nixon sought to defend all this by

quoting Lincoln as accurately as many Republicans at a
Lincoln Day dinner.

Referring explicitly to the statement

quoted above, Nixon began with an obligatory "Well," then
proceeded to explain that what he "at root . . . had in
mind was perhaps much better stated by Lincoln during the
War between the States."
Lincoln:

Then came Nixon's quotation of

'Action which otherwise would be unconstitutional,

could become lawful if undertaken for the purpose of
preserving the Constitution and the Nation.•

16

Richard Nixon was hardly an historian of the calibre
of some of his predecessors such as Woodrow Wilson or even

16

A transcript of the interview was printed in the
New York Times, 20 May 1977, p. 16. Nixon's quotation of
Lincoln was very close to what Lincoln wrote to A. Hodges on
14 April 1864. Lincoln's letter appears in Lincoln, Collected
Works, 7:281.
Nixon's Quotation
Lincoln's Words
'Action which otherwise
would be unconstitutional,
could become lawful if
undertaken for the purpose
of preserving the Constitution and the Nation.'

"Measures, otherwise
unconstitutional,
might become lawful by
becoming indispensable to
the preservation of the
Constitution, through the
preservation of the Nation."
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John Kennedy, 17 but he did know that history could be more
than just relating events from the past.

18

His citation

of Lincoln on this occasion mildly shocked his interviewer
who responded by asking Nixon how he could compare the
situation he faced regarding Vietnam with that Lincoln
faced regarding the Civil War.

Nixon replied by contending

that the nation "was torn apart in an ideological way by
the war in Vietnam as much as the Civil War tore apart the
Nation."

As for the larger issue of a president's

violating people's civil liberties and thereby apparently
setting himself above the law, Nixon agreed that there was
"nothing specific that the Constitution contemplates in
that respect."

Then after admitting that he had not read

''every word, every jot and every little title," Nixon, in a
manner that made it clear that he embraced it, adverted to
the argument that had been made "that as far as a President
is concerned that in war time, a President does have
certain extraordinary powers which would make acts that
would otherwise be unlawful, lawful if undertaken for the
purpose of preserving the nation and the Constitution."

19

His words rang Lincolnesque.

17

woodrow Wilson, A History of the American People
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1902); John F. Kennedy,
Profiles in Courage (New York: Harper & Row, 1956).
18 · h d N'
h Memoirs
.
. h ar d Nixon
.
Ric ar
ixon, Te
o f Ric
(New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 15.
19

New York Times, 20 May 1977, p. 16.
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Whatever one's opinion as to the parallelism of
the two situations, it must be admitted that the constitutionality of the practices of both Lincoln and Nixon are
highly suspect.

In any case the extent of the emergency

powers that a president might invoke is not a matter of
settled law.

20

Pending some clarification, only protests

against such extraordinary assumptions of power by presidents
whenever they occur will keep such extraordinary assumptions
of power by presidents from becoming common.

Lincoln's

actions encouraged Nixon's, even if they did not actually
inspire them.

Taney deserves credit for having the

Prometheus-like courage and forethought (coincidentally
the name Prometheus means forethought) to act on his
convictions--to sound an alarm warning of executive
encroachment and self aggrandizement on the part of
President Lincoln.
Any temptation to style Taney a perfect hero in the
struggle between him and Lincoln must be sternly resisted.

As

Prometheus was to Aeschelus, Taney was to Lincoln; he was simply

20

with regard to Lincoln, Taney's opinion in
Ex parte Merryman is not authoritative being the opinion
of only one justice. However, the position he assumed would
seem to have been upheld in Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall
2 (1861).
"The Constitution of the United States is a law
for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and
covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men,
at all times and under all circumstances. No doctrine
involving more pernicious consequences was ever invented by
the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be
suspended during any of the great exigencies of government.
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not the perfect hero.

The poet Shelley has made Prometheus

a cosmic revolutionary and hero to many in a way that
Aeschelus never would have countenanced.

21

There is no

desire here to idealize Taney in that manner.

It should

be enough that right would seem to have been on his side
as it was on Prometheus', and to note that Lincoln behaved
as Zeus behaved--"by all human standards . . . monstrously."
Traditionally judges, like Taney, are supposed to
base their decisions not on what they believe the law
should be but on what they perceive to have been the
intention of the lawmakers.
way.

This had always been Taney's

This was why he ruled as he did in Ex parte

Merryman, Dred Scott, and a host of other cases.

Viewing

the law in this manner leads unavoidable to a strict
interpretation of the Constitution.

The catch about

strictly interpreting the Constitution based on what its
creators intended is that it ties one to the past, or,
more accurately and hopefully,thewisdorn and forethought of
the past.

Taney just happened to be comfortable with the

Constitution as it was written.

Unfortunately, problems

develop when new realities outstrip old law.

Taney's

tragedy was that the nation, whatever it had been, was

21
22

Rex Warner in Lind, Ten Greek Plays, p. 4.
rbid.

22
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changing yet he stuck with his narrow interpretation of the
Constitution at a time when it was no longer as socially
23
acceptable as it had been.
After a war the victors write the history books,
observed one recent biographer of Taney four years before
his book was published.

After the Civil War, he went on,

this meant "New Englanders" who, in his estimation, treated
Taney "less than kind" while elevating Lincoln to
"greatness.''

24

All of this is true, but it ignores the fact

that the losers--those that survived--also wrote books,
including Jefferson Davis himself.

25

The difference is that

more people tend to read and pay more attention to winners
than losers.

In any case, the point is that the military

outcome of the Civil War really settled nothing except which
side could muster and equip the superior army.

All the

fighting did was to destroy the capability and will of the
South to resist the North.

Logically and intellectually

it is a truism that just because "one cannot physically
resist does not mean that one's argument has no validity. 1126

23

Spector, "Polarization," pp. 212-213.

24

w. Lesis, Remarks, 28 May 1961, in Lewis and
Marbury, "Ex parte Merryman," p. 391; Lewis, Without Fear
or Favor.
25

Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the
Confederate Government (New York: D. Appleton, 1881).
26

Spector, "Polarization," p. 201.
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The Civil War did change certain practices and circumstances
but it did not settle, at least at historical levels, the
debate over the nature of sovereignty in the United States,
whether secession is constitutional, or what the Constitution
originally intended about slavery or who could suspend
habeas corpus in times of rebellion.

The failure of one

side or the other to gain a military triumph does not
necessarily indicate an intellectual failing of the
ideology for which it fought.

Just because Lincoln emerged

victorious while Taney was shamed does not make Lincoln's
position regarding the suspension of habeas corpus absolutely
superior to Taney's.

Unfortunately, there is a tendency to

view everything about Lincoln in a shaft of golden light
as a result of the eventual military outcome of the great
struggle that was just beginning when John Merryman was
jailed.
However, with regard to Lincoln's authorizing the
suspension of habeas corpus there is no light or perspective
that does not show plainly that he transgressed the
Constitution.

Earlier herein it was demonstrated that the

writers and ratifiers of the Constitution, the first in
all probability and more importantly the latter almost
certainly, intended to place the power to suspend habeas
corpus in times of rebellion or invasion in the hands of
Congress and Congress alone.

27

Nevertheless, Lincoln

27 This point was discussed in chap. IV, "An Understanding of the Habeas Corpus Clause," pp. 30-47 above.
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expropriated that power for himself as president.

He had

his excuse--necessity--but Lincoln could only rationalize,
not justify his actions in the light of the law.
Lincoln interpreted the Constitution broadly and
in a manner completely opposite to Taney.

While Taney

argued the meaning of the Constitution on the basis of
what the Founding Fathers intended, Lincoln viewed it on
the basis of what he thought it had become after almost
three-quarters of a century of use.

To one of Lincoln's

mind the Constitution was not something static but a dynamic
document that changed over time in response to social,
economic, and even political circumstances.

The difference

was while Taney was content with the wisdom of the past,
Lincoln was intent on incorporating whatever wisdom came
along.
The government of the United States under the
Constitution of 1787 is approaching its bicentennial year.
The world in which the Constitution functions today is a
far different place than that in which it was forged.
Situations

and circumstances have changed but so has the

Constitution.

If it had not been so, government under it

might not have lasted even until Lincoln's time, much less
until when a two hundredth anniversary celebration would be
in the offing.
But change of the Constitution must be accomplished
by constitutional means.

The document can and has been
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amended in two ways:

One is the formal process of

amendment with its various procedures as spelled out in
the Constitution's fifth article.

It can also be amended

less formally but just as legitimately through reinterpretation and usage--provided that the new practices are
approved by the judiciary.

The situation is as Charles

Evans Hughes once declared:

"We are under a Constitution,

but it is what the judges say it is."

28

The executive is

no more to be entrusted with judging the Constitution it
will execute than it is to be trusted with judging the
validity of arrests it has undertaken.

In either case

there would be an intermingling of executive and judicial
functions completely undermining of the Constitution's
doctrine of tripartite government.

When the executive has

judged itself, its judgments have, not surprisingly, tended
to be self-serving.

Abraham Lincoln concluded, "in my

Opl·n1·on I v1·01ated no law."
"I am not a crook.''

30

29

Ri'chard Ni'xon procla1·med ,

Obviously the executive is ill-suited

28

c. E. Hughes, Speech at Elmira New York, 3 May
1907, quoted in Bergen Evans, ed., Dictionary of Quotations
(New York: Delacorte Press, 1968), p. 378.
29 A. Linco
,
1 n,

'
•
1
Message to Congress in
Specia
Session," 4 July 1861, Lincoln, Collected Works, 4:176-177.

30

II

R. Nixon, Question and Answer Session before the
National Conference of Associated Press Managing Editors,
17 November 1973, reprinted in Mercer Cross and Elder Wit,
eds., Watergate: Chronology of a Crisis (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly, 1975), p. 440.
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for objective, critical self appraisal.

If it is allowed to

be, the situation is akin to that of the fox guarding the
proverbial hen house.
Thoughtful people, even those who supported Lincoln,
found what he did with habeas corpus incredible even at the
time.

Late in 1861 one man observed that "Civil War and

Revolution start strange topics of discussion" but none
seemed more unbelievable to him than the suspension of
habeas corpus:
If any one, whether lawyer or layman . . . who had
ever given thought to the American Government, had
been told so lately as . . . 1860, that at this day
we would be discussing the question of the rightful
power of the president of the United States to arrest
and imprison its citizens at its discretion, what would
have such auditor said? Would any earthly information
have convinced him that such futurity was close at
hand? 31
The apparent popularity of what Lincoln did with
habeas corpus has been conceded.

Actually in absolute

terms it is very difficult to objectively gauge because it
was so entangled with the great patriotic outpouring with
which the war began.

In any case, Lincoln must be given

credit for disguising what he wanted with popular demand.
It is the mark of all who have successfully dabbled in
autocracy before him from Augustus to Napoleon.

For what-

ever reason, be it political acume.n or simple good luck,

31

Edward Ingersoll, Personal Liberty and Martial
Law (Philadelphia: C. Sherman & Son, 1862), p. 1.
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Lincoln had the mass of people on his side when he arrested
John Merryman and defied Roger Taney.
However in the United States what might be popular
at a given moment (assuming that can be determined) and,
perhaps, even necessary (a very subjective judgment) should
not necessarily come to be if it conflicts with established
constitutional law.
path.

The Constitution may block the popular

Of course any obstacle can be removed by constitu-

tional means, but until that is done the Constitution is not
something to be blithely construed as even a majority of
the people might wish at a given moment.
Nevertheless Lincoln did in fact suspend habeas
corpus and arbitrarily jail people in apparent contravention
of the Constitution and with the support of the people.
Taney's protest did in fact fall flat with the public.

And
In

effect President Lincoln attempted to amend the Constitution
by executive fiat supported by popular demand.

But if this

is to be then why the written Constitution with its
deliberate process of amendment?

POSTSCRIPT
John Merryman did not spend much time in the
guardhouse at Fort McHenry.

The Lincoln administration's

first impulse was to release him, and it probably would have
done so almost immediately if he had not challenged it by
suing out his writ of habeas corpus.

1

At no time, but

especially early in the war, did the government have any
desire to make anyone a martyr.

Later on others would spend

much longer terms under much worse conditions.

John

Merryman was released after forty-nine days of relatively
comfortable confinement.

2

In the wake of a Fourth of July interview with
Merryman,

3

Secretary of War Cameron through Attorney General

Bates ordered that he be turned over to civilian authorities.
The deal was that Merryman would be remanded to the marshal

1

New York Times, 4 June 1861, p. l; S. T. Wallis to
J. A. Pearce, 18 July 1861, Bernard Steiner, "James Alfred
Pearce," Maryland Historical Magazine 19 (1924) :24-25.
211 Report of Prisoners Taken, Released and Remaining

Since March 4, 1861 at Fort McHenry, Md.," ORR, ser. 2,
2:226; New York Evening Post, 3 June 1861, ~ 2 .
3 Lewis, Without Fear or Favor, p. 453; S. T. Wallis
to J. A. Pearce, 18 July 1861, Steiner, "Pearce," pp. 24-25.
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of the federal district court in Baltimore when that
officer presented a warrant for his arrest on charges of
treason.

4

On Saturday 13 July 1861, before Judge Giles

of the district court, Merryman was transferred to the
control of the civil process.

According to the bargain,

the clerk of the court had prepared a warrant for Merryman's
arrest and Judge Giles had signed an indictment against
him for treason.

On the motion of Merryman's lawyer,

George Gill, the court admitted him to bail set at the
considerable sum of $40,000.

Judge Giles allowed Merryman

$20,000 on personal recognizance and the rest was immediately
put up in joint security by four men.

One of these was

Charles Ridgely, Merryman's superior officer in the Horse
Guard.

Once the arrangements were concluded, Merryman was

released "to the cordial greetings of his numerous friends
and acquaintances."

Almost immediately he left for his

home,the "Hayfields. 115
Merryman was to have appeared before the November
term of the district court for trial.

He was spared because

the government recognized that its case was weak and they
feared defeat.

Even Attorney General Bates, who would have

4

E. Bates to W. Addison, 12 July 1861, Atty. Gen.
Letterbooks.
5 Baltimore Sun 15 July 1861, p. l; Bench Warrant,
Indictment for Treason and Bail Contract, 13 July 1861, all
in case file U.S. vs. John Merryman.
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loved to have prosecuted a few of the "most 'pestilent
fellows,'" conceded that it was "better to let twenty of
the guilty go free than be defeated in a single case. 116
The government also believed that in Baltimore a fair trial
was impossible for the time being.

7

As were many other cases, Merryman's was kept on the
docket from term to term throughout the war.

However, the

upper echelons of the Lincoln administration generally
showed little enthusiasm for pursuing such matters beyond
this point but on occasion some renegade underling would.

8

In Merryman's case it was an ambitious new district attorney
in Baltimore.

Fortunately for Merryman, between Judge Giles

and Chief Justice Taney his efforts were repeatedly foiled.
Although Merryman was indicted for a second time in July
1863, his trial on all charges was continually delayed. 9
Eventually on 23 April 1867, exactly six years to the day
after he burned the bridges and cut the telegraph along

6

E. Bates to A. Jones, 1 July 1861, Atty. Gen.
Letterbooks.
7

Appraisal of Gen. N. D. Banks who succeeded Gen.
Cadwalader in commanding the Dept. of Annapolis expressed
in N. D. Banks to E. Townsend, 13 July 1861, ORR, ser. 2,
1:587.
8

9

Randall, ''Lincoln Dictator," pp. 241-243, 244-245.

rndictment of J. Merryman, 28 July 1863, U.S. vs.
John Merryman; Swisher, R. B. Taney, p. 559; Hyman, Perfect
Union, pp. 234-235; Lewis, Without Fear or Favor, pp. 453454.
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the Northern Central Railroad, John Merryman was officially
relieved from jeopardy for his actions.

On order of the

attorney general's office in Washington in response to a
letter from another new district attorney in Baltimore,
permission was granted for the clerk of the district court
to enter a "nolle prosequi" in the case file of the U.S. vs.
John Merryman.

10

The case was closed.

It can not be said that John Merryman was an
ungrateful man.

In the interim he had named his fifth son

and ninth child Roger Brooke Taney Merryman.

11

lOM. F. Pleasants to A. S. Ridgely, 22 April 1867,
and "Nolle Prosequi," 23 April 1867, U.S. vs. John Merryman.
A "nolle prosequi" is ''a formal entry upon the record, by
. . . the prosecuting officer in a criminal action .
by which he declares that he 'will not further prosecute'
the case: see Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1198.
11

Culver, "Merryman Family," p. 297.
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